Inhouse counsel: Difference between revisions

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{{a|people|[[File:Legal eagle.jpg|450px|thumb|center|A [[legal eagle]] yesterday.]]}}{{d|Inhouse counsel|/ˈɪnhaʊs ˈkaʊns(ə)l/|n|}}
{{a|people|{{image|legal eagle|png|Know me by this name: EAGLE NINJA.}}}}{{d|Inhouse counsel|/ˈɪnhaʊs ˈkaʊns(ə)l/|n|}}


A peculiar breed of [[flannelwright]] whose chief expertise resides in:
A peculiar breed of [[flannelwright]] whose chief expertise resides in:
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The person who proves best at this behaviour over a sustained period of time gets to be [[general counsel]].
The person who proves best at this behaviour over a sustained period of time gets to be [[general counsel]].


Inhouse counsel are different from normal lawyers: more work-shy, less heroic about the number of hours, on the bounce, they can remain engaged in utter tedium without collapsing and being stretchered out. But then, without the time and attendance yardstick, the sole dimension of sustained concentration when gripped in the jaws of boredom and confusion is no great advantage.  
Inhouse counsel are different from [[Outhouse counsel|outhouse lawyers]]: more work-shy; less heroic about the number of hours on the bounce they can ensure catatonic [[tedium]] before being stretchered out.  


In this and many other ways their incentives are inverted. Where a [[private practice lawyer]] is a profit centre: one that profits from ''discord'' — the more of it, and the longer it takes to untangle, the better — an in-house lawyer resolutely is ''not''. Inhouse counsel don’t generate revenue: they can’t — they are not ''allowed'' to. They ''cost'' revenue. This is not just by coincidence: the [[legal department]] is by its very ''[[ontology]]'' a cost centre. This does not stop giddy [[general counsel]], [[from time to time]], alighting on the idea that perhaps they might like to be a profit centre. To be sure, this would be an excellent corrective to the unimaginative disposition usually held by the [[chief operating office]] when it holds the legal function in contemplation: that it is a blight, a cost, a drag and, at the end of the day, a roadblock: a costly department stocked with expensive professionals whose main talent seems to be devising creative ways of saying “''no''”.
=== The difficult subject of [[value]] ===
But then, without the [[time and attendance]] yardstick, the sole dimension of “sustained concentration whilst gripped by the jaws of [[boredom]] and confusion” is no great advantage.  


“But many of our lawyers are commercial and creative, and they ''do'' contribute to the successful execution of banking deal flow.” Indeed; this is quite so. “So, why should we not be credited with our contribution?”
Undoubtedly, there are better ways of describing a lawyer’s worth than simple time spent, though that is not to say anyone in the legal team has yet nutted out what they are.


There are many simple, axiomatic answers to this question: the importance of segregating those divisions whose primary mandate is defensive from those whose role is to seek out reward — that kind of thing. But one can quickly become bogged down with distracting details  and lose sight of the wood for all the argumentative trees. An easier way of remembering and shutting off this debate before it gets going is the single word: “[[Enron]]”. That is what happens when you turn a risk control function into a profit center.
In this and many other ways are the [[Private practice lawyer|outhouse]] and inhouse incentives inversions of each other. Where a [[private practice lawyer]] is a ''[[profit centre]]'' — one who profits from ''discord'': the more of it, and the longer it takes to untangle, the better — an inhouse legal eagle resolutely is ''not''. Inhouse counsel ''don’t'' generate revenue: they can’t — they are not ''allowed'' to. They ''cost'' revenue. This is not just by coincidence, but design: the [[legal department]] is by its very ''[[ontology]]'' a [[cost centre]].  


There is a cautionary tale the JC has a
This does not stop starry-eyed [[general counsel]], [[from time to time]], wishing their department ''could'' be a [[profit centre]], of course. 
 
To be sure, this would be an excellent corrective to the [[chief operating office]]’s disposition when it beholds the legal function: that it is a blight, a [[Cost reduction|cost]], a drag and, at the end of the day, a roadblock: a department stocked with expensive professionals whose main talent seems to be coming up with creative ways to say “''no''”. 
 
“But many of our lawyers are commercial and creative, and they ''do'' contribute to the successful execution of banking deal flow,” the [[General counsel|GC]] will think to herself. She may even articulate this to her management committee, and they will agree: inhouse lawyers are frequently vital. “So, why should we not be credited with our contribution?”
 
Here, if she is lucky, a brave soul on that committee will object: for it is easy to be carried away, but there are many simple, axiomatic answers to this question: the importance of segregating those whose mandate is ''defensive'' from those whose role is to seek out reward — that kind of thing. One can quickly become bogged down with distracting details and lose sight of the wood for all the argumentative trees.
 
But there is a single word which should bring a GC to her senses if carried away with such a frolicsome idea: “[[Enron|''Enron'']]”. ''[[Enron Corporation|Enron]]'' is what happens when you try to turn a [[control function]] into a [[profit centre]].


{{sa}}
{{sa}}
*[[Time and attendance]]
*[[Inhouse legal team of the year]]
*[[Inhouse legal team of the year]]
*[[Circle of escalation]]
*[[Circle of escalation]]

Latest revision as of 11:07, 9 November 2022

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Inhouse counsel
/ˈɪnhaʊs ˈkaʊns(ə)l/ (n.)

A peculiar breed of flannelwright whose chief expertise resides in:

(i) knowing enough about the law to frame a sensible question about it for someone else, but disclaiming enough knowledge to competently answer the question by herself; and
(ii) having the tactical acumen to throw just such a hospital pass without anyone twigging that she has done it.

You can find detailed criteria — what it takes to excel at the job of steering emails — here.

The person who proves best at this behaviour over a sustained period of time gets to be general counsel.

Inhouse counsel are different from outhouse lawyers: more work-shy; less heroic about the number of hours on the bounce they can ensure catatonic tedium before being stretchered out.

The difficult subject of value

But then, without the time and attendance yardstick, the sole dimension of “sustained concentration whilst gripped by the jaws of boredom and confusion” is no great advantage.

Undoubtedly, there are better ways of describing a lawyer’s worth than simple time spent, though that is not to say anyone in the legal team has yet nutted out what they are.

In this and many other ways are the outhouse and inhouse incentives inversions of each other. Where a private practice lawyer is a profit centre — one who profits from discord: the more of it, and the longer it takes to untangle, the better — an inhouse legal eagle resolutely is not. Inhouse counsel don’t generate revenue: they can’t — they are not allowed to. They cost revenue. This is not just by coincidence, but design: the legal department is by its very ontology a cost centre.

This does not stop starry-eyed general counsel, from time to time, wishing their department could be a profit centre, of course.

To be sure, this would be an excellent corrective to the chief operating office’s disposition when it beholds the legal function: that it is a blight, a cost, a drag and, at the end of the day, a roadblock: a department stocked with expensive professionals whose main talent seems to be coming up with creative ways to say “no”.

“But many of our lawyers are commercial and creative, and they do contribute to the successful execution of banking deal flow,” the GC will think to herself. She may even articulate this to her management committee, and they will agree: inhouse lawyers are frequently vital. “So, why should we not be credited with our contribution?”

Here, if she is lucky, a brave soul on that committee will object: for it is easy to be carried away, but there are many simple, axiomatic answers to this question: the importance of segregating those whose mandate is defensive from those whose role is to seek out reward — that kind of thing. One can quickly become bogged down with distracting details and lose sight of the wood for all the argumentative trees.

But there is a single word which should bring a GC to her senses if carried away with such a frolicsome idea: “Enron”. Enron is what happens when you try to turn a control function into a profit centre.

See also