Template:M gen 2002 ISDA 12

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Mandatory, or not?

Section 12 specifies a variety of different formats by which a party “may” deliver notices under the ISDA Master Agreement. Ordinarily “may” implies discretion and optionality on a party, such that if it wishes it might choose something different. We have waxed lyrical elsewhere about the potential redundancy of such optional clauses.[1] However, this is not how Andrews J saw this particularmay” in the idiosyncratic, but unappealed, case of Greenclose. This “may” means “must” and, as long as Greenclose remains the unchallenged last word in British jurisprudence, it excludes any other means of delivering a notice. Since hand-delivery and delivery by courier are mentioned but the ordinary post isn’t, this probably rules it out. (But if it’s important, who would use snail mail anyway?)

On the other hand it hardly needs to be said that all of the ordinary day-to-day communication under the ISDA Master Agreement between trading and back-office staff of each party — inconsequential matters like trading, payments, settlements, reconciliations, and margin — will happen by telephone and email, in naked disregard for the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement which, at that point, will be languishing languishing unobserved in an electronic document repository to which operations staff might not even have access. This somewhat gives the lie to Greenclose’s rather quaint apprehensions about how ISDA Master Agreements operate in practice.

Close-out notice restrictions

However curious Andrews J’s reasoning on “may”, note the overriding restriction on forms of notice for closing out: no email, no electronic messages. But note another dissonance: in the 1992 ISDA, close-out notification by fax was expressly forbidden; in the 2002, it is not: only electronic messaging systems and e-mail are verboten. Ironic, seeing how faxes have got on as a fashionable means of communication in the decades since they were sophisticated enough to be a plot McGuffin for a John Grisham novel.


The Cambridge Dictionary says that to “deliver” is “to take goods, letters, parcels, etc. to people’s houses or places of work”.[2]

Merriam Webster says it means “to take and hand over to or leave for another”.[3]

The Collins Dictionary of British English, in a rather modishly modern English format, tells us “If you deliver something somewhere, you take it there”.[4]

A bit more challengingly, the Lexico Oxford Dictionary says it means “bring and hand over (a letter, parcel, or goods) to the proper recipient or address”. Oxford’s language suggests a “handing” from sender to recipient, though a commonsense application of delivery through a letterbox to an address says the only “hands” involved are the sender’s.

An agent for the recipient does not need to be there; just that the notice is conveyed to the appointed place. It is no good refusing to answer the door, hiding behind the sofa or blocking up your letterbox with Araldite: if the sender’s agent brings a notice to your designated address, even by regular post, the sender has “delivered” it.

If it is, literally, impossible to arrange even an agent to hand-deliver a package, what then? Before the spring of 2020, most learned commentators would have regarded such a scenario as so absurd as to not dignify an answer. By April, ISDA was seeking advice about it.

Email vs electronic messaging system

A John Grisham McGuffin yesterday. well, in about 1986 actually.

The well-intended and, we think, presumed harmless — even modern — addition of email in the 2002 ISDA, in addition toelectronic messaging system”, persuaded the Chancery Division of the High Court to conclude that “electronic messaging system” and “email” are mutually exclusive things, rather than a basic commentary on ISDA’s crack drafting squadTM inability to let things go — a conclusion which the JC finds hard to accept, as you will see if you read the Greenclose v National Westminster Bank plc case note.


Note that the 1995 English Law CSA subjects its notice provisions to this provision (see Paragraph 9(c) and 11(g).