Template:Severability boilerplate capsule: Difference between revisions

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Severability is [[boilerplate]] the [[JC]] has a hard time understanding the logic of in any weather, but you can see purveyors of top quality [[finance contract]]s harbouring a tightness in the jaw at the thought that if I agree to lend you six squillion smackeroonies and you agree to repay in one year with interest ''and provide me one bowl of [[Brown M&Ms|M&Ms per week with the brown ones removed]]'', then if it becomes illegal supply enormous financial institutions with bowls of M&Ms (look, let’s just say OK?), that doesn’t let you off your loan repayment or interest obligations. This seems less of a monstrously critical risk for me if the [[fruits of the contract|contractual fruits]] I am expecting from you ''do not include your repayment of six squillion smackeroonies''.
The [[JC]] has a hard time understanding the logic of severability [[boilerplate]], but it seems to be this: Let’s say I agree to lend you one hundred million dollars for a year. The terms of are loan are that you must repay in a year, together with fixed interest in the mean time and on the scheduled repayment date I must deliver you ''a single bowl of [[Brown M&Ms|M&Ms with the brown ones removed]]''.
 
Everyone happy, right? Now what should happen if, unexpectedly, it becomes illegal to supply doctored bowls of M&Ms (look, let’s just say OK?)? Without a functioning severability clause, the contract might be void. ''I might never get my money back''.
 
''Really?'' This reasoning seems to depend on a rather rigid application of a latin maxim (''ex turpi causa non oritur actio) whereas the common law, if it ever thought that, doesn’t any more (see {{casenote|Patel|Mirza}}).

Revision as of 11:57, 15 June 2021

The JC has a hard time understanding the logic of severability boilerplate, but it seems to be this: Let’s say I agree to lend you one hundred million dollars for a year. The terms of are loan are that you must repay in a year, together with fixed interest in the mean time and on the scheduled repayment date I must deliver you a single bowl of M&Ms with the brown ones removed.

Everyone happy, right? Now what should happen if, unexpectedly, it becomes illegal to supply doctored bowls of M&Ms (look, let’s just say OK?)? Without a functioning severability clause, the contract might be void. I might never get my money back.

Really? This reasoning seems to depend on a rather rigid application of a latin maxim (ex turpi causa non oritur actio) whereas the common law, if it ever thought that, doesn’t any more (see Patel v Mirza).

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