Template:GMSLA compensation for mismanagement: Difference between revisions

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(Created page with "===Retrospective compensation for corporate mismanagement=== An interesting question arises as to whether settlements or judgments reflecting corporate malfeasance by issuers...")
 
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Such disputes can take years — decades even — to iron out, can take any number of different forms and, if viewed as {{gmslaprov|Income}}, represent a significant tail risk in a {{gmslaprov|Borrower}}’s trading book.
Such disputes can take years — decades even — to iron out, can take any number of different forms and, if viewed as {{gmslaprov|Income}}, represent a significant tail risk in a {{gmslaprov|Borrower}}’s trading book.
On one hand, the definition of {{gmslaprov|Income}} is very wide:
{{Template:GMSLA 2010 Income}}
On the other hand — and it pains me somewhat to lay some {{t|Latin}} on you, but I will — the [[ejusdem generis]] rule of interpretation says where general words (here, “distribution of [[Any type, kind or nature|any kind whatsoever]]”) follow specific words (“[[Dividend - Equity Derivatives Provision|dividends]], [[interest]]”), the general words are cover only objects similar in nature to those specific words. So the distribution should be of the same nature as interest or dividends.
So, is  a court-mandated compensation for historical corporate malfeasance “of the same nature” as an issuer’s voluntarily declared dividend intended to reflect its good performance? The JC would argue that it is not.