Template:GMSLA compensation for mismanagement: Difference between revisions

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On one hand, the definition of {{gmslaprov|Income}} is very wide:
On one hand, the definition of {{gmslaprov|Income}} is very wide:


{{Template:GMSLA 2010 Income}}
“''{{Template:GMSLA 2010 Income}}''”


On the other hand — and it pains me somewhat to lay some {{t|Latin}} on you, but I will — the [[ejusdem generis]] rule of interpretation says where general words (here, “distribution of [[Any type, kind or nature|any kind whatsoever]]”) follow specific words (“[[Dividend - Equity Derivatives Provision|dividends]], [[interest]]”), the general words are cover only objects similar in nature to those specific words. So the distribution should be of the same nature as interest or dividends.
On the other hand — and it pains me somewhat to lay some {{t|Latin}} on you, but I will — the [[ejusdem generis]] rule of interpretation says where general words (here, “distribution of [[Any type, kind or nature|any kind whatsoever]]”) follow specific words (“[[Dividend - Equity Derivatives Provision|dividends]], [[interest]]”), the general words are cover only objects similar in nature to those specific words. So the distribution should be of the same nature as interest or dividends.


So, is  a court-mandated compensation for historical corporate malfeasance “of the same nature” as  voluntarily declared dividend, intended by its issuer to reflect its own satisfactory stewardship of the corporation’s commercial affairs? The [[JC]] would argue that it is not. Quite the opposite, in fact: if we take it as read that one borrows {{gmslaprov|securities}} to [[Short sell|short-sell]] them in the market we see that the [[short-seller]]’s exact view is that the {{gmslaprov|securities}} are overvalued: this is consistent with the theory that their issuer is mismanaging the company. The [[Short sell|Short-seller]] bets that the truth will eventually come out and, when it does, the shares will fall in price. It can then buy them back, take a profit, and deliver them back to the {{gmslaprov|Lender}}.
So, is  a court-mandated compensation for historical corporate malfeasance “of the same nature” as  voluntarily declared dividend, intended by its [[issuer]] to reflect its own satisfactory stewardship of the corporation’s commercial affairs? The [[JC]] would argue that it is not. Quite the opposite, in fact: if we take it as read that one borrows {{gmslaprov|securities}} to [[Short sell|short-sell]] them in the market we see that the [[short-seller]]’s exact view is that the {{gmslaprov|securities}} are overvalued: this is consistent with the theory that their issuer is mismanaging the company. The [[Short sell|Short-seller]] bets that the truth will eventually come out and, when it does, the shares will fall in price. It can then buy them back, take a profit, and deliver them back to the {{gmslaprov|Lender}}.


It can't be right that, where the [[Short sell|short-seller]] is ''so'' right about this the {{gmslaprov|Securities}} issuer is breaching its fiduciary duties to its shareholders, that it must compensate the {{gmslaprov|Lender}} as a result.
It can't be right that, where the [[Short sell|short-seller]] is ''so'' right about this the {{gmslaprov|Securities}} issuer is breaching its fiduciary duties to its shareholders, that it must compensate the {{gmslaprov|Lender}} as a result.


But this puts the poor {{gmslaprov|Lender}} in a sorry spot. Because it has lent the securities, it is not on the register as of the Income Record Date, so however you characterise that compensation payment, it can’t claim if from ''anyone''. “The deal”, it will argue, “is that the {{gmslaprov|Borrower}} should put me in the position I would have been in had I continued to hold the shares. ''I'' wasn’t expressing a view here. I stayed long the conomic exposure of the stock. All I wanted was a lending fee.”
But this puts the poor {{gmslaprov|Lender}} in a sorry spot. Because it has lent the securities, it is not on the register as of the {{gmslaprov|Income Record Date}}, so however you characterise that compensation payment, it can’t claim if from ''anyone''. “The deal”, it will argue, “is that the {{gmslaprov|Borrower}} should put me in the position I would have been in had I continued to hold the shares. ''I'' wasn’t expressing a view here. I stayed long the economic exposure of the stock. All I wanted was a lending fee.”
 
It is hard not to be sympathetic about this. Were the {{gmslaprov|Borrower}} to have held the shares, it might even be prepared to make that ''ex gratia'' payment on the basis that it was a windfall: it knew the company was rubbish and made its money on the short sale. But there’s the rub: The borrower ''didn’t'' hold the shares. It ''sold'' them. That is why it Borrowed them in the first place.
 
So however you look at it, there’s a loser here. But in a sense, remember this is a windfall payment — some public spirited activist has jemmied some extra cash out of a reluctant issuer. Had it not done so no one would have been any the wiser.