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Laches: Difference between revisions
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“Now the doctrine of [[laches]] in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a [[equitable remedy|remedy]], either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as a [[waiver]] of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”}} | “Now the doctrine of [[laches]] in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a [[equitable remedy|remedy]], either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as a [[waiver]] of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”}} | ||
But let’s be clear: | |||
*It is an equitable doctrine, and denies only [[equitable remedy|equitable remedies]]. | *It is an equitable doctrine, and denies only [[equitable remedy|equitable remedies]]. You can’t invoke it to ''prevent'' a claim in [[damages]] for [[breach of contract]]. | ||
*It doesn’t override a specific [[statute of limitations]] (for much the same reason). | *It doesn’t override a specific [[statute of limitations]] (for much the same reason). | ||
There are two main situations: | There are two main situations where it might apply: | ||
*Where you seek an [[equitable remedy]] (e.g., [[specific performance]] to a common law action. Here you lose the remedy through unreasonable delay | *Where you seek an [[equitable remedy]] (e.g., [[specific performance]] to a [[common law]] action. Here you lose the remedy through unreasonable delay: this may be a matter of days or weeks. | ||
*Where you seek to mount an equitable defence to an action where no statutory limitation period applies to the cause of action, e.g. where the claimant seeks to set aside a transaction for undue influence, mistake or fraud. Relief may also be refused in these circumstances on grounds of delay. But in these circumstances the critical question is usually whether the claimant acted promptly after becoming aware of | *Where you seek to mount an [[equitable]] defence to an action where no statutory [[limitation period]] applies to the cause of action, e.g. where the claimant seeks to set aside a transaction for undue influence, [[mistake]] or [[fraud]]. Relief may also be refused in these circumstances on grounds of delay. But in these circumstances the critical question is usually whether the claimant acted promptly after becoming aware of her legal rights. | ||
{{sa}} | {{sa}} | ||
*{{casenote|Goldsworthy|Brickell}} | *{{casenote|Goldsworthy|Brickell}} | ||
*{{casenote|Lindsay Petroleum Company|Hurd}} | *{{casenote|Lindsay Petroleum Company|Hurd}} | ||