Mercury Tax Group Limited v HMRC: Difference between revisions

{{quote|“... I believe that the common understanding is that the document to be signed exists as a discrete physical entity (whether in a single version or in a series of [[counterparts]]) at the moment of signing. The significance of this is not entirely talismanic (though it would not affect my view even if it were): the requirement that a party sign an actual existing authoritative version of the contractual document gives some, albeit not total, protection against fraud or mistake.”}}

The court found that this language necessarily involves that the signature and attestation must form part of the same physical document constituting the deed. Additionally, the fact that the parties ''intended'' them to be deeds, rather than that they were ''required by law to be'' deeds (in order to have legal effect) was what mattered: “the fact remains that the parties intended them to be deeds and their validity must be judged on that basis”.<ref>Just quietly, we don’t think this follows: if an instrument doesn’t ''have'' to be a deed to be binding, and the way it is executed means  in fact it ''isn’t'' a valid deed, the mere fact that the parties have in mind that it should be a deed does not undermine their general intention to become bound by a [[simple contract]], if the usual ingredients of offer, acceptance and consideration are present. A deed is a “super contract” — the equity of the situation surely requires it to fall back to a [[simple contract]] if one of those would, legally do. To hold otherwise is to prefer [[Substance and form|form over substance]] — like when has that ever happened.</ref>