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This, all agree, is the unavoidable price one must pay to persuade good men and women to devote their creative souls to the dark arts of financial service. | This, all agree, is the unavoidable price one must pay to persuade good men and women to devote their creative souls to the dark arts of financial service. | ||
But ''is'' it? Every [[agent]], however devoted to its [[principal]], has against it the same, aligned, common interest: that, whatever happens, it should continue to be ''needed'', and therefore ''paid''. Do not forget that such a fellow, like the one who hotly insists on imposing gardening leave upon departing colleagues, is, at one remove, talking {{sex|his}} own book. This is the [[agency]] | But ''is'' it? Every [[agent]], however devoted to its [[principal]], has against it the same, aligned, common interest: that, whatever happens, it should continue to be ''needed'', and therefore ''paid''. Do not forget that such a fellow, like the one who hotly insists on imposing gardening leave upon departing colleagues, is, at one remove, talking {{sex|his}} own book. This is the [[agency problem]]. | ||
And plenty of organisational psychologists have identified better, more plausible drivers for optimised productivity and excellent performance than the discretionary bonus. {{author|Daniel Pink}} has made a fair bit of his own compensation making this very point. Superficially, it is easy to understand why this might be so: the simple amount of energy, infrastructure and human ''effort'' that goes into figuring out, to the penny, who gets what itself occupies a month or more of the collective assembled’s time. Now, here is the proof of the [[AI]] pudding by the way: however much the [[thought leader]]s swear [[neural network]]s will replace divisions of their staff, if you think they would, for a moment, entrust ''any'' part of determining their own compensation to an algorithm, you have profoundly misunderstood the nature of this beast. | And plenty of organisational psychologists have identified better, more plausible drivers for optimised productivity and excellent performance than the discretionary bonus. {{author|Daniel Pink}} has made a fair bit of his own compensation making this very point. Superficially, it is easy to understand why this might be so: the simple amount of energy, infrastructure and human ''effort'' that goes into figuring out, to the penny, who gets what itself occupies a month or more of the collective assembled’s time. Now, here is the proof of the [[AI]] pudding by the way: however much the [[thought leader]]s swear [[neural network]]s will replace divisions of their staff, if you think they would, for a moment, entrust ''any'' part of determining their own compensation to an algorithm, you have profoundly misunderstood the nature of this beast. | ||
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{{sa}} | {{sa}} | ||
*[[Agency problem]] | |||
*{{br|Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us}} — {{author|Daniel Pink}} | *{{br|Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us}} — {{author|Daniel Pink}} | ||
*[[Diversity]] | *[[Diversity]] |