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{{a|hr|}}{{d|{{PAGENAME}}|ˈlɔɪəlti ˈdɪskaʊnt |n|}}The great falsification of the [[human resources]] dogma. | {{a|hr|}}{{d|{{PAGENAME}}|ˈlɔɪəlti ˈdɪskaʊnt |n|}}The great falsification of the [[human resources]] dogma. | ||
For the strictures of salary bands, [[forced ranking]], gerrymandered [[performance appraisal]] system — all the great apocrypha of the HR canon — mean that through time how much a given employee is [[compensation|paid]] will decouple from | For the strictures of salary bands, [[forced ranking]], gerrymandered [[performance appraisal]] system — all the great apocrypha of the [[HR]] canon — mean that through time how much a given employee is [[compensation|paid]] will decouple from the value she offers the firm, however meagre.<ref>As we have [[Cost-value threshold|remarked elsewhere]], it is more or less axiomatic that all employees contribute ''some'' positive value to their organisation: you would have to be pathologically antisocial not to. The exception that proves this rule is the unnamed [https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/15-years-skipping-work/ Italian hospital worker who bunked off for fifteen years].</ref> | ||
Over time, those who remain loyal to the firm are ''penalised''. The only way to correct this — to [[mark-to-market|mark yourself to market]] — is to [[lateral quitter| | Over time, those who remain loyal to the firm are progressively ''penalised''. If they get pay rises they are anaemic, shrugged of with the two-way short optionality that characterises those who manage for a living. | ||
“As part of infrastructure, you don't share in the ''upside'', but you’re protected in a down year” they will say, in a good year, in a bad one, “we’ve managed to minimise the [[RIF]], but we’re still under s a 15% [[cost challenge]],” as if one is supposed to be grateful. | |||
The net upshot, per worker, is usually stagnation; in real terms — [[inflation]]-adjusted — you may wind up going backwards, over long periods. | |||
But over those periods, good employees get ''better''. They learn things, they gain experience. They build networks. They bat themselves in. They may see less able, less loyal coworkers forge ahead with lateral moves. | |||
By the way, none of this is to defend much less justify in absolute terms city pay which, however you look at it, is absurd. Only its allocation. | |||
City pay is what it is. The multinationals are still remarkable [[flywheel]]s: they generate extraordinary returns despite being staffed with mediocrity. They might generate more if they looked after good staff. | |||
The longer good staff stay, the worse, generally, they are treated. Their only way to correct this — to [[mark-to-market|mark yourself to market]] — is to [[lateral quitter|leave]]. This seems a bit mad. | |||
To be sure, salaries may drift upwards, decade by decade, courtesy of HR’s finely honed calculus, predicated as it is on abstract, but unshakable logic: a director is worth more than an associate director; a good associate director worth more than a bad one, and so on. All true, and fair, in ''the abstract'', but here is the thing. Employees don’t ''work'' in the abstract. Only [[averagism|averages]] do. | To be sure, salaries may drift upwards, decade by decade, courtesy of HR’s finely honed calculus, predicated as it is on abstract, but unshakable logic: a director is worth more than an associate director; a good associate director worth more than a bad one, and so on. All true, and fair, in ''the abstract'', but here is the thing. Employees don’t ''work'' in the abstract. Only [[averagism|averages]] do. | ||