What We Owe The Future: Difference between revisions

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[[Probabilities]] are suitable for closed, bounded systems with a ''complete'' set of ''known'' outcomes. The probability when rolling dice is ⅙ because a die has six equal sides, is equally likely to land on any side, must land on one, and no other outcome is possible. This is an artificial, tight, closed system. We can only calculate an expected value ''because'' of this artificially constrained outcome. Probabilities only work for such [[finite game]]s. ''Almost nothing in every day life works like that''.<ref>Ironically, not even dice: even a carefully machined die will not have exactly even sides and may fall off the table, or land crookedly, or fracture on landing!</ref> The future is [[Finite and Infinite Games|infinite]]: unbounded, ambiguous, incomplete, the range of possible outcomes are not known. ''You can’t calculate probabilities about it''.
[[Probabilities]] are suitable for closed, bounded systems with a ''complete'' set of ''known'' outcomes. The probability when rolling dice is ⅙ because a die has six equal sides, is equally likely to land on any side, must land on one, and no other outcome is possible. This is an artificial, tight, closed system. We can only calculate an expected value ''because'' of this artificially constrained outcome. Probabilities only work for such [[finite game]]s. ''Almost nothing in every day life works like that''.<ref>Ironically, not even dice: even a carefully machined die will not have exactly even sides and may fall off the table, or land crookedly, or fracture on landing!</ref> The future is [[Finite and Infinite Games|infinite]]: unbounded, ambiguous, incomplete, the range of possible outcomes are not known. ''You can’t calculate probabilities about it''.


It is a situation of ''[[doubt]]'', not ''risk''. Here, expectation theory is ''worthless. This is a good thing.''
It is a situation of ''[[doubt]]'', not ''risk''. Here, expectation theory is ''worthless''.  
 
This is a ''good thing.''
===About that thought experiment===
===About that thought experiment===
MacAskill came to his thesis courtesy of the thought experiment mentioned above: imagine living the life of every being that has habited the planet since mitochondrial Eve up to the present day. This gives us an idea of our own utter contingency, and of the present’s microscopic insignificance in the Grand Scheme, relative to the hundred billion who have gone before and the putative trillions yet to come. Despite our insignificance we are here, disproportionately empowered to affect the future.
MacAskill came to his thesis courtesy of the thought experiment mentioned above: imagine living the life of every being that has inhabited the planet from [[Mitochondrial Eve]] up to the present day. The exercise is meant to illustrate our own personal contingency and microscopic insignificance in the Grand Scheme. There are a paltry eight billion of us; ten times that have gone before and a thousand times that are — if we don’t bugger everything up — yet to come.  
 
The human condition: despite our mortal insignificance we are here, they are not. We lowly ants are disproportionately empowered to determine the future.
 
The idea chimes for a moment and then falls apart. For this is to see our ''present'' existence as no more than the task of cranking the ''right'' handle on the cosmic machine, to vouchsafe a calculable outcome for someone else. We are but set builders, moving quietly about a dark theatre. As long as we do as bidden, on time, all will be well and performers will shine. Our role is barely worth a mention in the final credits.
 
But we are not Sisyphus. We have our own [[lived experience]] to think about. It does not follow, ''[[a priori]]'' that we are bound to practise Calvinist forbearance for the sake of unspecified descendants.  


The idea chimes for a moment and then falls apart in your fingers. This, I think, gives the game away. For this is to see our ''present' existence as no more than the task of cranking the ’’right’’ handle on the cosmic machinery, to vouchsafe a calculable outcome for someone else. But our Sisyphusian existence cannot be some kind of Calvinist forbearance for the sake of a better life for an unspecified descendant, because when we get to such a person, won’t the calculus be just the same for her? Isn’t she going to have to selflessly crank the cosmic machine for the better life of someone even ''further'' down the line? Who gets to enjoy all this self-restraint?
Indeed, ''[[a priori]]'', it presents a paradox. For every step we take, the future keeps retreating. Who get to be the players to shine upon our set? As each generation rolls around, won’t the calculus be just the same for them? Won’t every  to have to selflessly crank the cosmic machine for the better life of someone even ''further'' down the line? Who gets to enjoy all this self-restraint?


But it is nothing of the sort. This is as misconceived as is [[Richard Dawkins]]’ idea that a fielder does, or even ''could'', functionally calculate differential equations to catch a ball.  
But it is nothing of the sort. This is as misconceived as is [[Richard Dawkins]]’ idea that a fielder does, or even ''could'', functionally calculate differential equations to catch a ball.