Metavante v Lehman: Difference between revisions

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In which the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court found that poor old Metavante Corporation, a [[Non-defaulting party - ISDA Provision|non-defaulting counterparty]] relying on Section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}} to withhold payments under live derivatives with Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. due to a valid pending but un-triggered {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} — all standard operating procedure, so they thought — had to, um, ''sit'' or ''get off the pot''.  And, by the time they heard the case, thought their honours, ''it was too late to do either''. Ouch ouch ouch.
In short, the Court held:
*that the [[safe harbor]]s in the US [[Bankruptcy Code]] only protect a [[non-defaulting party]]’s right to terminate a swap, and enforce net termination values but  do not allow it to withhold performance under a swap if the swap is not terminated;
*that Metavante must make all past payments due under the {{isdama}} with [[default interest]], and resume future payments, despite Metavante's contractual right under section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}} to withhold them based upon LBSFs’ ongoing bankruptcy; and,
*11 months after the bankruptcy filing was too late for Metavante to suddenly go “oh whoopsie” and trigger early termination. It imposed a [[sunset clause|sunset]] on a Metavante’s right to early termination following a bankruptcy even though there wasn’t one in the {{isdama}} or the [[Bankruptcy Code]] itself.
===Media===
*[http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/09/30/74606/lehman-metavante-and-the-isda-master-agreement/ Lehman, Metavante and the ISDA Master Agreement - FT Alphaville]
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