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| Okay. Now a broker fills your order by going to the market. In practice this means The broker will interrogate [[market maker|market makers]], [[Exchange|exchanges]] and other sources of market liquidity ([[Multilateral trading facility|multilateral trading facilities]] [[dark pool]]s and so on), to identify that best price, retrieve it and bring it back for you. | | Okay. Now a broker fills your order by going to the market. In practice this means The broker will interrogate [[market maker|market makers]], [[Exchange|exchanges]] and other sources of market liquidity ([[Multilateral trading facility|multilateral trading facilities]] [[dark pool]]s and so on), to identify that best price, retrieve it and bring it back for you. |
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| Note the inherent asymmetry here: on one side of the broker millions of tiny investors, Each paying teeny commissions. On the other side, a small number of market intermediaries, each of Home hopes to handle a vast volume of transaction, charging even teenier commissions, but in such colossal quantities that in aggregate it makes a ''lot'' of money. | | Note the inherent asymmetry here: on one side of the broker millions of tiny investors, each paying teeny commissions. On the other side, a small number of market intermediaries, each hoping to handle a vast volume of transactions, charging even teenier commissions, but in such colossal quantities that in aggregate it makes a ''lot'' of money. |
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| The more order flow an [[market-maker]] gets, the more money it makes. Like brokers, market-makers are [[Agency problem|agents]]: they do not take a principal position, but merely route customer orders to the market. Their revenue is an annuity: it depends on ''volume''. [[Market-makers]] will (if they are allowed to) happily pay “[[Retrocession|retrocessions]]” for volume to individual brokers. They pay, in other words, for order flow. | | The more “order flow” an [[market-maker]] gets, that is to say, the more money it makes. |
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| They are allowed to in the US; they are not in the UK. The FCA banned payment for order outright about five years ago on the theory that it undermines transparency and efficiency, is inimitable to the idea of [[best execution]], and also it creates a perceived conflict of interest between broker and clients.
| | Like brokers, market-makers are [[Agency problem|agents]]: they do not take a true principal position, but merely route customer orders to the market. Their revenue is an annuity: it depends on ''volume''. [[Market-makers]] will (if allowed happily pay “[[Retrocession|retrocessions]]” for volume to individual brokers. They pay, in other words, for order flow. |
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| In the US the dynamic is very different. Payment for order flow allows the retail platforms (Ameritrade, Schwab, eToro, RobinHood etc) to offer ''commission free'' trading. Like in Vegas, ''if the drinks are free, you are paying some other way''. Most retail folks are happy enough with that trade: brokers have to disclose their PFOF arrangements. Sunlight is the best disinfectant, right? But for the most part the [[conflict of interest]] is more optical than fundamental: neither the broker nor the market-maker has a dog in the fight: as long as the trade gets done, everyone gets their little [[Look, I tried|nibble on the client’s parcel]] and all is well in the world.
| | They are allowed to do that in the US; they are not in the UK. The FCA banned payment for order outright in 2012 on the theory that it undermines transparency and efficiency, is inimical to the idea of [[best execution]], and also it creates a perceived conflict of interest between broker and clients. |
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| The [[GameStop]] [[market un-crash]] of 2021 has highlighted, starkly, that [[conflict of interest]] becomes a bit more visceral when it turns out the [[market maker]]’s ''brother'' has a dog in the fight. Some [[market-maker]]s are part of bigger [[financial services]] organisations, and may also have a [[broker-dealer]], an [[asset manager]] and even — [[dramatic look gopher —a [[hedge fund]] in the same market. Now if the [[hedge fund]] is short a stock that retail markets are buying like crazy through the trading platform then — hold on tiger. If ''all'' the long interest is coming through the retail platform, and all the short interest is institutional, then if the activity on the platforms can be dampened somehow — you know, by the platform suddenly shutting down the ability for punters to put risk on, and only allowing them to take risk off — that makes the job of shorting the shit out of the market a lot easier.
| | In the US the dynamic is very different. Payment for order flow allows the retail platforms (Ameritrade, Schwab, eToro, RobinHood etc) to offer ''commission free'' trading. |
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| ===UK regulation===
| | Like in Vegas, ''if the drinks are free, you are paying some other way''. Most retail folks are happy enough with that trade: brokers have to disclose their PFOF arrangements. Sunlight is the best disinfectant, right? But for the most part the [[conflict of interest]] is more optical than fundamental: neither the broker nor the market-maker has a dog in the fight: as long as the trade gets done, everyone gets their little [[Look, I tried|nibble on the client’s parcel]] and all is well in the world. |
| Well, the {{tag|FCA}} has been commendably plain in its guidance.
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| {{box|The {{tag|FCA}} considers {{tag|PFOF}} to be bad for our markets and a direct risk to all three of the FCA’s operational objectives for the following reasons:
| | The [[GameStop]] [[market un-crash]] of 2021 has highlighted, starkly, that [[conflict of interest]] becomes a bit more visceral when it turns out the [[market maker]]’s ''brother'' has a dog in the fight. Some [[market-maker]]s are part of bigger [[financial services]] organisations, and may also have a [[broker-dealer]], an [[asset manager]] and even — [[dramatic look gopher]] —a [[hedge fund]] in the same market. |
| *It creates a conflict of interest between the [[broker]] and its clients because the [[broker]] is incentivised to pursue payments from [[market maker|market makers]] rather than to provide {{tag|best execution}} in the interests of its clients.
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| *It undermines the transparency and efficiency of the price formation process. This is because the prices paid by clients include hidden costs – and whilst clients may be aware of the level of commission they pay to their [[broker]]s – they might not be aware of the higher spread that they may additionally need to pay to take account of the fees paid by the market marker.
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| *Forcing market makers to ‘pay-to-play’ can distort competition by creating barriers to entry and expansion. Indeed, if brokers refuse to look beyond fee-paying market makers, the most obvious way for new market makers to enter the market is to offer payment for order flow that is higher than the rates paid by existing market makers – an outcome that is inconsistent with promoting effective competition in the interests of consumers. Our supervisory work indicates that, for the most part, brokers routinely exclude non-paying [[market maker|market makers]]. This approach can result in poorer price outcomes for clients because, in addition to the wider spread that the client is likely to pay to account for the fees paid by the market maker, these ‘non-paying’ [[market maker|market makers]] might otherwise provide the most competitive pricing.}}
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| As of September the {{tag|FCA}} has concluded:
| | Now if the [[hedge fund]] is short a stock that retail markets are buying like crazy through the trading platform then — hold on tiger. If ''all'' the [[long]] interest is coming through the retail platform, and ''all'' the [[Short sale|short]] interest is institutional, then if the long activity on the platforms can be dampened somehow — you know, by the platform suddenly shutting down the ability for punters to put risk on, and only allowing them to take risk off — that makes the job of shorting the kahunas out of the market a lot easier. |
| *The large integrated [[investment bank]]s have largely stopped charging {{tag|PFOF}} in respect of all client business and across all market segments. (This is as close as a regulator will ever get to saying “hooray for investment banks”!)
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| *Independent [[broker]]s have mainly stopped charging {{tag|PFOF}} to professional clients.
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| *Some independent brokers continue to charge [[market maker|market makers]] commission in return for order flow in respect of [[ECP]] initiated business. Here, the FCA still believes purported management of inherent [[conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in PFOF are inadequate in light of {{fcaprov|SYSC 10}}. Nor would they satisfy the expectations under {{tag|MiFID II}}.
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| {{sa}} | | {{sa}} |
| *[[GameStop]] and the great [[market un-crash]] of 2021 | | *[[GameStop]] and the great [[market un-crash]] of 2021 |
| *[[Conflict of Interest]]
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| The FCA's [https://www.fca.org.uk/sites/default/files/marketwatch-51.pdf FCA Marketwatch 51] released on 1 September 2016 — from which the above is extracted — should give you what you need. If that isn't enough, have a look at the FCA's original Thematic Review [https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/thematic-reviews/tr14-13.pdf TR 14/13] of [[best execution]] and [[PFOF]].
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| *[[Inducements]] and the rule against them. | | *[[Inducements]] and the rule against them. |
| | *[[Conflict of interest]] |
| | *The [[FCA]]’s [https://www.fca.org.uk/sites/default/files/marketwatch-51.pdf FCA Marketwatch 51] of 1 September 2016 should give you what you need. If that isn’t enough, have a look at the FCA’s original [https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/thematic-reviews/tr14-13.pdf Thematic Review TR 14/13] of [[best execution]] and [[PFOF]]. |