LIBOR rigging: Difference between revisions

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With LIBOR the banks could then set the rates for their deposits and calculate a suitable fixed rate for new term loans . Happy, dull stuff, carried out by happy, dull people: We din’t want to run the LIBOR people down, but pre 1997 this was the after-school chess club: all the cool kids were out shagging, smoking weed and shorting structured credit.
With LIBOR the banks could then set the rates for their deposits and calculate a suitable fixed rate for new term loans . Happy, dull stuff, carried out by happy, dull people: We din’t want to run the LIBOR people down, but pre 1997 this was the after-school chess club: all the cool kids were out shagging, smoking weed and shorting structured credit.


It is one of JC’s axioms that market catastrophe will find where you least expect it. This is because success in financial services is in large part about [[edge]], and you find the most edge where no-one else is looking for it.  
It is one of JC’s axioms that [[Air crashes v financial crashes|market catastrophe will happen where you least expect it]]. This is because success in financial services is in large part about [[edge]], and you find the most [[edge]] where no-one else is looking for it.  


Tom Hayes was a cool kid. He hung out in chess club. And shagged and smoked weed. ''Metaphorically''. He found some edge. So did a bunch of other groovers. No-one bothered them and they didn’t do any harm — at least, not that anyone has been since able to point to.
Tom Hayes was a cool kid (''metaphorically'': he doesn’t seem to have been ''literally'' cool in the slightest). But he hung out in the chess club. He, and a bunch of other grooves, found some edge there, where no one was looking for it. No one bothered them and they didn’t do any harm — at least, not that anyone has been since able to point to. But they sent lots of embarrassing emails


As per the basic model, to manage their structural interest rate risk, banks ''generally'' would want LIBOR low — but deposits are not the only show in town. Some banks — principally those that were swap dealers — had exposure to the interest rate market through swaps.
As per the basic model, to manage their structural interest rate risk, banks ''generally'' would want LIBOR low — but deposits are not the only show in town. Some banks — principally those that were swap dealers — had exposure to the interest rate market through swaps.


Here, the bank “swaps” interest rates with its customers: it might  pay one customer a fixed rate and receive from it a floating rate; with another it might swap floating for fixed.  
Here, the bank “swaps” interest rates with its customers: it might  pay one customer a fixed rate and receive from it a floating rate; with another it might swap floating for fixed.