LIBOR rigging: Difference between revisions

no edit summary
No edit summary
No edit summary
Line 163: Line 163:


{{quote|
{{quote|
That is not, however, determinative. It was not a criminal offence ''per se'' to fail to comply with the Take-over Code, but that did not stop it being treated in Spens''<ref>{{cite|R|Spens|1991|1 WLR|624}}.</ref> as something which demanded construction as a question of law in the same way as primary or delegated legislation. Although compliance with LIBOR or EURIBOR was not directly a regulated activity, it
That is not, however, determinative. It was not a criminal offence ''per se'' to fail to comply with the Take-over Code, but that did not stop it being treated in Spens''<ref>{{cite|R|Spens|1991|1 WLR|624}}, which opined that, “our view is that [the Takeover Code] sufficiently resembles legislation as to be likewise regarded as demanding construction of its provisions by a judge.” But the takeover code regulated the behaviour of persons in connection with mergers and acquisitions. It is a quasi-regulatory arrangement. LIBOR determination is not. That “failure to comply with LIBOR could give rise to regulatory consequences” is something quite different: a person may in breaching an employment contract also commit a traffic offence: this does not make an employment contract a quasi-regulatory arrangement.</ref> as something which demanded construction as a question of law in the same way as primary or delegated legislation. Although compliance with LIBOR or EURIBOR was not directly a regulated activity, it
was indirectly so: failure to comply with their provisions could give rise to regulatory consequences.
was indirectly so: failure to comply with their provisions could give rise to regulatory consequences.
}}
}}