Loyalty discount: Difference between revisions

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{{a|hr|{{image|Loyalty Discount|png|}}}}{{d|{{PAGENAME}}|ˈlɔɪəlti ˈdɪskaʊnt |n|}}The great falsification of the [[human resources]] dogma.  
{{a|hr|{{image|Loyalty Discount|png|}}}}{{dpn|/ˈlɔɪəlti ˈdɪskaʊnt/ |n|}}{{Quote|“Our people are our most valuable asset.”
— Every [[human resources]] department ever.}}For the miscellany of the [[HR]] military-industrial complex — salary bands, [[forced ranking]], gerrymandered [[performance appraisal]] system — all militate ''against'' the idea that staff are are a precious resource. These are lined up to ensure that, through time, an employee’s [[Compensation|pay]] will decouple from, and then trail, the value she offers her firm.


For the strictures of salary bands, [[forced ranking]], gerrymandered [[performance appraisal]] system — all the great apocrypha of the [[HR]] canon — mean that through time how much a given employee is [[compensation|paid]] will decouple from the value she offers the firm, however meagre.<ref>As we have [[Cost-value threshold|remarked elsewhere]], it is more or less axiomatic that all employees contribute ''some'' positive value to their organisation: you would have to be pathologically antisocial not to. The exception that proves this rule is the unnamed [https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/15-years-skipping-work/ Italian hospital worker who bunked off for fifteen years].</ref>
That is, loyalty to the firm is progressively ''penalised''. If they get pay rises at all, they are anaemic. Accompanying protests of iniquity are shrugged off with the two-way optionality that HR managers know they are long.


Over time, those who remain loyal to the firm are progressively ''penalised''. If they get pay rises at all, they are anaemic, and shrugged off with the two-way optionality that HR managers know they are long.  
“As part of infrastructure, you don’t share in the ''upside'', but you’re protected in a down year” [[Human resources|HR]] will say, in a good year.


“As part of infrastructure, you don't share in the ''upside'', but you’re protected in a down year” they will say, in a good year.
In a bad one, they will tell you, “we’ve managed to minimise the [[RIF]], but we’re still under a 15% [[cost challenge]], so — just to manage your expectations, you’ll do well to be flat”.


In a bad one, they will tell you, “we’ve managed to minimise the [[RIF]], but we’re still under s a 15% [[cost challenge]],” as if you are supposed to be grateful.  
Now none of this is to defend, much less justify, city pay levels. Should we shed tears about relative disfavour among a group as systematically overcompensated as city drones? We should not. And we do not. But still, we should understand the [[systemantic]] forces at play.


For all the time you spend conducting and being subjected to [[performance appraisal]]s, at the business end of the year, talk of performance is mysteriously absent. It’s all about the big numbers, lumbering about way over your head, above your pay-grade and beyond your control. It’s not about you.
Fundamentally, the allocation of financial capital — which is the sum total of what the financial services machine, at its most basic level, does — is a risky, important and therefore valuable thing. Markets that most effectively allocate capital do best. In any case, those who are good at it stand to make a lot of money. This will not change. Effective capital allocation is worth paying for.


The net upshot, per worker, is usually stagnation; in real terms — [[inflation]]-adjusted — you may wind up going backwards, over long periods.
The [[JC’|JC’s]] operating premise is that those who do get to do it do ''not'' do nearly as good a job of it as they should. Our [[roll of honour]] refers.


But over those periods, good employees get ''better''. They learn things, they gain experience. They build networks. They bat themselves in. They may see less able, less loyal coworkers forge ahead with lateral moves.
If the system rewarded excellence, not mediocrity, perhaps fewer shitstorms would happen. So — with the caveat that, sure, everyone gets paid too much — we ask here a different question: how do we allocate pay more effectively? Resource allocation is, after all, what the industry is meant to be best at.
===Mediocrity drift===


By the way, none of this is to defend much less justify in absolute terms city pay which, however you look at it, is absurd. Only its allocation.
The longer good staff stay, the worse, generally, they are treated. Their only means to correct this — to [[mark-to-market|mark yourself to market]] — is to [[lateral quitter|leave]]. This seems a bit mad.


City pay is what it is. The multinationals are still remarkable [[flywheel]]s: they generate extraordinary returns despite being staffed with mediocrity. They might generate more if they looked after good staff.
To be sure, salaries may drift upwards, decade by decade, courtesy of [[HR]]’s finely honed calculus, predicated as it is on abstract, but unshakable logic: a director is worth more than an associate director; a good associate director worth more than a bad one, and so on. All true, and fair, in ''the abstract'', but here is the thing. Employees don’t ''work'' in the abstract. Only [[averagism|averages]] do.  
 
The longer good staff stay, the worse, generally, they are treated. Their only way to correct this — to [[mark-to-market|mark yourself to market]] — is to [[lateral quitter|leave]]. This seems a bit mad.
 
To be sure, salaries may drift upwards, decade by decade, courtesy of HR’s finely honed calculus, predicated as it is on abstract, but unshakable logic: a director is worth more than an associate director; a good associate director worth more than a bad one, and so on. All true, and fair, in ''the abstract'', but here is the thing. Employees don’t ''work'' in the abstract. Only [[averagism|averages]] do.  


But the [[Modernist|modern]] world ''loves'' its archetypes. Just as the [[common law]] has its [[reasonable person]], economics its rational one, the boxwallahs of [[personnel]] have their average employee.
But the [[Modernist|modern]] world ''loves'' its archetypes. Just as the [[common law]] has its [[reasonable person]], economics its rational one, the boxwallahs of [[personnel]] have their average employee.
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*[[Employment derivatives]]
*[[Ergodicity]]
*[[Ergodicity]]
*[[Lateral hire]]
*[[Lateral hire]]