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{{a|negotiation| | {{a|negotiation| | ||
[[File:Jungfrau.png|450px|thumb|center|O Tempora! O | [[File:Jungfrau.png|450px|thumb|center|O Tempora! O {{t|paradox}}!]] | ||
}}The sort of thing a [[co-calculation agent]] is expected to do — one that law students learn in lesson one of ''The Law of {{tag|Contract}}'' one logically cannot be obliged to do — is agree that you will, later, agree on something you cannot be bothered to agree upon just yet. But oh, perfidious syntax of our earthly legal frames! Those who foresee arguments about [[valuation]] know there are jagged corals of metaphysical rock not | }}The sort of thing a [[co-calculation agent]] is expected to do — one that law students learn in lesson one of ''The Law of {{tag|Contract}}'' one logically cannot be obliged to do — is agree that you will, later, agree on something you cannot be bothered to agree upon just yet. But oh, perfidious syntax of our earthly legal frames! Those who foresee arguments about [[valuation]] know there are jagged corals of metaphysical rock not far beneath our footsteps. | ||
This paradox curls back reflexively on itself, for if you agree to it, you must ''have'' agreed, but if you have ''not'' agreed it, you ''can’t'' have. | This {{t|paradox}} curls back reflexively on itself, for if you agree to it, you must ''have'' agreed, but if you have ''not'' agreed it, you ''can’t'' have. | ||
This sort of thing made [[Kurt Gödel]] very famous, but unpopular with Bertrand Russel and David Hilbert. It is an example of the necessary incompleteness of law as a logical system. | This sort of thing made [[Kurt Gödel]] very famous, but unpopular with Bertrand Russel and David Hilbert. It is an example of the necessary incompleteness of law as a logical system. |