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Whose job was it to decide what they meant? Was it, in other words, a matter of fact or law?</ol> | Whose job was it to decide what they meant? Was it, in other words, a matter of fact or law?</ol> | ||
US courts, in acquitting Connolly and Black,<ref> | US courts, in acquitting Connolly and Black,<ref>{{citer|United States|Connolly and Black|2d Cir. 2022|No. 19-3806|}} </ref> had considered them to be matters of ''fact''. The English court considers contractual interpretation of contracts to be a matter of law. This seems right, though it leaves something out, which is ''what did the parties believe the rules to mean?'' | ||
Under the intellectual theory of the common law that goes only to mitigation and not liability, though — as we will see — in a market where plainly ''everyone'' shared an opinion, different from the judge’s one, about what the “LIBOR Definition” meant, this risks rendering the law “a ass”. | Under the intellectual theory of the common law that goes only to mitigation and not liability, though — as we will see — in a market where plainly ''everyone'' shared an opinion, different from the judge’s one, about what the “LIBOR Definition” meant, this risks rendering the law “a ass”. |