Lucy Letby: the insulin smoking gun: Difference between revisions

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This might seem a small point, but in the context of the “dodgy shift rota” — the only piece of identification evidence positively implicating Ms. Letby — it is ''massive''.<ref>See [[Lucy Letby: malicious legalese]].</ref>

====“Man with a hammer” bias====

{{Drop|W|e are pattern}}-matching machines. [[prosecutor’s tunnel vision|When we are artificially motivated]] to find certain patterns and, as we shall see, discouraged by system incentives from looking for other ones, we get good at zeroing in on what we are hoping to find. If you had to design laboratory conditions that were ''optimised'' for [[prosecutor’s tunnel vision]], could scarcely do better.

This is a form of ''remunerated'' [[confirmation bias]]. We are, anyway, primed and motivated to see patterns that conform to familiar concepts from the canon of our professional expertise — call this [[expert validation bias]] or “man with a hammer” bias —and that promote our own personal significance (you might call this “make way, I’m a doctor” bias, although it is really just an aspect of [[expert validation bias]]).

Police officers exist to see crime patterns. Prosecutors exist to see, and deliver, convictions. Expert witnesses who are engaged by police officers to find forensic evidence of wrongdoing only optimise their fees if they see what their clients want them to see. If you always tell the police “there’s nothing to see here”.

====Disconfirmation bias====

~~We are pattern-matching machines.~~ [[~~prosecutor’s tunnel vision|When we are artificially motivated~~]] to find ~~certain patterns~~ we ~~get good at zeroing in on them~~. ~~This is a form of~~ ''~~remunerated~~'' [[confirmation bias]]. ~~We are primed~~ and ~~motivated~~ to ~~see patterns that will~~ promote ~~our~~ own ~~personal significance~~. ~~Police officers exist~~ to ~~see crime patterns~~. ~~Prosecutors exist~~ to ~~see~~, ~~and deliver, convictions. Expert witnesses optimize their fees seeing what their clients want them~~ to ~~see.~~

{{Drop|O|ne way of}} disarming this systemic [[confirmation bias]] would to introduce incentives for seeking out ''gaps'' in corroborating evidence: things we would expect to find, if our hypothesis were true but which we do ''not'' find. To introduce some ''dis''[[confirmation bias]].

If your theory is that a dead-eye marksman has been potshotting a single point your barn, a thorough review of the rest of the barn, surrounding trees, fenceposts and outhouses for similar bulletholes will paint a fairer picture of the side of your [[Texan barn]] without a target painted on it.

This is not how an adversarial system naturally behaves: it expects each side to aggressively promote its own interest. Plainly, the prosecution cannot be expected, or trusted, to lean into the pursuit of exculpatory evidence, but the defence certainly can.

But this somewhat undermines the sacred precept of criminal liability: ''the [[burden of proof]] is on the prosecution''. It should not be — ''is not'' — the defence’s job to prove anything. After all, how is an innocent defendant supposed to know how an alleged crime went down?

~~A way of disarming~~ this ~~[[confirmation bias]]~~ is to ~~seek out ''gaps''~~ in ~~corroborating~~ evidence~~: things we would expect to~~ find, ~~if our hypothesis were true but which we do ''not'' find~~. ~~To introduce some ''dis''~~[[~~confirmation bias~~]].

Furthermore in certain cases, and Ms. Letby’s is one, the vital exculpatory evidence may lie entirely within the prosecutor’s confidential possession. What was the prosecution’s methodology for selecting suspicious events?<ref>You would think, wouldn’t you, that this question is obviously or great relevance and ought to be disclosed to the defence. It seems the prosecution declined to do so, and Mr. Justice Goss rejected the defence’s application to drive them to. </ref>

====On not asking questions you won’t like the answer to====

{{Drop|S|peaking of system}} effects, rules of court procedure positively discourage prosecutors engaging in open-minded challenge. Should you look for disconfirming evidence, and find it, you must at once turn over to the defence.<ref>See Section 7A(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. Discussed also at “[[Lucy Letby: how the charges were selected]]”</ref> This hardly encourages prosecution teams to open-minded enquiry.

~~The rules of court procedure positively discourage that sort of~~ behaviour, ~~though. Under~~ disclosure ~~rules~~, ~~any falsifying evidence you~~ do ~~find~~ you ~~must turn over~~ to the ~~defence . This hardly encourages prosecution teams to open-minded enquiry~~.

Theoretically , there are safeguards against this behaviour: prosecutors have an abstract duty to seek exculpatory evidence, and there is judicial oversight of the disclosure process, but these are hard to enforce, and, and judging by recent experience, don’t work) are especially ineffective early in an investigation before charges have been laid.

Nor do they really address the fundamental problem of “not asking questions you don't want to know the answers to”.

~~Now [[absence of evidence is~~ not ~~evidence~~ of ~~absence]]~~, of ~~course~~, but ~~all the same,~~ if ~~your theory is that~~ a ~~burglar was in the house~~, a ~~normally excitable dog who did not bark might be a useful corrective, at least to paint a picture~~ of the ~~side~~ of ~~that [[Texan barn]] without the target painted on it~~.

Were prosecutors required to file with the court not just a charge sheet but a table of alternative theories they’d considered and the steps they’d taken to test these theories, and their rationale for dismissing these alternative explanations, this would create direct judicial oversight of investigative thoroughness and would give defense a stick with which to beat lazy prosecution teams. This may create additional costs and place additional burdens on police and prosecution teams, but if applied at a significant threshold, this would seem a justified burden in light of the potential consequences of criminal conviction.

====Concession that the insulin was deliberate====

@@ Line 123: / Line 123: @@
 This might seem a small point, but in the context of the “dodgy shift rota” — the only piece of identification evidence positively implicating Ms. Letby — it is ''massive''.<ref>See [[Lucy Letby: malicious legalese]].</ref>
+====“Man with a hammer” bias====
+{{Drop|W|e are pattern}}-matching machines. [[prosecutor’s tunnel vision|When we are artificially motivated]] to find certain patterns and, as we shall see, discouraged by system incentives from looking for other ones, we get good at zeroing in on what we are hoping to find. If you  had to design laboratory conditions that were ''optimised'' for [[prosecutor’s tunnel vision]], could scarcely do better.
+This is a form of ''remunerated'' [[confirmation bias]]. We are, anyway, primed and motivated to see patterns that conform to familiar concepts from the canon of our professional expertise — call this [[expert validation bias]] or “man with a hammer” bias —and that promote our own personal significance (you might call this “make way, I’m a doctor” bias, although it is really just an aspect of [[expert validation bias]]).
+Police officers exist to see crime patterns. Prosecutors exist to see, and deliver, convictions. Expert witnesses who are engaged by police officers to find forensic evidence of wrongdoing only optimise their fees if they see what their clients want them to see. If you always tell the police “there’s nothing to see here”.
 ====Disconfirmation bias====
-We are pattern-matching machines. [[prosecutor’s tunnel vision|When we are artificially motivated]] to find certain patterns we get good at zeroing in on them. This is a form of ''remunerated'' [[confirmation bias]]. We are primed and motivated to see patterns that will promote our own personal significance. Police officers exist to see crime patterns. Prosecutors exist to see, and deliver, convictions. Expert witnesses optimize their fees seeing what their clients want them to see.
+{{Drop|O|ne way of}} disarming this systemic [[confirmation bias]] would to introduce incentives for seeking out ''gaps'' in corroborating evidence: things we would expect to find, if our hypothesis were true but which we do ''not'' find. To introduce some ''dis''[[confirmation bias]].
+If your theory is that a dead-eye marksman has been potshotting a single point your barn, a thorough review of the rest of the barn, surrounding trees, fenceposts and outhouses for similar bulletholes will paint a fairer picture of the side of your [[Texan barn]] without a target painted on it.
+This is not how an adversarial system naturally behaves: it expects each side to aggressively promote its own interest. Plainly, the prosecution cannot be expected, or trusted, to lean into the pursuit of exculpatory evidence, but the defence certainly can.
+But this somewhat undermines the sacred precept of criminal liability: ''the [[burden of proof]] is on the prosecution''. It should not be — ''is not'' — the defence’s job to prove anything. After all, how is an innocent defendant supposed to know how an alleged crime went down?
-A way of disarming this [[confirmation bias]] is to seek out ''gaps'' in corroborating evidence: things we would expect to find, if our hypothesis were true but which we do ''not'' find. To introduce some ''dis''[[confirmation bias]].
+Furthermore in certain cases, and Ms. Letby’s is one, the vital exculpatory evidence may lie entirely within the prosecutor’s confidential possession. What was the prosecution’s methodology for selecting suspicious events?<ref>You would think, wouldn’t you, that this question is obviously or great relevance and ought to be disclosed to the defence. It seems the prosecution declined to do so, and Mr. Justice Goss rejected the defence’s application to drive them to. </ref>
+====On not asking questions you won’t like the answer to====
+{{Drop|S|peaking of system}} effects, rules of court procedure positively discourage prosecutors engaging in open-minded challenge. Should you look for disconfirming evidence, and find it, you must at once turn over to the defence.<ref>See Section 7A(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. Discussed also at “[[Lucy Letby: how the charges were selected]]”</ref> This hardly encourages prosecution teams to open-minded enquiry.
-The rules of court procedure positively discourage that sort of behaviour, though. Under disclosure rules, any falsifying evidence you do find you must turn over to the defence . This hardly encourages prosecution teams to open-minded enquiry.
+Theoretically , there are safeguards against this behaviour: prosecutors have an abstract duty to seek exculpatory evidence, and there is judicial oversight of the disclosure process, but these are hard to enforce, and, and judging by recent experience, don’t work) are especially ineffective early in an investigation before charges have been laid.
+Nor do they really address the fundamental problem of “not asking questions you don't want to know the answers to”.
-Now [[absence of evidence is not evidence of absence]], of course, but all the same, if your theory is that a burglar was in the house, a normally excitable dog who did not bark might be a useful corrective, at least to paint a picture of the side of that [[Texan barn]] without the target painted on it.
+Were prosecutors required to file with the court not just a charge sheet but a table of alternative theories they’d considered and the steps they’d taken to test these theories, and their rationale for dismissing these alternative explanations, this would create direct judicial oversight of investigative thoroughness  and would give defense a stick with which to beat lazy prosecution teams. This may create additional costs and place additional burdens on police and prosecution teams, but if applied at a significant threshold, this would seem a justified burden in light of the potential consequences of criminal conviction.
 ====Concession that the insulin was deliberate====