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A market, in the abstract, looks like a [[nomological machine]]. There is a bounded environment, a finite trading day, a limited number of market participants and financial instruments regarding which one can engage in a limited range of transactions, the outcome of which will be to set a price for that instrument, which will be either higher or lower than (or the same as) the most recently traded price for the instrument. From this information we can extract a mathematical relationship: price went up, price stayed the same, price went down.
A market, in the abstract, looks like a [[nomological machine]]. There is a bounded environment, a finite trading day, a limited number of market participants and financial instruments regarding which one can engage in a limited range of transactions, the outcome of which will be to set a price for that instrument, which will be either higher or lower than (or the same as) the most recently traded price for the instrument. From this information we can extract a mathematical relationship: price went up, price stayed the same, price went down.


Notice how arbitrary that “relationship” between two discrete transactions is. If they are independent of each other — and in a first order sense, they are the participants in the later trade do not know who or where the participants in the earlier even are, let alone what their motivations for trading were — then a “trend” we draw between them is more or less meaningless.  
Notice how arbitrary that “relationship” between two discrete transactions is. If the events are “independent” of each other — in a first order sense, they are: the participants in the later trade do not know who or where the participants in the earlier even are, let alone what their motivations for trading were — then a “trend” we draw between them is, more or less, meaningless.  


But we draw it because we make some assumptions about the homogeneity of all market participants: we assume all have more or less perfect price information, and that all are propelled by an essential economic rationalism: you don’t sell things you expect to perform better than comparable investments, and you don’t buy things you expect to perform worse. Each investor’s private motivation is nuanced and personal — how is the rest of it's portfolio placed, what are the local macro risks to which it is especially sensitive, but largely these proclivities cancel themselves out in a large sample and we can treat professional market participants as largely homogenous.
But we draw it all the same. We make assumptions about the homogeneity of all market participants: we assume all have similar price information, and that all are propelled by the same essential economic rationalism: you don’t sell things you expect to do better than comparable investments, and you don’t buy things you expect to do worse. Each investor’s private motivation may be nuanced and personal — how is the rest of its portfolio positioned, what are the local macro risks to which it is especially sensitive but largely these idiosyncrasies cancel themselves out in a large sample — they are noise — and we can treat professional market participants as a largely homogenous group from which emerges, over time, a signal. Almost like, you know, like an ''invisible hand'' is guiding the market.


This is good: it gets our model out of the gate. If investors were not broadly homogeneous, our statistics would not work. “What is the average height of all things” is not a meaningful calculation.
This is good: it gets our model out of the gate. If investors were not broadly homogeneous, our statistics would not work. “What is the average height of all things” is not a meaningful calculation.


But there is a second order sense in which the earlier and later trades are related: the later participants know about the earlier trade and its price — and its position in a trend from the trade before that — and they will use l this abstract information to form their bid and ask. This interconnectedness of all similar transactions means they are ''not'' independent, as the probabilities of [[normal distributions]] require, but most of the time it's close enough: the immediate transaction history is pretty chaotic — as traders say, “noisy”— in the immediate term, here the dissimilarities between trader motivations are most pronounced, but over a large aggregation of trades these dissimilarities tend to cancel themselves out. A “signal” only emerges from the noise over time. If all traders are using market information, this immediate interdependence looks like independence. So a “normal” probabilistic model<ref>I am working hard not to use the intimidating term [[stochastic]]” by the way.</ref> works fairly well. In the same way, when you bounce a ball friction, energy loss, structural imperfections and intervening causal interference means the conditions to fully satisfy Newton’s model are never present, so a bouncing ball never quite obeys it, but it is close enough. So it is supposed to be with statistical techniques for measuring behaviour in the market. The occasional intervention of idiosyncratic behaviour is basically noise.
But there is a second order sense in which the earlier and later trades ''are'' related: the later participants know about the earlier trade and its price — it is part of that universal corpus of market information, deemed to be known to all. And all can thereby infer its position in a trend from the trade before that — and they will use this abstract information to form their [[bid]] or [[ask]].  
 
This interconnectedness of all similar transactions means they are ''not'' independent, as the probabilities of [[normal distributions]] require, but most of the time it's close enough: the immediate transaction history is pretty chaotic — as traders say, “noisy”— in the immediate term, here the dissimilarities between trader motivations are most pronounced, but over a large aggregation of trades these dissimilarities tend to cancel themselves out. A “signal” only emerges over time. If all traders are using market information, this immediate interdependence looks a lot like independence. So a “normal” probabilistic model<ref>I am working hard not to use the intimidating term [[stochastic]]” here by the way.</ref> works fairly well. It’s not a bad ''model''.
 
In the same way, when you bounce a ball, friction, energy loss, structural imperfections, impurities in the rubber and interference from the environment means the conditions to fully satisfy the parameters of Newton’s mechanics are never present, so a bouncing ball never quite obeys the laws of thermodynamics but no one is counting, and it is close enough.  
 
The same applies to the statistical techniques for we use to measure behaviour of the market. The occasional intervention of idiosyncratic behaviour is basically noise. Where the interdependence creates a persistent variance from the normal probability model over time we can model that, too. Measures like volatility. We use probabilistic techniques to model these, too.  


But there is a third order of dissimilarities. In times of stress in the market the behaviour of other people in the market ''directly'' and ''directionally'' affects your transaction, and yours affects others.
But there is a third order of dissimilarities. In times of stress in the market the behaviour of other people in the market ''directly'' and ''directionally'' affects your transaction, and yours affects others.


This is not just the crowded theatre phenomenon, when everyone stampedes for the exits at once, and the narrow aperture makes the stampede all the more urgent, and therefore dramatic — but second order features. An investor long “on margin” might wish to, and be able to, ride out a short term crash by meeting margin calls. In most dislocations this is the obvious and — if you can manage it, correct — thing to do. The market usually recovers, at least in the short term. But meeting your margin call means drawing on your revolving credit facility and your bank is experiencing a liquidity crisis and unexpectedly pulls you lines, or suspends withdrawals, as a result of its own market exposure to the crash. Your prime broker, usually patient with you and tolerant of peripheral looseness in your margin operations, is also under pressure, has told you today there is no flex, and for good measure, it is jacking up your IM.
This is not just the crowded theatre phenomenon, when everyone stampedes for the exits at once, and the narrow aperture makes the stampede all the more urgent, and therefore dramatic — but second order features. An investor long “on margin” might wish to, and be able to, ride out a short term crash by meeting margin calls. In most dislocations this is the obvious and — if you can manage it, correct — thing to do. The market usually recovers, at least in the short term. But meeting your margin call means drawing on your revolving credit facility and your bank is experiencing a liquidity crisis and unexpectedly pulls you lines, or suspends withdrawals, as a result of its ''own'' market exposure to the crash. Your prime broker, usually patient with you and tolerant of peripheral looseness in your margin operations, is also under pressure, has told you today there is no flex, and for good measure, it is jacking up your IM.
 
All that near perfect information in the market evaporates — rather, other information, which the market ''didn’t'' have, but took for granted, such as the solvency of systemically important financial institutions, suddenly becomes much more important. And it dramatically impacts behaviour in the market. All at once no-one fancies taking a view on ''anyone’s'' credit.
 
Cash is suddenly King, Queen, Jack and Ace. There are people on the TV in sharp suits wandering dazedly around outside their buildings clutching [[Iron Mountain]] boxes full of personal effects.
 
All indicators are going one way, across the board, in all markets and all asset classes.


Cash is suddenly King Queen, Jack and Ace. People on the TV wandering dazedly around outside their buildings clutching [[Iron Mountain]] boxes full of personal effects.
Now we find the model we were using has stopped being largely right, or broadly right, or even vaguely right. It is flat out wrong.


All indictators are going one way, across the board, in all markets and all asset classes.
You will find at this stage limited tolerance for blaming a model. If you say things like {{Viniar quote}}
buy or sell. In the modern days of computerised trading everything is very clean, tidy observable, unitary and discrete.


====Derivatives trading====
====Derivatives trading====