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Template:M intro technology Better call ChatGPT: Difference between revisions
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, 8 February→Variance, redux: when “solution” is the problem
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{{Quote|Q: What’s the difference between an [[LLM]] and a [[trainee]]? <br> | {{Quote|Q: What’s the difference between an [[LLM]] and a [[trainee]]? <br> | ||
A: You only have to punch information into an [[LLM]] once.<ref>This is a nerd’s version of the drummer joke: ''What’s the difference between a drummer and a drum machine? You only have to punch information into a drum machine once.''</ref> }} | A: You only have to punch information into an [[LLM]] once.<ref>This is a nerd’s version of the drummer joke: ''What’s the difference between a drummer and a drum machine? You only have to punch information into a drum machine once.''</ref> }} | ||
{{drop|C|ontrary to [[modernist]]}} wisdom — viz., ''thou shalt not rest until all problems are solved'' — descending the fractal tunnel of error is, sometimes, a bad idea. ''Usually'', in fact. Down it | {{drop|C|ontrary to [[modernist]]}} wisdom — viz., ''thou shalt not rest until all problems are solved'' — descending the fractal tunnel of error is, sometimes, a bad idea. ''Usually'', in fact. Down it are [[snafu]]<nowiki/>s and boo-boos that an experienced lawyer will roll her eyes at, take a moment to sanctimoniously tut about, ''but then let go''. | ||
Life, you see, is too short. She may even filter these out | Life, you see, is too short. She may even filter these out with her subconscious fast brain before she registers them at all. This is [[Signal-to-noise ratio|pure ''noise'']]: instinctive, formalistic fluff, well beyond a seasoned professional’s [[ditch tolerance]]. | ||
This, perhaps, explains that mysterious | This, perhaps, explains that mysterious “alpha variance” among experienced lawyers. [[Contract review]], end of the day, is an art, not a science. Much of a contract is filler: we are better satsficing than optimising it, much less ''perfecting'' it. But where you draw the line depends on the kind of day you’re having: sometimes you take a point, sometimes you don’t. | ||
Some like the comfort of redundant boilerplate, others cannot abide it. Harbouring personal traumas and scars, different individuals — and institutions — are fearful about different things. | |||
Does it ''matter'' that your contract has a [[counterparts]] clause? Does it matter that it ''doesn’t''? | Does it ''matter'' that your contract has a [[counterparts]] clause? Does it matter that it ''doesn’t''? | ||
A busy-body [[Large language model|LLM]] that catches every blemish and cannot take a view as often creates a problem as a solution. This kind of literalness rubs off, or is beaten out of, junior lawyers as they develop. But mechanical ducks like LLMs have an insatiable thirst for it. | A busy-body [[Large language model|LLM]] that catches every blemish and cannot take a view as often creates a problem as a solution. This kind of literalness rubs off, or is beaten out of, junior lawyers as they develop. But mechanical ducks like LLMs have an insatiable thirst for it. This satisfies nothing beyond [[management information and statistics]]. | ||
For what we are fighting here is not bad lawyering, nor bad machines nor bad intentions but ''bad process design''. | For what we are fighting here is not bad ''lawyering'', nor bad ''machines'' nor bad ''intentions'' but ''bad process design''. Reinforcing it with machinery won’t help. | ||
This is the lesson of the sorcerer’s apprentice. | |||
====The oblique purposes of formal contracts==== | ====The oblique purposes of formal contracts==== | ||
{{Drop|T|here is one}} peculiarity that a literal approach to contract review cannot address, but we should mention: sometimes a contract’s true significance runs tangentially to its content. The forensic detail is not always the point.<ref>This is, broadly, true of all contracts, from execution until formal enforcement — and the overwhelming majority of contracts are never formally enforced.</ref> | {{Drop|T|here is one}} peculiarity that a literal approach to contract review cannot address, but we should mention: sometimes a contract’s true significance runs tangentially to its content. The forensic detail is not always the point.<ref>This is, broadly, true of all contracts, from execution until formal enforcement — and the overwhelming majority of contracts are never formally enforced.</ref> | ||
A basic example: {{plainlink|https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/COBS/8A/1.html|European financial services regulations}} require institutions to have written contracts with all customers, as a regulatory end in itself. The rules are less prescriptive about what the contracts should ''say''. | A basic example: {{plainlink|https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/COBS/8A/1.html|European financial services regulations}} require institutions to have written contracts with all customers, as a regulatory end in itself. The rules are less prescriptive about what the contracts should ''say''. | ||
A firm must, therefore, have a written contract to do business. To meet that end, ''any'' delay in finalising that contract, in the name of “getting it right”, ought to be a source of regret. (You might be surprised how often firms are obliged to negotiate their [[terms of business]], in that it is not “never”.) | A firm must, therefore, have a written contract to do business. To meet that end, ''any'' delay in finalising that contract, in the name of “getting it right”, ought to be a source of regret. (You might be surprised how often financial firms are obliged to negotiate their [[terms of business]], in that it is not “never”.) | ||
Other contracts act as a sort of mating ritual: a performative ululation of customary cultural verities signalling that yes, we care about the same things you do, are of the right stuff, the same mind and our “ad idems” are capable of consensus. Again, it matters less what the contract says than that it is ''there''. It is a commitment signal. | |||
If it is that — most [[NDA]]s are that — then descending into an LLM-level of subterranean pedantry and exactitude, in the service of “picking up things that even a gun [[paralegal]] might not”, is a rum plan. The point is to carry out the ritual, afford it the minimum required pleasantries, but not to ''labour'' them. | If it is that — most [[NDA]]s are that — then descending into an LLM-level of subterranean pedantry and exactitude, in the service of “picking up things that even a gun [[paralegal]] might not”, is a rum plan. The point is to carry out the ritual, afford it the minimum required pleasantries, but not to ''labour'' them. | ||
====Volume contracts==== | ====Volume contracts==== | ||
{{drop|T|hose exceptions aside}}, where high-volume, low-risk legal processes do not function as courting rituals, the name of the game is not ''perfect'' negotiation, but ''no'' negotiation. | {{drop|T|hose exceptions aside}}, where high-volume, low-risk legal processes do not function as courting rituals, the name of the game is not ''perfect'' negotiation, but ''no'' negotiation. This is a crucial distinction: negotiation does not fix the problem: it ''is'' the problem. | ||
'' | |||
If | If your customers regularly negotiate your [[terms of business]], or you get regular snarl-ups on procurement, ''you have bad forms''. ''Fix'' them. | ||
'' | This might mean persuading Legal to come to Jesus on the width of its idealised liability exclusion, or it just rewriting forms in a nicer font and plainer language — but either way, the answer is not to leave the problem where it is and just ''mechanise it''. | ||
Doing that will leave you two enduring problems: first, your portfolio of standard contracts will not be standard; secondly, your bad form is now beset with administrative machinery it will be hard, later, to take away. By appointing unskilled technocrats to manage a broken process — and, likely, ''other'' unskilled technocrats to oversee and monitor them — you have institutionalised a bad process. | |||
John Gall’s wonderful [[Systemantics]] captures this well: [[The temporary tends to become permanent|temporary fixes have a habit of becoming permanent]]. Bureaucrats are butterfly collectors: they do not give up their responsibilities without a fight. Their managers rarely have the stomach for one: ''it does a job: leave it be''. | |||
John Gall’s [[Systemantics]] captures this well | |||
Before long, this process will have itself sedimented into the administrative sludge that weighs your organisation down. Other processes will depend on it. Surgical removal will be ''hard''. | Before long, this process will have itself sedimented into the administrative sludge that weighs your organisation down. Other processes will depend on it. Surgical removal will be ''hard''. | ||
====LLMs and waste==== | ====LLMs and waste==== | ||
{{drop|L|LMs can’t function}} by, or think for, themselves (''yet''). Their deployment implies not saved legal cost, but “[[Seven wastes of negotiation|waste]]” transferred: what once was spent fruitlessly on [[legal eagle]]s will instead be diffused among a phalanx of [[software-as-a-service]] providers, procurement personnel, [[internal audit]] boffins, [[operations]] folk and, yes, the dear old [[legal|legal eagles]] who will ''still'' have to handle exceptions, manage and troubleshoot the system, vouch for it, be blamed for it, periodically certify that it is legally adequate to the [[Chief operating officer|COO]] and then, when it turns out not to be, explain why it wasn’t to the operational risk [[steerco]]. All of this costs money, takes time and distracts the firm’s resources from better things they could be doing. Just because it is harder to evaluate, doesn’t mean it isn’t ''there''.<ref>This is wishful thinking, of course: in a world where accounting projections are the first and last word, that ''is'' all that matters.</ref> | {{drop|L|LMs can’t function}} by, or think for, themselves (''yet''). They need looking after. Their deployment implies not saved legal cost, but “[[Seven wastes of negotiation|waste]]” transferred: what once was spent fruitlessly on [[legal eagle]]s will instead be diffused, fruitlessly, among a phalanx of [[software-as-a-service]] providers, procurement personnel, [[internal audit]] boffins, [[operations]] folk and, yes, the dear old [[legal|legal eagles]] who will ''still'' have to handle exceptions, manage and troubleshoot the system, vouch for it, be blamed for it, periodically certify that it is legally adequate to the [[Chief operating officer|COO]] and then, when it turns out not to be, explain why it wasn’t to the operational risk [[steerco]]. | ||
All of this costs money, takes time and distracts the firm’s resources from better things they could be doing. Just because it is harder to evaluate, doesn’t mean it isn’t ''there''.<ref>This is wishful thinking, of course: in a world where accounting projections are the first and last word, that ''is'' all that matters.</ref> | |||
==== The finite game ==== | ==== The finite game ==== | ||