Epistemic priority
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Philosophy
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When a man throws a ball high in the air and catches it again, he behaves as if he had solved a set of differential equations in predicting the trajectory of the ball. He may neither know nor care what a differential equation is, but this does not affect his skill with the ball. At some subconscious level, something functionally equivalent to the mathematical calculations is going on.
- —Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976).
{{|Epistemic priority|ˈɛpɪˈstiːmɪk praɪˈɒrɪti|n}}when two competing models appear to explain, account for or manage some phenomenon equally well, a means of deciding, which is the “proper” one.
For example, the trajectory of a missile may be accounted equally well, in theory, for by special relativity, Newtonian mechanics, or the “gaze heuristic”.
Which, all other things being equal, should we prefer? Does one have, as a piece of credentialised technical knowledge about the world, “epistemic priority” over the others?
You may not be surprised to hear opinions tend to be divided with experts in competing magisteria trending to talk their own book. Some will appeal to Occam’s razor, but this is no rule of scientific discourse: it is a lazy fudge. It has no epistemic priority either.
So the pragmatist’s answer is “no.” Horses for courses. If your models works, use it.
(It is no little irony that the “gaze heuristic” works worst in theory — I just “kind of keep my eye on the ball and keep running” might struggle to get past peer review — but best in practice: there’s a reason not many astrophysicists play cricket for England.)