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An “absolute” [[discretion]] is to be contrasted in theory, if not really in practice, with one that is bounded by an overriding obligation to act “in [[good faith]], and in a [[commercially reasonable manner]]”. But, as we have sounded off [[Commercial imperative|elsewhere]], any merchant that acts in [[bad faith|''bad'' faith]], or in a [[Commercially reasonable|commercially ''un''reasonable]] manner, ''even if his contract permits it'', should not expect to have clients for very long. | An “absolute” [[discretion]] is to be contrasted in theory, if not really in practice, with one that is bounded by an overriding obligation to act “in [[good faith]], and in a [[commercially reasonable manner]]”. But, as we have sounded off [[Commercial imperative|elsewhere]], any merchant that acts in [[bad faith|''bad'' faith]], or in a [[Commercially reasonable|commercially ''un''reasonable]] manner, ''even if his contract permits it'', should not expect to have clients for very long. | ||
You will hear it [[Special pleading|specially plead]] that, for all its superficial appeal, a component of “reasonableness” in a discretion invites argument about its scope, precisely at the point where you might not want any. When, for example, you are exercising a reasonable discretion to demand more [[margin]], or something like that. | You will hear it [[Special pleading|specially plead]] that, for all its superficial appeal, a component of “reasonableness” in a discretion invites argument about its scope, precisely at the point where you might not want any. When, for example, you are exercising a reasonable discretion to demand more [[margin]], or something like that. | ||
But this argument has more mouth than trouser: | |||
A discretion, by its nature, is a self-help remedy. Its exercise requires no permission; no appeal to the court, no arbitral award. One may just do it, at — well — at one’s ''discretion''. Forensic examination of the ''propriety'' of the exercise of a reasonable discretion necessarily come after the fact. Yes; your counterparty might challenge it in court, but will come a lot later, and — honestly? — it will only do that ''if you were being manifestly unreasonable''. The standard of reasonableness, as we have seen,<ref>{{casenote|Barclays|Unicredit}}</ref> is subjective. The owner of the discretion gets the benefit of the doubt. It is hard for a third party to displace. Besides, you can control for this later eventuality by ''not being manifestly unreasonable in the first place''. If you ''are'' being manifestly unreasonable you are beyond help and, frankly, sympathy. | |||
But, for the time being, if you have a reasonable discretion, you can just box on.<ref>Now, your counterparty ''could'' seek an [[injunction]] to stop you exercising your reasonable discretion. But the [[common law]] is hardly littered with injunctions against the exercise of reasonable discretion.</ref> Curiously, this might be a bad time to ask your [[legal eagles]] what to do. | |||
For if you are staring into the abyss — if your genuinely believe your client is corkscrewing into the side of a hill — and you hesitate to exercise a discretion because it might not turn out to have been reasonable, the problem is not with your legal documents. It is with you. Your coat is on the hook. | |||
{{sa}} | {{sa}} |