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For there are certain pillars of bank activity — the conduct of [[litigation]] being one, the execution corporate advisory business another and let us throw in the wheel-spinning “industry” of [[industry associations]] for a third — whose conduct so depends upon, and is in thrall to, the memetic interests and commercial imperatives of law firms, to the outright detriment of anyone else involved, that it is hard to rationalise these activities other than as some kind of extended phenotype for private practice of commercial law. | For there are certain pillars of bank activity — the conduct of [[litigation]] being one, the execution corporate advisory business another and let us throw in the wheel-spinning “industry” of [[industry associations]] for a third — whose conduct so depends upon, and is in thrall to, the memetic interests and commercial imperatives of law firms, to the outright detriment of anyone else involved, that it is hard to rationalise these activities other than as some kind of extended phenotype for private practice of commercial law. | ||
In this view, the in-house [[legal department]] — a bank function all but unknown thirty years ago, but now so monstrous that it needs its own chief operating officer< | In this view, the in-house [[legal department]] — a bank function all but unknown thirty years ago, but now so monstrous that it needs its own chief operating officer<ref>our [[history of inhouse legal]] refers.</ref> — really only exists to make life as easy as possible for the law firms to optimise recovery of recorded chargeable time. | ||
A warning flag: any kind of structural intermediation between those who ''instruct'' the lawyers and those who are expected to ''pay'' for them. That might be the advisory bank’s legal department on one hand (instructing) and the advised client on the other (paying), or it might just be the legal department and the banks actual shareholders. | A warning flag: any kind of structural intermediation between those who ''instruct'' the lawyers and those who are expected to ''pay'' for them. That might be the advisory bank’s legal department on one hand (instructing) and the advised client on the other (paying), or it might just be the legal department and the banks actual shareholders. | ||