Agency problem: Difference between revisions

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Any one of its agents is charged with protecting the principal’s interests, but two overriding considerations will inevitably take priority: (i) their wish to protect and perpetuate their own role ''as'' agent, and its accompanying income stream — their need to ''persuade the principal that their role is needed'' whether or not it ''is'' needed — no turkey votes for Christmas; and (ii) their wish to not ''fuck up'' — to demonstrate that not only is the role necessary but ''I am the best person to carry out that role''.  
Any one of its agents is charged with protecting the principal’s interests, but two overriding considerations will inevitably take priority: (i) their wish to protect and perpetuate their own role ''as'' agent, and its accompanying income stream — their need to ''persuade the principal that their role is needed'' whether or not it ''is'' needed — no turkey votes for Christmas; and (ii) their wish to not ''fuck up'' — to demonstrate that not only is the role necessary but ''I am the best person to carry out that role''.  
==Big law and the agency problem==
 
{{Who domesticated whom}}
==Scale==
==Scale==
Another “tell” is for the size of money at stake to be so large that even a legal bill in the tens of millions will amount to a rounding error.
Another “tell” is for the size of money at stake to be so large that even a legal bill in the tens of millions will amount to a rounding error.
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{{Sa}}
{{Sa}}
*[[The domestication of law]]
*[[Reliance on legal advice]]
*[[Reliance on legal advice]]
*[[Stakeholder capitalism]]
*[[Stakeholder capitalism]]