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Alchemy: The Surprising Power of Ideas that Don’t Make Sense: Difference between revisions
Alchemy: The Surprising Power of Ideas that Don’t Make Sense (view source)
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===Our expectation affects our experience=== | ===Our expectation affects our experience=== | ||
A flower is simply a weed with a marketing budget==== | |||
It is not about efficiency. Sometimes the very inefficiency is what marks out effectiveness. | ===A flower is simply a weed with a marketing budget==== | ||
It is not about efficiency. Sometimes the very inefficiency is what marks out effectiveness — the peacock’s tail. | |||
===Logic kills off magic=== | ===Logic kills off magic=== | ||
People don’t perceive the word objectively. So, address people’s perceptions of reality, not necessarily reality itself. | People ''don’t'' perceive the word objectively. So, address people’s ''perceptions'' of reality, not necessarily reality itself. | ||
===A good guess which stands up to empirical observation is still science=== | ===A good guess which stands up to empirical observation is still science=== | ||
See also Nassim Nicholas | See also {{author|Nassim Nicholas Taleb}}’s remarks about “lecturing birds to fly”. Random accidents can generate progress. On which Sutherland invokes the impish figure of {{author|Paul Feyerabend}} who, with RThomas Kuhn}}, is one of the JC’s favourite contrarians in the philosophy of science. | ||
===Test counterintuitive things because no-one else will=== | ===Test counterintuitive things because no-one else will=== | ||
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===Solving problems using only rationality is like playing golf using only one club=== | ===Solving problems using only rationality is like playing golf using only one club=== | ||
Rationality has its uses; but it is a naive model of the world, and what it leaves might be more important than what it leaves ''in''. The moment you say is “the way to solve the problem is like this ~” you have defined the problem in a way that allows only a very small solution set. There are lots of reasons people behave as they do, and economic incentives only over a small part of them. | Rationality has its uses; but it is a naive model of the world, and what it leaves might be more important than what it leaves ''in''. The moment you say is “the way to solve the problem is like this ~” you have defined the problem in a way that allows only a very small solution set. There are lots of reasons people behave as they do, and economic incentives only over a small part of them. | ||
{{sa}} | |||
*[[Behavioural economics]] | |||