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Anti-money laundering: Difference between revisions
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{{g}}[[Know your customer]] is just a part of the [[anti-money laundering]] compliance procedures that any regulated financial services provider anywhere in the world must undergo. These days it is a serious, onerous business, and it means [[on-boarding]] a client, and keeping it on-boarded, is a tremendous pain in the arse. Which makes you wonder why you still get statements from Halifax relating to an account you closed in 2004 but that is another story. | {{g}}[[Know your customer]] is just a part of the [[anti-money laundering]] compliance procedures that any regulated financial services provider anywhere in the world must undergo. These days it is a serious, onerous business, and it means [[on-boarding]] a client, and keeping it on-boarded, is a tremendous pain in the arse. Which makes you wonder why you still get statements from Halifax relating to an account you closed in 2004 but that is another story. | ||
Is anti-money laundering “the world’s lease effective policy experiment?” Ron Pol thinks so | Is anti-money laundering “the world’s lease effective policy experiment?” | ||
{{author|Ron Pol}} thinks so: | |||
{{quote|“... the anti-money laundering policy intervention has less than 0.1 percent impact on criminal finances, compliance costs exceed recovered criminal funds more than a hundred times over, and banks, taxpayers and ordinary citizens are penalized more than criminal enterprises. The data are poorly validated and methodological inconsistencies rife, so findings cannot be definitive, but there is a huge gap between policy intent and results.” | {{quote|“... the anti-money laundering policy intervention has less than 0.1 percent impact on criminal finances, compliance costs exceed recovered criminal funds more than a hundred times over, and banks, taxpayers and ordinary citizens are penalized more than criminal enterprises. The data are poorly validated and methodological inconsistencies rife, so findings cannot be definitive, but there is a huge gap between policy intent and results.” | ||
:—Abstract, ''Anti-money laundering: The world’s least effective policy experiment? Together, we can fix it'', | :—Abstract, ''[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339486326_Anti-money_laundering_The_world's_least_effective_policy_experiment_Together_we_can_fix_it/fulltext/5e55561e4585152ce8ee54c5/Anti-money-laundering-The-worlds-least-effective-policy-experiment-Together-we-can-fix-it.pdf Anti-money laundering: The world’s least effective policy experiment? Together, we can fix it]'', 2020}} | ||
Hard to argue, though the [[Basel Accords|Basel]] rules on [[close-out netting]] run it fairly close. | |||
[https://www.amlassurance.com/uploads/2/1/1/6/21169026/pol_2019_acc_docket_almost_completely_ineffective.pdf This], in which Dr Pol summarises the paper, in nuggets designed for the attention span of [[inhouse counsel]], would be amusing were it not so distressing. | |||
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