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 ''Everyone'' involved in the business of [[prime services]], and global markets broking generally, should read {{plainlink|https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/reports-research/archegos-info-kit.html|the Credit Suisse Report}}.
-And while the goings on at this brokerage were breathtakingly, class-leadingly chaotic — it is hard to believe that any one organisation could have made ''so'' many unforgivable errors, in such scale, over such a long period, so consistently, missing many opportunities to cotton on, without catching even ''one'' lucky break as the apocalypse unfolded around it — this really is a royal flush of idiocy — the ''makings'' of all these [[joint and several liability|joint and several]] catastrophes is imprinted in the DNA of ''every'' multinational organisation. An onlooker who denies it — who does not shudder and think, ''there, but for the grace of God, go I'' — is showing ''precisely'' the lack of awareness that caused this situation.
+And while the goings on at this brokerage were class-leadingly chaotic — it is hard to believe that any one organisation could have made ''so'' many basic errors, in such scale, for so long, so consistently, missing so many opportunities to cotton on, without catching even ''one'' lucky break as the apocalypse unfolded around it —  the ''makings'' of all these [[joint and several liability|joint and several]] catastrophes is imprinted in the DNA of ''every'' multinational organisation. An onlooker who does not shudder and think, “there, but for the grace of God, goes my firm; go ''I''” — is showing ''precisely'' the lack of awareness that caused this situation.
-After all, this broker was by no means alone in taking a hammering in the fallout from Archegos.<ref>Famously, of all the brokers, Goldman fared bestr, suffering “immaterial losses”. This may well be superior risk management practice — it’s Goldman, right? — but may have something to do with the fact that, according to the Credit Suisse report, Goldman didn’t have Archegos on its books at all until at least April 2020 </ref> It just took the ''worst'' hammering, and has been the most candid about why. Its special committee makes a number of excellent recommendations — all worth heeding — but stops short of the one that must have been most tempting to the Board: ''get the hell out of the broking business altogether''.
+After all, this broker was by no means alone in taking a hammering. It just took the ''worst'' hammering, and has been the most candid about what happened. Its special committee makes a number of excellent recommendations — but stops short of the one that must have been most tempting to the Board: ''get the hell out of the broking business altogether''.
-Almost all the most egregious errors were sociological, and not systemic: they speak of human foibles, the thrall of power, human seduction by the simplicity of models and the internal primacy afforded to capital calculations — a proxy means of measuring ones ability to withstand catastrophe and not avoiding catastrophe as an end in itself — with arse-covering, deference to hierarchy, fiefdoms and silos, inexplicable insouciance in the face of steadily escalating risk and, when it comes to it, outright idiocy.
+That said, this was not an institution out of its depth in a market it did not understand. Most of the mishaps have a curiously sociological, and not systemic, cast to them: they speak of bad management, backside covering, too little communication, misunderstanding human weakness: the thrall of power, the seductive simplicity of models, the priority afforded to configuring internal models structures, reports, dashboards, processes, and  calculations to accommodate the risk, rather than adjusting the risk to come within the models (though there was a fair bit of ignoring inconvenient models too). Models are a [[heuristic]]: a proxy to [[Legible|legibly]] gauge one’s ability to ''withstand'' catastrophe: to satisfy the model is not to avoid catastrophe in itself. — with arse-covering, deference to hierarchy, fiefdoms and silos, inexplicable insouciance in the face of steadily escalating risk and, when it comes to it, outright idiocy.
 This sums up how dire the whole sorry business was: In early March, 2021, the broker gingerly ''asked'' Archegos to consider a new margin proposal under which the broker would take $1.35 billion of ''funds it currently held for Archegos'' and recharacterise them as [[initial margin]]: ''asked'', that is, when it was contractually entitled to ''demand'' that, and more, on 3 days’ notice.