Calculation Agent: Difference between revisions

no edit summary
No edit summary
No edit summary
 
(4 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{a|isda|{{image|Calculation Agent|png|Secret Co-Calculation Agent [[Georgia Apathy|Apathy]], in a still from Otto {{buchstein}}’s under-appreciated 1952 [[Opco Boone]] noir'' The [[Co-calculation agent|Co-Calculation Agent]] Who Loved Me''}}}}{{d|Calculation Agent|/ˌkælkjʊˈleɪʃən ˈeɪʤənt/|n}}One who ''calculates'' things on behalf of contracting counterparties. In theory, under any kind of finance contract, but in practice, mainly in the ISDA  and its extended fan-fiction universe ([[GMSLA]], [[GMRA]], [[DRV]], [[FBF]] etc), and in the documentation of [[debt securities]].  
{{a|isda|{{image|Calculation Agent|png|Secret Co-Calculation Agent [[Georgia Apathy|Apathy]], in a still from Otto {{buchstein}}’s under-appreciated 1952 [[Opco Boone]] noir'' The Co-Calculation Agent Who Loved Me''}}}}{{d|Calculation Agent|/ˌkælkjʊˈleɪʃən ˈeɪʤənt/|n}}One who ''calculates'' things on behalf of contracting counterparties. In theory, under any kind of finance contract, but in practice, mainly in the ISDA  and its extended fan-fiction universe ([[GMSLA]], [[GMRA]], [[DRV]], [[FBF]] etc), and in the documentation of [[debt securities]].  


To be endlessly compared and contrasted with a “[[determination agent]]”, who ''determines'' things on behalf of contracting counterparties. Do “calculation” and “determination” differ? Not as far as this correspondent can see. You tend to say, perversely, that a Calculation Agent ''determines'' things, and a Determination Agent ''calculates'' things, but largely because elegant prose has a horror of repetition. But will that stop [[legal eagle|over-enthusiastic members of the bar]] waxing lengthily about how they ''do'' differ? it will not.<ref>Pedants will note the different roles played by the {{eqderivprov|Calculation Agent}} and the {{eqderivprov|Determining Party}} in the {{eqdefs}}.</ref>
To be endlessly compared and contrasted with a “[[determination agent]]”, who ''determines'' things on behalf of contracting counterparties. Do “calculation” and “determination” differ? Not as far as this correspondent can see. You tend to say, perversely, that a Calculation Agent ''determines'' things, and a Determination Agent ''calculates'' things, but largely because elegant prose has a horror of repetition. But will that stop [[legal eagle|over-enthusiastic members of the bar]] waxing lengthily about how they ''do'' differ? it will not.<ref>Pedants will note the different roles played by the {{eqderivprov|Calculation Agent}} and the {{eqderivprov|Determining Party}} in the {{eqdefs}}.</ref>
Line 18: Line 18:
Therefore, I must have a mechanic to dispute a calculation my dealer makes that seems “off”.
Therefore, I must have a mechanic to dispute a calculation my dealer makes that seems “off”.


Now, to be fair, there was a time, in living memory, when swap dealers ''would'' rip off their clients’ faces at the merest opportunity, in some markets. “[[Cheapest to deliver]]” options in managed [[Collateralised debt obligation|CDO]] portfolios spring unhappily to mind. Banks used to “prop trade” a lot more than they do now. The year or our lord 2006 was a wild time. There are different regulations now: capital rules, clearing obligations, prop-trading restrictions, and [[best execution]] obligations. Dealers play much more of an agency role now. They act like brokers ought to: they execute as riskless principals, they earn their keep from commissions, and not by trading against their clients. In observable, liquid markets, clients can see for themselves whether they are getting good prices, and can take their business elsewhere if they are not.
Now, to be fair, there was a time, in living memory, when swap dealers ''would'' rip off their clients’ faces at the merest opportunity, in some markets. “[[Cheapest to deliver]]” options in managed [[Collateralised debt obligation|CDO]] portfolios spring unhappily to mind. Banks used to “prop trade” a lot more than they do now. The year of our lord 2006 was a wild time. There are different regulations now: capital rules, clearing obligations, prop-trading restrictions, and [[best execution]] obligations. Dealers play much more of an [[agency]] role now. They act like brokers ''ought'' to: they execute as [[Riskless principal|riskless principals]], they earn their keep from commissions and not by trading against their clients. In observable, liquid markets, clients can see for themselves whether they are getting good prices, and can take their business elsewhere if they are not.


Yet we are still beset by fear of dealer mendacity.  
Yet we are still beset by fear of dealer mendacity.  


But even if they were justified, the dispute mechanism our learned friends habitually confect boil down to seeking prices from ''other'' “reference dealers”. The exact method can be baroque: appeals to Law Society presidents, competing panels of reference dealers, fallbacks dealers, [[Co-calculation agent|co-calculation agents]], discarding outliers, splitting differences and so on, but each is predicated on the idea that a disinterested market participant — who is still, remember, a rapacious dealer, just not one with a dog in the fight — will be less [[inclined]] to tear your face from the bone than the one with whom you have had a fruitful twenty-year relationship. This feels wishful.
But even if they were justified, the dispute mechanisms our learned friends habitually confect boil down to seeking prices from ''other'' “reference dealers”. The exact method can be baroque: appeals to Law Society presidents, competing panels of reference dealers, fallbacks dealers, [[Co-calculation agent|co-calculation agents]], discarding outliers, splitting differences and so on, but each is predicated on the idea that a disinterested market participant — who is still, remember, a rapacious dealer, just one without a dog in the fight — will be less [[inclined]] to tear your face from the bone than the one with whom you have had a fruitful twenty-year relationship. This feels wishful.


As does the idea that a disinterested dealer will have any interest in offering a price ''at all''. Why would it? What does it have to gain from reverse engineering a historical  market value for a a security it will not actually get to trade?
As does the idea that a disinterested dealer will have any interest in offering a price ''at all''. Why would it? What does it have to gain from reverse engineering a historical  market value for a a security it will not actually get to trade? It will have its own [[Legal eagle|legal eagles]], they will be fearful, as all legal eagles are, and will worry about getting sued, or being joined in litigation. Their counsel will be to ''not get involved''.  So good luck with that leading reference dealer.


This is quite different from the case of your actual dealer. It will base its marks on where it has actually executed its own [[Delta-hedging|delta-hedge]]. In other words, these are prices at which it has actually traded, and for which it has off-setting liability. Why would it ever accept a hypothetical price from a disinterested third party over its own actually traded price?
This is quite different from the case of your actual dealer. It will base its marks on where it has actually executed its own [[Delta-hedging|delta-hedge]]. In other words, these are prices at which it has actually traded, and for which it has off-setting liability. Why would it ever accept a hypothetical price from a disinterested third party over its own, actually traded, price? This not hypothetical:  it stands to lose real money if it does.


The real answer to calculation agent disputes is the [[commercial imperative]]. Dealers trade countless swaps every day. Their business viability depends on satisfied old customers coming back and placing more orders. Customers who have had their faces ripped off don’t do that.
==== All hail the commercial imperative ====
The real answer to the calculation agent dispute conundrum is the [[commercial imperative]]. Dealers trade countless swaps every day. Their business viability depends on satisfied existing customers coming back and placing ''more'' orders. Customers who have had their faces ripped off don’t do that.


We sense there will be buyside legal-eagles out there who are not persuaded by this. We know there are, in fact: their Byzantine valuation dispute mechanisms pepper ISDA portfolios from New York to Tokyo. If you are one of them, here is a question: ''when did your client last actually invoke a dispute mechanism in anger?'' 
This is basic business common sense. Still, we sense it will be a foreign country to buyside legal-eagles out there who will never be persuaded that swap dealers can behave like decent human beings, even if their own commercial interest encourages it. We know there are, in fact: their Byzantine valuation dispute mechanisms pepper ISDA portfolios from New York to Tokyo.  


How strongly each feels about its right to ''query'' or ''dispute'' the {{isdaprov|Calculation Agent}}’s determinations will depend on the sort of products they’re expecting to trade: [[FX]] and simple [[equity derivative|equity derivatives]] have deep, liquid, observable markets, and as there’s little scope for picking a fight, a [[dealer]] {{isdaprov|Calculation Agent}} may not be bothered about ceding rights to dispute its calculations. Expect a different reaction should you seek to second-guess your [[dealer]]’s marks on exotic [[credit derivative|credit derivatives]], on the other hand. These rely enormously on the dealer’s internal models, pricing curves and other kinds of idiosyncratic financial [[bullshit|alchemy]] that are almost certainly unique to the [[dealer]] in question.
If you are one, here is a question: ''when did your client last actually invoke a dispute mechanism in anger?''  


Do write in and let us know. 


{{sa}}
{{sa}}
*{{eqderivprov|Determining Party}}
*{{eqderivprov|Determining Party}}
*[[Commercial imperative]]
*[[Financial weapons of mass destruction]]
{{ref}}
{{ref}}