Client’s best interest rule

The JC’s Reg and Leg resource™ UK Edition Go Premium COBS 2.1.1: The client's best interests rule (1) A firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its client (the client's best interests rule). (2) This rule applies in relation to designated investment business carried on: (a) for a retail client; and (b) in relation to MiFID or equivalent third country business, for any other client. (3) For a management company, this rule applies in relation to any UCITS scheme or EEA UCITS scheme the firm manages. Note: article 19(1) of MiFID and article 14(1)(a) and (b) of the UCITS Directive. Index: Click ᐅ to expand: Regulation Comments? Questions? Suggestions? Requests? Insults? We’d love to 📧 hear from you. Sign up for our newsletter.

the much talked-about, seldom iunderstood, TCF provision. To be read in conjuction with the FCA’s “PRIN” general principles and, for those of you, my pretties, who like to dive deeper, the FCA’s discussion paper on conflicts of interest published in July 2018.

The general principles in play here are:

• Principle 2 Skill, care and diligence – A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence.
• Principle 6 Customers' interests – A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.
• Principle 7 Communications with clients – A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading.
• Principle 8 Conflicts of interest – A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another client.
• Principle 9 Customers: relationships of trust – A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment.

There is much general lofty aspiration here, but not much by way of flesh on the bones. This, generally, is how the JC likes regulations — self explanatory, and demanding the application of common sense — but it does lead nervous compliance officers, who, having been beaten and bloodied in the foregoing decade don’t always have much of a conceptualisation of common sense — to adopt a bunker mentality. So a few remarks about what the fairness requirement should not mean. You know how we like disclaimers, folks, and this being turf into which the better angels of the professional advisorate tend not to rush — consider our disclaimer absolute. Take the following as you find it, and don’t blame me if you wind up in jail.

It doesn’t mean you have to offer the same product, on the same terms, to everyone.

That would be madness. But you see this argument advanced:

“If we offer this groundbreaking product — tranched synthetic collateralised emissions credit derivatives, denominated in bitcoin to one special client, then we will have to offer it to everyone. This is required by the TCF rule”.

This cannot be right.

Firstly, treating customers fairly generally tilt towards not offering them flakey products, rather than being forced to.

Secondly, where a dealer has offered a product — flakey or otherwise — TCF is about then ensuring that the dealer exercises its rights against clients in that product (ceteris paribus) fairly. So, if you have 100 clients long the same delta-one equity swap and there is a market disruption affecting half your hedge, you close out all positions pro rata, rather than closing out the small clients in full and keeping the juicy platinum client open and therefore happy, however much that is better to your long term revenue profile.

Thirdly, trading any products necessarily involves taking on risk. Dealers do not have an unlimited tolerance for this stuff. It is axiomatic that dealers don’t, without good reason and comprehensive verbiage grant their clients committed trading facilities. It might attract a capital charge for one thing. Suggesting that, because you have traded with one client means you are obliged to trade with another, obliges you, effectively to write the whole world a committed trading facility.

So let’s say dealer A has put on a big trade with client X in the process maxing out its appetite for bitcoin denominated cannabis futures. If client Y comes along and says, “well you did 5 yards with him, so you can do five yards with me too,” it puts our poor risk manager in a pickle. Must she double her exposure, in the name of treating customers fairly? Is even that the end of it? If clients P, Q, and R arrive with the same request the next day, must she quadruple her exposure? Clearly, madness. To take our reductio ad absurdam to the other end, we wonder, must our hapless risk manager instead keep some risk headroom open when trading with X, thereby declining to fill the client’s whole order, just so she can keep enough room to accommodate Y, P, Q, and R pari passu in case they decide they want to transact? But what of clients A, B,C all the way to n? Clearly this is madness also.

So we start to put some parameters on it: a dealer must have legitimate grounds for not trading: credit appetite, market risk, prevailing volatility, reputational and so on, as legitimate grounds. No doubt imaginative risk managers could think of others. At some point one can contrive some excfuse for not trading But note, none of these go to fairness between clients as such — they relate to the dealer’s risk position, not the client. We are led to one of two