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{{a| | {{a|systems|{{image|Pripyat|jpg|}}}}{{quote| | ||
''Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.'' | |||
:—Mike Tyson}} | |||
===You can’t ''eliminate'' the risk, so focus on ''managing'' it=== | ===You can’t ''eliminate'' the risk, so focus on ''managing'' it=== | ||
A traditional risk manager — that is, one managing [[complicated system]]s and not [[complex system|complex]] ones<ref>Open question — a ''gaping'' open question, like when your goalie has come up for a corner — is ''why'' a traditional risk manager is managing what is undoubtedly a [[wicked environment]] using tools suitable for a [[tame environment|tame]] one. But it was ever thus: [[Black-Scholes option pricing model]], which is predicated on a normal distribution, can’t work with The [[Black swan|tail events]] and whose failure in those circumstances led directly to both the [[LTCM]] collapse and the [[Great Financial Crisis]], is still widely used today, after all.</ref> — will be conditioned to using control techniques to anticipate and eliminate all risk. | A traditional risk manager — that is, one managing [[complicated system]]s and not [[complex system|complex]] ones<ref>Open question — a ''gaping'' open question, like when your goalie has come up for a corner — is ''why'' a traditional risk manager is managing what is undoubtedly a [[wicked environment]] using tools suitable for a [[tame environment|tame]] one. But it was ever thus: [[Black-Scholes option pricing model]], which is predicated on a normal distribution, can’t work with The [[Black swan|tail events]] and whose failure in those circumstances led directly to both the [[LTCM]] collapse and the [[Great Financial Crisis]], is still widely used today, after all.</ref> — will be conditioned to using control techniques to anticipate and eliminate all risk. | ||
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This is hard for a [[complicated system]]s guy. [[Complicated system]]s you can brute force, and you can predict how they will behave. You can pre-bake solutions, making them more simple. In [[complex system]]s you can’t: need to keep your options open and be prepared to shift, adapt, re-evaluate, and toss out whatever you might have concluded before now. {{author|Philip Tetlock}}’s “{{br|Superforecasters}}” are complex systems thinkers. Baseball players are complex systems thinkers. Richard Dawkins, whom I like to imagine was dyspraxic,<ref>largely because he was trying to solve differential equations instead of running after the ball, of course.</ref> is a [[complicated system]]s thinker. | This is hard for a [[complicated system]]s guy. [[Complicated system]]s you can brute force, and you can predict how they will behave. You can pre-bake solutions, making them more simple. In [[complex system]]s you can’t: need to keep your options open and be prepared to shift, adapt, re-evaluate, and toss out whatever you might have concluded before now. {{author|Philip Tetlock}}’s “{{br|Superforecasters}}” are complex systems thinkers. Baseball players are complex systems thinkers. Richard Dawkins, whom I like to imagine was dyspraxic,<ref>largely because he was trying to solve differential equations instead of running after the ball, of course.</ref> is a [[complicated system]]s thinker. | ||
===If a | ===If a complex system blows up, “[[complicated]]” risk management systems can get in the way=== | ||
Frequently complicated system risk attenuators can, in fact, aggravate risk situations in complex systems. Alarms going off make it harder to hear; multiple alarms increase panic and obscure each other; an obligation to follow prescribed safety routines can impede quick and surgical response to traumatic situations. There are times, therefore, where you want to throw your checklist out the window. <ref>I know, I know — try telling that to the chap who landed his plane on the Hudson thanks to his unflappable compliance with cockpit checklists, right?</ref> | Frequently complicated system risk attenuators can, in fact, aggravate risk situations in complex systems. Alarms going off make it harder to hear; multiple alarms increase panic and obscure each other; an obligation to follow prescribed safety routines can impede quick and surgical response to traumatic situations. There are times, therefore, where you want to throw your checklist out the window. <ref>I know, I know — try telling that to the chap who landed his plane on the Hudson thanks to his unflappable compliance with cockpit checklists, right?</ref> | ||
{{ref}} | {{ref}} | ||