Cross acceleration - ISDA Provision: Difference between revisions

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{{a|isda|{{subtable|'''In a {{nutshell}}'''<br>
{{a|isda|{{subtable|'''ISDA’s Cross Default clause in a {{nutshell}}'''<br>
{{Nutshell 2002 ISDA 5(a)(vi)}}}}
{{Nutshell 2002 ISDA 5(a)(vi)}}}}
{{subtable|'''In full'''<br>
{{subtable|'''ISDA’s Cross Default clause in full'''<br>
{{ISDA Master Agreement 2002 5(a)(vi)}}
{{ISDA Master Agreement 2002 5(a)(vi)}}
}}}}“Cross acceleration” is not an ''actual'' ISDA {{isdaprov|Event of Default}}, but it is what ''happens'' to an actual ISDA Event of Default — namely, the much-negotiated, seldom-used Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(vi)}},  {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} EOD, if you can persuade your credit department to water it down to something sensible.
}}}}“Cross acceleration” is not an ''actual'' ISDA {{isdaprov|Event of Default}}, but it is what ''happens'' to an actual ISDA Event of Default — namely, the much-negotiated, seldom-used Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(vi)}},  {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} EOD, if you can persuade your credit department to water it down to something sensible.
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Therefore to convert a [[cross default]] to a [[cross acceleration]], you only need to require ''general'' defaults to have been accelerated. Repayment defaults ''can’t'' be accelerated.
Therefore to convert a [[cross default]] to a [[cross acceleration]], you only need to require ''general'' defaults to have been accelerated. Repayment defaults ''can’t'' be accelerated.


Cross acceleration also avoids the need to muck around allowing for grace periods apply, administrative and operational error and all that utter dreck: if the counterparty ''has actually accelerated the loan, the grace periods and operational errors are moot. It is too late. The game is up.
Cross acceleration also avoids the need to muck around allowing for [[grace period]]s to expire, granting indulgences for administrative and operational error and all that dreck: if the counterparty ''has actually accelerated the loan, the grace periods and operational errors are moot. It is too late. The game is up.


Now to be sure [[legal eagles]], especially the ''lesser-spotted buy-side legal eagle'', might start hopping up and down, flapping their wings and squawking restively at this point. “But,” they will say, “what about grace periods and operational errors on that final payment. We must be allowed those before you can close us out!” You may roll your eyes at this — the [[JC]] certainly does — and while it might make you feel better for a moment, it won’t make the problem go away. The short answer is that ordinary grace periods are factored in — the event isn’t triggered until they have all expired, and as for contractual affordances that don’t quite count as grace periods (that are dependent on the borrower providing evidence of operational error) — well, on a fair, large and liberal view these count as grace periods anyway, and if you aren’t persuaded of that [[I’m not going to die in a ditch about it|am I going to die in a ditch about it]]? It depends how late it is on a Friday, and how sporting I am feeling, is the usual answer.
Now, to be sure, [[legal eagles]], especially the ''lesser-spotted [[buy-side legal eagle]]'', might start hopping up and down, flapping their wings and squawking restively at this point.  
 
“But,” they will say, “what about [[grace period]]s and operational errors on that final payment? We must be allowed those before you can close us out!”  
 
You may roll your eyes at this — the [[JC]] certainly does — and while it might make you feel better for a moment, it won’t make the problem go away. The short answer is that ''ordinary'' [[grace period]]s ''are'' factored in if you would care to read the language — the event isn’t triggered until they have all expired, and as for contractual affordances that don’t quite count as [[grace period]]s (that are, for example, dependent on the borrower providing evidence of [[operational error]] to give it some more time to pay) — well, on a [[fair, large and liberal]] view these count as [[grace period]]s anyway, and if you aren’t persuaded of that [[I’m not going to die in a ditch about it|am I going to die in a ditch about it]]? It depends how late it is on a Friday. At the time of writing it is 6:30 pm and the [[JC]] is like ''oh pleeeeease''.


===Is “downgrading” to [[cross acceleration]] ''wise'', though?===
===Is “downgrading” to [[cross acceleration]] ''wise'', though?===
There are two schools of thought:  
There are two schools of thought:  
*''''Yes''': The sensible, pragmatic, wise, [[noble, fearless and brave]] one you will find in these pages: “''Yes''. Cross default is misplaced in a modern collateralised {{isda}}. Anything you can do either to restrict its scope, or simply to avoid being dragged into a [[tedious]] argument about its scope, is sensible.”
*''''Yes''': The sensible, pragmatic, wise, [[noble, fearless and brave]] one you will find in these pages: “''Yes''. [[Cross default]] is misplaced in a modern daily-collateralised {{isda}}. Anything you can do either to restrict its scope, or simply to avoid being dragged into a [[tedious]] argument ''about'' its scope, is worth doing.”
*'''No''': The learned one, from the learned author of that terrible [[FT book about derivatives]]: “All other things being equal, ''no''. One should only weaken [[cross default]] reluctantly.”  
*'''No''': The learned one, from the learned author of that terrible [[FT book about derivatives]]: “All other things being equal, ''no''. One should only soften [[cross default]] reluctantly. Because other counterparts might not be so weak.”  
With respect to my learned friend, his reasoning isn’t massively compelling, as it rather mischaracterises what is going on:
With respect to my learned friend, his reasoning isn’t massively compelling, as it rather mischaracterises what is going on:
:''With [[cross acceleration]] the innocent third party actually has to start proceedings<ref>Actually, it doesn’t have to ''sue'' your counterparty; just call its debt in.</ref> against the defaulting counterparty before you can trigger your transaction termination rights ... . The downgrading [of cross default to cross acceleration] therefore affects the timing of your right to terminate, It is no longer automatic but deferred.<ref>I have no idea what the learned author means by “automatic” here: either way the your termination right is ''optional'', not ''automatic'': it is simply contingent on an independent event in either case: in one case the default; in other case the lender’s ''acceleration'' of the default.</ref>
:''With [[cross acceleration]] the innocent third party actually has to start proceedings<ref>Actually, it doesn’t have to ''sue'' your counterparty; just call its debt in.</ref> against the defaulting counterparty before you can trigger your transaction termination rights ... . The downgrading [of cross default to cross acceleration] therefore affects the timing of your right to terminate, It is no longer automatic but deferred.<ref>I have no idea what the learned author means by “automatic” here: either way the your termination right is ''optional'', not ''automatic'': it is simply contingent on an independent event in either case: in one case the default; in other case the lender’s ''acceleration'' of the default.</ref>
:''If the third party is your counterparty’s main relationship bank it may take some time to review its position<ref>Indeed it may, and probably will. ''But while it is doing that it is not accelerating its indebtedness.'' It is granting its customer an indulgence. Your position is, therefore, not worsened in the mean time.</ref> and may propose a compromise which does not suit you. <ref>You, bear in mind, are the owner of a fully collateralised {{isdama}} which the counterparty has, in the mean time, continued faithfully to perform. If one of your co-creditors has granted an indulgence on outstanding indebtedness — even in return for some other surety or compromise — which avoid that debt being accelerated in full, how can that by itself make your position worse?</ref>
:''If the third party is your counterparty’s main relationship [[bank]] it may take some time to review its position<ref>Indeed it may, and probably will. ''But while it is doing that it is not accelerating its claim against your counterparty.'' It is granting its customer, and your counterparty, an indulgence. ''Your'' position is, therefore, not worsened in the meantime.</ref> and may propose a compromise which does not suit you. <ref>You, bear in mind, are the owner of a fully collateralised {{isdama}} which the counterparty has, in the mean time, continued faithfully to perform. If one of your co-creditors has granted an indulgence on outstanding indebtedness — even in return for some other surety or compromise — which avoid that debt being accelerated in full, how can that by itself make your position worse?</ref>
 
“But other swap counterparties —” Ahh yes: the learned author is, technically, correct, you are marginally worse off if you have conceded to [[cross acceleration]] and other swap counterparties have not. They can beat you, and your counteroparty’s main relationship bank, to the punch. ''But that just illustrates how stupid the concept of cross default is''. ''Especially'' in our enlightened age of zero-threshold, [[daily margined|variation margin]] unexotic swap contracts. ''Especially'' given the extreme conceptual difficulty of even gathering enough information to work out whether you even ''can'' exercise your stupid cross default right. (Just how a third party would ever be able to assess the value of defaulted Specified Indebtedness has never been explained to this old goat).


The learned author is correct, that you are marginally worse off if you have conceded to cross acceleration and other swap counterparties have not. But in the age of zero-threshold, daily margined variation margin, and given the extreme conceptual difficulty of gathering enough information to be confident you even can exercise your cross default (just how a third party would ever be able to assess the value of defaulted Specified Indebtedness has never been explained) this is angel-on-the-head-of-a-pin stuff indeed.
This is angel-on-the-head-of-a-pin stuff indeed.


{{sa}}
{{sa}}
*[[Cross default]] generally
*[[Cross default]] generally
{{ref}}
{{ref}}