82,891
edits
Cross default: Difference between revisions
no edit summary
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) |
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
||
| Line 44: | Line 44: | ||
Yet still we persist in our sophistry. | Yet still we persist in our sophistry. | ||
===Then the [[lawyer|lawyers]] and [[credit officer|credit officers]] start fiddling with things=== | ===Then the [[lawyer|lawyers]] and [[credit officer|credit officers]] start fiddling with things=== | ||
Cross default is a bad enough idea in a [[derivatives]] [[master agreement]] in the first place | Cross default is a bad enough idea in a [[derivatives]] [[master agreement]] in the first place, before [[risk managers]] start having a go at it. Misguided things they can do include the following: | ||
*Widening it to include default under agreements which aren’t in the nature of indebtedness. for example derivatives. Or even any payment of money; | |||
*Adding in [[grace period]]s or other preconditions, excuses, permission to skip PE class and so on, before a party is entitled to invoke a [[cross default]]; | |||
*Arguing the toss about [[threshold amount]]s (should it be shareholders funds or cash? or both? lower or higher of? Honestly it is so tedious). | |||
==Introduction== | ==Introduction== | ||
A cross default provision in an agreement allows a [[non-defaulting party]], on a [[default]] by the other party under any separate contract it may have entered for [[borrowed money]], to [[close out]] the agreement containing the cross default provision. Compare this with: | A cross default provision in an agreement allows a [[non-defaulting party]], on a [[default]] by the other party under any separate contract it may have entered for [[borrowed money]], to [[close out]] the agreement containing the cross default provision. Compare this with: | ||
| Line 87: | Line 91: | ||
===Contagion risk=== | ===Contagion risk=== | ||
It is important to maintain minimum standards which are reflective of genuine credit concerns against the bank so as to limit a “snowball” effect: were we to allow a £50mm Threshold Amount, we would potentially be open to a large number of derivative counterparties simultaneously (and opportunistically) closing out out-of-the-money derivatives positions, which in itself could have massive liquidity and capital implications. | It is important to maintain minimum standards which are reflective of genuine credit concerns against the bank so as to limit a “snowball” effect: were we to allow a £50mm Threshold Amount, we would potentially be open to a large number of derivative counterparties simultaneously (and opportunistically) closing out out-of-the-money derivatives positions, which in itself could have massive liquidity and capital implications. | ||