Data modernism: Difference between revisions

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{{D|Data modernism|/ˈdeɪtə ˈmɒdənɪzm/|n|}}
The belief that sufficiently powerful machines running sufficiently sophisticated [[algorithm]]s over sufficiently massive quantities of unstructured [[data]] can solve the future.}} A prelude to the [[great delamination]].
 
There is a strand of [[High modernism|modernist]] thinking that flows from [[The Death and Life of Great American Cities|Robert Moses]], Le Corbusier, that there is an optimisable configuration for human interaction and it can be derived from a rigorously scientific, or at least mathematical, method: that the only obstacle to implementing it has been the lack of a sufficiently powerful machine to run the calculation.
 
The time is now close at hand, whereby the means is at our disposal. We now have the processing power to take massive amounts of “[[noise]]” and from it extrapolate a [[Signal-to-noise ratio|signal]]. We don’t necessarily understand ''how'' the [[algorithm]]<nowiki/>s extrapolate a signal; they just do — this inscrutability  is part of the appeal of it: there is no “all-too-human” bias<ref>At least, until the algo goes rogue and becomes a Nazi.</ref> — but there is a belief which stretches from paid-up Randian anarcho-capitalists to certified latter-day socialists, that ''we can solve our problems with data''.
 
===Data ''modernism''? Or ''post''-modernism?===
An initial objection: in James C. Scott’s classic account of [[high-modernism]]<ref>{{Br|Seeing Like A State}}</ref> there is a top-down, beneficent, controlling human mind of some kind with a pre-existing theory of the game. That central intelligence has derived a theory from deterministic first principles; a sort of [[cogito ergo sum]] begets [[income tax and rice pudding]] begets a mechanised [[High modernist|modernist]] way of life. The housing project, or five-year plan, or Ministry of Truth is an implementation of that pre-existing theory.
 
In “data modernism” the controlling human mind does a different job: it no longer needs a pre-existing theory of the game: it delegates — or, at any rate, ''yields'' — that responsibility to a more or less ineffable ''[[algorithm]]''. the “controlling mind” need not know how, in the particular case, the algorithm works, how it gets to its conclusions, and is fixed with the conviction that, being the summed and filtered output of the collected [[wisdom of the crowd]], the algorithm has a greater intelligence than any “single controlling” mind anyway.
 
High modernism — a type of top-down, controlling, conviction politics — thereby seems sufficiently different to “data modernism” — agnostic, open-minded, conditional, following the evidence rather than shaping it — that we shouldn’t use the same term for both. what I am calling data modernism is in more like [[Post-modernism|''post''modernism]], or ''post''-[[Post-modernism|postmodernism]].
 
=== Unstructured data as hubbub ===
Now data, as it comes, is an incoherent, imperfect, meaningless thing. It is the pre-cinema audience chat before the lights go down;  a “hubbub” made up of millions of individual interactions, each of which has its own (possibly imperfect) meaning '''—''' but which aggregated taken as a whole have no particular meaning at all.
 
Imagine being asked to take that audience hubbub and condense it to a single proposition: “what was this audience thinking?”  But the interactions are unstructured, as between themselves random and disconnected. Obviously, there ''is'' no thread. But the machine nonetheless extracts one — spurious correlations or just some kind of frequency analysis pulls out some themes.
 
''Now imagine'' feeding that single confabulated sentence back to all the theatre patrons to say “this is the issue which the theatre was debating. Now, which side were you on?”
 
It is natural human nature to read that against your personal situation and come to a view  — as if reading a horoscope.  Suddenly everyone in the cinema ''does'' have a view. They will invest in that conversation.
 
But the hubbub was just noise all along. None of the individual conversations had anything to do with each other. All had their own, independent meanings. They are ''immune'' to aggregation.
 
We say “we have unconscious biases and they inform our reactions”. Well, no ''shit''.
 
To extract signal from noise is to filter, limit compress and selectively amplify on the predication that there ''is'' a signal; that that hubbub is something like a de-tuned radio, or we are looking for pulsars, quasars and intelligent life on the SETI array.
 
But we are not. There isn’t always a signal. the SETI array is a bad [[metaphor]]: here we are trying to tease out a bilateral signal that ''is'' there from a spectrum of other kinds of radiation that qualitatively different, but just broadcast on the same frequency. With the human hubbub there are a spectrum of unconnected communications and ''no'' real “signal”. We are not trying to isolate a single conversation out of all the other ones — that is the direct analogy — but trying to extract a an aggregated message that is not actually there, and to treat is as an [[Emergence|emergent]] property of all those conversations. This is a different thing entirely. ''There is no emergent property from millions of  unrelated conversations''. The result is brown, warm and even: maximum ''entropy''.
 
To make something out of nothing is to ''deliberately'' bias.  It is to carve David out of a marble block. Bias ''creates'' meaning. There may be ''local'' meanings — maybe — based on local interactions and echo chambers but these are informal, incomplete, and impossible to delimit.
 
So we tend to “extrapolate” central figures from random noise: economic growth. The intention behind expressed electoral preference. Average wages. The wage gap. Why the stock market went up. ''That'' the stock market went up: these are spectral figures. They are ghosts, gods, monsters and devils. They are no more real than religions, just because they are the product of “science” and “techne”.
 
We have, on occasion, some convenient proxies, but they are just proxies: for example, in an election, a manifesto. Without a manifesto, a binary vote for a single candidate in a local electorate (I am assuming FPP, but in honesty it isn’t wildly different for proportional represerntation) tells us nothing whatever about the individual motivation to vote as she did. A manifesto helps, by a process of [[Deemery|deem]]<nowiki/>ery.
 
Did every Conservative voter read the party’s manifesto? Almost certainly, no. Did every Conservative voter who did read it subscribe to every line? Again, almost certainly no. Did ''anyone'' subscribe to every line in it? Perhaps, but by no means certainly.  So, can we legitimately infer uniform support for the Conservatives’ manifesto from all who voted Conservative? ''No''. We only do by dint of the political convention that those who vote for a party are deemed to support a manifesto (if one is published). But even that convention is a spectre. And where your vote is an issue-based referendum, there is not even a manifesto. Who knows why 33 million people voted for Brexit? Who could possibly presume to aggregate all those individual value judgments into a single guiding principle? There were 33 million reasons for voting leave. They tell us nothing except... ''leave''.
 
But yet the delaminated [[Onworld]] — especially as it feeds back its simplified “signal” and thereby amplifies it — we draw our battle lines and attack based on these, invented, signals. We take them, and make them our own. We truck in archetypes of our own devising.<ref>Our personal conceptualisations of archetypes never quite map to the world: the “Google Disappointment Effect” when an image search (or AI prompt) never quite returns the image you had in mind. This is the variation of the “no average fighter pilot” effect. </ref>
 
So, to take the ''issue du jour'' — fools rush in etc — how you feel about gender identity might depend on how you envisage the quintessential gender-fluid individual: if you see an exotic, beautiful, fragile, elfen, teenaged creature of  beguiling androgyny you will see trans people as harmless, vulnerable and in need of all the protections society can offer. If your personal archetype is six-foot male self-identifying to compete in women's sport, or to access women's changing rooms,  you will see trans people as predatory and dangerous.
 
The argument between people holding alternative visions will be fruitless.
 
Yet such patently ludicrous arguments animate the public squares in the [[Onworld]].
 
Hence the delamination: the online world is a world of extruded ghoulish signals aggregated from the unfiltered noise of discourse. The offline world — can we call it the offworld? — is a world of bilateral conversations, one on one. A world of shades, nuance, detail, richness, complexity's and — for the most part — civility.
 
Feedback loopsand feeding that signal back into the memeplex, without necessarily surveilling it or taking anything out of it.
So it would include machine learning, AI, etc
 
{{Sa}}
*The [[cult of the average]]
*[[Great delamination]]
*[[High modernism]]
{{Ref}}