Discourse on Intercourse: Difference between revisions

{{a|myth|

}}[[Discourse on Intercourse]] is a well-meant though basically wrong-headed philosophical tract formulated by delusional librettist [[Otto Büchstein]] in the depths of dengue fever delirium in 1769. It immediately preceded — and some say influenced — his last, great unfinished play {{dsh}}.

Outraged by [[René Descartes]] [[Discourse on the Method|suggestion in 1637]] that the only indubitable thing in the universe was one’s own existence, [[Büchstein]] set out to deduce an entire multi-personal [[epistemology]] from the commercial inevitability of [[conference call]]s.  

{{Buchstein}}’s logic was this: [[All-hands conference call|all-hands conference calls]] ''must'' exist, since no-one in her right mind would make up such a horrendous idea if she didn’t have to. So, since someone ''has'' had such an idea, [[conference call]]s must therefore exist as a necessary, indubitable, fact of corporate life.  

On that predicate, it follows as an ''[[a priori]]'' fact that since a [[conference call]] must comprise more than one person (“a man cannot meet alone”, {{buchstein}} was fond of quipping), for conference calls to be possible one’s most basic [[irreducible]] [[ontology]] implies that universe must contain not just one but ''multiple'' individuals.  

At least three, thought [[Büchstein]]: the “meetor” (which he regarded as an analog of [[Descartes]]’ “thinking thing”, or ''[[res cogitans]]''), one “meetee” (which [[Büchstein]] characterised primarily as a “talking thing” (''[[res verbositans]]'') and since, transparently neither of these homunculi would willingly meet without there being some kind of compulsion to do so, a third person (a [[management consultant]] or [[project manager]] of some kind) to ensure the meeting happens, that minutes are taken, actions assigned and timelines “agreed” for “action closure” (this third person {{Buchstein}} called an “action-assigning thing” or ''[[res bossitans]]'').  

In any case, since they were all engaged on a [[conference call]], none of them ''needed'' to be, or indeed ''could'' be, God. Buchstein arrived at this conclusion with the following reasoning:

 

This led {{buchstein}} to a dark place. Rather than simply rebutting [[Descartes]]’ assertion that there ''must'' be a God, by illustrating one was not necessary, [[Büchstein]] went further: “a universe in which [[conference call]]s necessarily exist,” he contended, “is logically inconsistent with the continued presence of an omniscient, benign, omnipotent deity”. He took this as an ''[[a priori]]'' proof of the ''non''-existence of God.