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Doctrine of precedent: Difference between revisions
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The [[doctrine of precedent]] stands in contradistinction to realistic, pragmatic [[Epistemology|theories of knowledge]] which recognise that since, as a brute fact, the class of “things that have not yet happened yet” is — to the best of anyone’s knowledge — unlimited and, however compendious it may be, the class of “things that have already happened” may be, it is necessarily finite. Since infinity divided by a finite number is still infinity, managing unknowable risk by doing only what you’ve always done isn’t enormously prudent. | The [[doctrine of precedent]] stands in contradistinction to realistic, pragmatic [[Epistemology|theories of knowledge]] which recognise that since, as a brute fact, the class of “things that have not yet happened yet” is — to the best of anyone’s knowledge — unlimited and, however compendious it may be, the class of “things that have already happened” may be, it is necessarily finite. Since infinity divided by a finite number is still infinity, managing unknowable risk by doing only what you’ve always done isn’t enormously prudent. | ||
And nor is there much to be said for closing your stable door once your horse has bolted, either. | And nor is there much to be said for closing your stable door once your horse has bolted, either. Even if it has just smacked you on the backside. | ||
{{seealso}} | {{seealso}} | ||