Doctrine of precedent: Difference between revisions

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====On whether there is anything new under the sun====
====On whether there is anything new under the sun====
The [[doctrine of precedent]] stands in contradistinction to realistic, pragmatic [[Epistemology|theories of knowledge]] which recognise that since, as a brute fact, the class of “things that have not yet happened yet” is to the best of anyone’s knowledge unlimited and, however compendious it may be, the class of “things that have already happened” may be, it is necessarily finite. Since infinity divided by a finite number is still infinity, managing unknowable risk by doing only what you’ve always done isn’t enormously prudent.
The [[doctrine of precedent]] stands in contradistinction to realistic, pragmatic [[Epistemology|theories of knowledge]] which recognise that since, as a brute fact, the class of “things that have not yet happened yet” is, to the best of anyone’s knowledge<ref>Subject to the [[rapture]], of course.</ref>, unlimited and, however compendious it may be, the class of “things that have already happened” may be, it is necessarily finite. Since infinity divided by any finite number is still infinity, managing unknowable risk by doing only what you’ve always done isn’t prudent.


And nor is there much to be said for closing your stable door once your horse has bolted, either. Even if it has just smacked you on the backside.
And nor is there much to be said for closing your stable door once your horse has bolted, either. Even if it has just smacked you on the backside.