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=====Model 2: ''{{risk|Brutish}}'', per {{author|Thomas Hobbes}}’ {{br|Leviathan}}===== | =====Model 2: ''{{risk|Brutish}}'', per {{author|Thomas Hobbes}}’ {{br|Leviathan}}===== | ||
Survival of the most brutish. Nature is red in tooth and claw. <br> | Survival of the most brutish. Nature is red in tooth and claw. <br> | ||
*No cooperation: Others will stab you as soon as look at you. | *'''No {{risk|cooperation}}''': Others will stab you as soon as look at you. | ||
*No altruism: Noone acts out of genuine disinterested compassion for another. | *'''No altruism''': Noone acts out of genuine disinterested compassion for another. | ||
*No trust: The delicate conditions required for {{risk|trust}} to thrive do not exist. There is little {{risk|trust}}, so no {{risk|cooperation}}. | *'''No {{risk|trust}}''': The delicate conditions required for {{risk|trust}} to thrive do not exist. There is little {{risk|trust}}, so no {{risk|cooperation}}. | ||
====They ''are'' only models —“[[Nomological machine]]s”==== | ====They ''are'' only models —“[[Nomological machine]]s”==== | ||
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=====Problems===== | =====Problems===== | ||
Of course, neither model completely reflects reality. | Of course, neither model completely reflects reality. For one thing, {{risk|market}} conditions (the levelness of the playing field; availability of information) and prevalent {{risk|cooperation}} strategies amongst participants are interdependent. Adam Smith’s conditions for a benign market are not stable: no equilibrium will ever form there, because we are social, hoarding animals. | ||
*'''{{risk|Information}}''' | *'''{{risk|Information}}''' | ||
**''Information is inherently valuable''': Information is ''not'' universal, immediate, or homogeneous. Much of commerce would fail if it were. ''Therefore'' those who have information first have a distinct advantage over those who do not. | **''Information is inherently valuable''': Information is ''not'' universal, immediate, or homogeneous. Much of commerce would fail if it were. ''Therefore'' those who have information first have a distinct advantage over those who do not. | ||
**''Therefore it is economically rational to hoard information''. This tends to make it less likely that information will be free, a key assumption of the {{risk|Benign}} model. | **''Therefore it is economically rational to hoard information''. This tends to make it less likely that information will be free, a key assumption of the {{risk|Benign}} model. | ||
*'''{{risk|Cooperation}}''' | *'''{{risk|Cooperation}}''' | ||
*''We do cooperate''' In the right conditions individuals form natural alliances to share and protect valuable assets (like information). | *''We do cooperate''' In the right conditions individuals form natural alliances to share and protect valuable assets (like information). | ||
*''Cooperation brings economy of scale and natural advantage: Cooperation rigs the {{risk|market}} in favour of the cooperators against the unaffiliated, thus taking the market further from the {{risk|benign}} ideal. This is not, intrinsically, a bad thing. It is rational, logical and sensible behaviour. Nepotism is an instance of this kind of cooperation: it relies on a structure of trust. It is better viewed as a defensive strategy to ensure those we deal with we can trust, than an offensive strategy to keep strangers out. | *''Cooperation brings economy of scale and natural advantage: Cooperation rigs the {{risk|market}} in favour of the cooperators against the unaffiliated, thus taking the market further from the {{risk|benign}} ideal. This is not, intrinsically, a bad thing. It is rational, logical and sensible behaviour. Nepotism is an instance of this kind of cooperation: it relies on a structure of trust. It is better viewed as a defensive strategy to ensure those we deal with we can trust, than an offensive strategy to keep strangers out. | ||
*Cooperation ''changes'' the {{risk|market}}: where there were ten equal players, now there are nine: Eight equal small ones, and a bigger one. | *Cooperation ''changes'' the {{risk|market}}: where there were ten equal players, now there are nine: Eight equal small ones, and a bigger one. |