Employment derivatives: Difference between revisions

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{{a|myth|{{image|Ironmountain1|jpg|}}}}{{d|employment derivatives|/ɪmˈplɔɪmənt dɪˈrɪvətɪvz/|n|}}
{{a|myth|{{image|Ironmountain1|jpg|}}}}{{d|employment derivatives|/ɪmˈplɔɪmənt dɪˈrɪvətɪvz/|n|}}
A financial asset class developed in the early part of this millennium by derivatives pioneer and perennial boiler of pots, {{author|Hunter Barkley}}.
A financial instrument developed in the early part of this millennium by derivatives pioneer and perennial boiler of pots, {{author|Hunter Barkley}}.


When midway through his customary annual rant about the meaningless of his life and meagreness of his pay packet, it struck Barkley — an amateur fi-fi novelist and financial services naturalist — that just as the variable cost of his own employment was a material, and largely unhedged, contingency in his own life — Barkley believed himself, rightly, to be short a very ugly option to the Man — so too was everyone else in modern finance and therefore, the other side of that trade, but on a greatly levered magnitude, were banks.
When midway through his customary annual rant about the meaningless of his life and meagreness of his pay packet, it struck Barkley — an amateur [[fi-fi]] novelist and financial services naturalist — that just as the variable cost of his own employment was a material, and largely unhedged, contingency in his own life — Barkley believed himself, rightly, to be short a very ugly [[option]] to the Man — so too was everyone else’s in modern finance and therefore, on the other side of that trade, but on a greatly levered magnitude, were banks’.


A good-sized investment bank, he reasoned, would have an annual ''variance'' in employee compensation, without accounting for any ''changes'' in employment, of at least $2bn.<ref>The maths was like so: assume 40,000 people at an average total compensation of about $300,000, with a ratio of discretionary to fixed of between 20% and 50%</ref>
A good-sized bank, he reasoned, would have an annual ''variance'' in employee compensation, without accounting for any ''changes'' in employment, in the billions of dollars.<ref>The maths was like so: assume 40,000 people at an average total compensation of about $300,000, with a ratio of discretionary to fixed of between 20% and 50%</ref>


But banks were themselves structurally short a rising bid. If rapacious [[private equity]] firms and gormless [[crypto]] startups were bidding mid ranking ops bulls to the moon, the banks had little choice but to follow the bid — for replacement hires. The banks had duration risk: present staff were like callable fixed rate term debt with a three month call. New staff would come in at the prevailing astral rates
This ''variable'' cost of employment had little to do with the bank’s own performance, let alone that of its employees, and a lot to with ''everyone else’s'' performance. A firm having a bad year while its competitors feasted had no option but to hike pay to stop flush rivals piratically raiding its meagre stocks of [[human capital]]. By the same token, a firm that was knocking the ball out of the park while its competitors floundered, did not need to pay its own staff outsized bonuses. Where were they going to go?


Employees rate derivatives promised to change that by taking rebenching lateral movements — which were necessarily highly entropic - they cost a lot in transaction friction, institutional leakage and so on, which could be avoided by just paying the employees more.
Legend has it, upon being timorously asked for a raise, the [[Vampire Squid]]’s fearsome [[GC]] would theatrically throw open a draw with all the unsolicited CVs she had collected in the last week.  “I am sure we’ll find someone to do your job if you’re too good for it.”
 
But this only works when the industry is not in the grip of some mania, as it tends to be from time to time: dot-com startups, hedge funds, crypto and private equity have all skewed the market for unremarkable drones in recent times. This is why you have to pay a brainless trainee two hundred grand.
 
So that option is ugly both ways. Even for a vampire squid. Banks were themselves structurally short a rising bid. If rapacious [[private equity]] firms, or gormless [[crypto]] startups were poaching mid-ranking operations bulls, the banks had little choice but to follow the bid — for replacement hires. The banks thereby had duration risk: current staff would  put up with a certain amount of stuff arming, but there were limits. Traders in the [[human capital management]] desks traders priced staff were like callable fixed rate term debt with a three month call. New staff would come in at the prevailing astral rates, so hedging strategies became vital.
 
Employment rate derivatives promised to change that by taking rebenching lateral movements — which were necessarily highly entropic - they cost a lot in transaction friction, institutional leakage and so on, which could be avoided by just paying the employees more.


The first employment rate swap was between the mid market broker [[Wickliffe Hampton]] and then start-up darling [[lexrifyly]]. WH swapped its discretionary pool for Lexrifyly’s — complicated cross currency issues as it was denominated in crypto.
The first employment rate swap was between the mid market broker [[Wickliffe Hampton]] and then start-up darling [[lexrifyly]]. WH swapped its discretionary pool for Lexrifyly’s — complicated cross currency issues as it was denominated in crypto.