Employment derivatives: Difference between revisions

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A financial instrument developed in the early part of this millennium by derivatives pioneer and perennial boiler of pots, {{author|Hunter Barkley}}.

{{Drop|W|hen midway through}} his customary annual rant about the meaningless of his life and meagreness of his pay packet, it struck Barkley — an amateur [[fi-fi]] novelist and financial services naturalist — that just as the variable cost of his own employment was a material, and largely unhedged, contingency in his own life — Barkley believed himself, rightly, to be short a very ugly [[option]] to the Man — so too was everyone else’s in modern finance and therefore, on the other side of that trade, but on a greatly levered magnitude, were banks’.

A good-sized bank, he reasoned, would have an annual ''variance'' in employee compensation, without accounting for any ''changes'' in employment, in the billions of dollars.<ref>The maths was like so: assume 40,000 people at an average total compensation of about $300,000, with a ratio of discretionary to fixed of between 20% and 50%</ref>

This ''variable'' cost of employment had little to do with the bank’s own performance, let alone that of its employees, and a lot to with ''everyone else’s'' performance. A firm having a bad year while its competitors feasted had no option but to hike pay to stop flush rivals piratically raiding its meagre stocks of [[human capital]]. By the same token, a firm that was knocking the ball out of the park while its competitors floundered, did not need to pay its own staff outsized bonuses. Where were they going to go?

Legend has it, upon being timorously asked for a raise, the [[Vampire Squid]]’s fearsome [[GC]] would theatrically throw open a draw with all the unsolicited CVs she had collected in the last week.  “I am sure we’ll find someone to do your job if you’re too good for it.”

But this only works when the industry is not in the grip of some mania, as it tends to be from time to time: dot-com startups, hedge funds, crypto and private equity have all skewed the market for unremarkable drones in recent times. This is why you have to pay a brainless trainee two hundred grand.  

So that option is ugly both ways. Even for a vampire squid. Banks were themselves structurally short a rising bid. If rapacious [[private equity]] firms, or gormless [[crypto]] startups were poaching mid-ranking operations bulls, the banks had little choice but to follow the bid — for replacement hires. The banks thereby had duration risk: current staff would  put up with a certain amount of stuff arming, but there were limits. Traders in the [[human capital management]] desks traders priced staff were like callable fixed rate term debt with a three month call. New staff would come in at the prevailing astral rates, so hedging strategies became vital.

Employment rate derivatives promised to change that by taking rebenching lateral movements — which were necessarily highly entropic - they cost a lot in transaction friction, institutional leakage and so on, which could be avoided by just paying the employees more.

The first employment rate swap was between the mid market broker [[Wickliffe Hampton]] and then start-up darling [[lexrifyly]]. WH swapped its discretionary pool for Lexrifyly’s — complicated cross currency issues as it was denominated in crypto.

The banks could sell these derivatives directly to employees, saving the bother of having to hedge themselves.

Barkley also saw the opportunity to trade the instrument as an abstract benchmark, for which you need not be employed at all. So did banks, unfortunately, and so began the employment rate swap misselling scandal during which banks would separately hedge out their employee risk and then peremptorily terminate the staff member’s employment, leaving her holding a twenty five year out of the money employment rate swap.

The LIEBOR rate was not the only component of an individual swap: each employee would also have a credibility spread over or under the prevailing LIEBOR rate. This was a competence assessment made by human capital analysts if the staff. Mispricing this could lead to staff defections, to it was routinely marked to market and adjusted by way of a 360° [[performance appraisal|credibility appraisal]] process.

It led to anomalies. HR departments would segment staff according to an internal 5 point scoring metric (a “credibility rating”), and would force rank staff to a curve, lest the banks exposure to employee “alpha” became too concentrated.

Interdepartmental secondments were beset by [[cheapest to deliver]] strategies and diversity arbitrage, particularly over quarter end.

Meantime while periodic RIFs were greatly reduced they were not avoided entirely, and now could be handled quantitatively without reference to performance or value as it was baked into the credibility rating. This led to the curious counterintuitive phenomenon that the staff with the ''highest'' credibility ratings — ergo the most, well, “poubs for pound” expensive — were the first to go. This assisted also in the force ranking process.

They would be like [[interest rate swap|interest rate swaps]]. A bunch of large employers would submit, daily, how much they would be prepared to pay to hire established categories of worker, to derive some kind of London Inter-Employer Bid-Offer Rate (can we call this LIEBOR?). Then the British Human Capital Managers Association would compile and publish a list of rates. Employer could swap out their fixed costs for a floating rate, thereby hedging employment costs. Employees could do the same, hedging against their intrinsic loyalty discount, and restricting employee moves to genuine changes in role, or idiosyncratic hatred of boss, rather than just the need to rebenchmark periodically.