From Bacteria to Bach and Back Again: Difference between revisions

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{{a|book review|}}{{br|From Bacteria to Bach and Back Again}}<br>  
{{a|book review|}}{{br|From Bacteria to Bach and Back Again}}<br>  
{{author|Daniel Dennett}} <be>
{{author|Daniel Dennett}} <br>
===On how to philosophise with a hammer===
===On how to philosophise with a hammer===
{{quote|''Truth cannot be out there — cannot exist independently of the human mind — because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own, unaided by the describing activities of humans, cannot.''
{{quote|{{rorty on truth}}}}
:- {{author|Richard Rorty}}, {{br|Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity}} }}


{{author|Daniel Dennett}} has a knack for a pithy aphorism. He writes technical philosophy in clear, lively prose which invites engagement from enthusiastic amateurs like me. He is best known for 1995’s {{br|Darwin’s Dangerous Idea}}, an exposition about natural selection. Dennett’s insight was to present [[evolution]] as an algorithm:  
{{author|Daniel Dennett}} has a knack for a pithy aphorism. He writes technical philosophy in clear, lively prose which invites engagement from enthusiastic amateurs like me. He is best known for 1995’s {{br|Darwin’s Dangerous Idea}}, an exposition about natural selection. Dennett’s insight was to present [[evolution]] as an algorithm:  
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Darwin’s idea is dangerous because it works on anything that habitually replicates itself with occasional variations: not just organisms. [[Evolution]] is, says Dennett, like a “[[universal acid]]”, apt to dissolve knotty intellectual conundrums wherever they arise.  
Darwin’s idea is dangerous because it works on anything that habitually replicates itself with occasional variations: not just organisms. [[Evolution]] is, says Dennett, like a “[[universal acid]]”, apt to dissolve knotty intellectual conundrums wherever they arise.  


Conundrums don’t come knottier than those of classical metaphysics, and {{author|Daniel Dennett}} has spent the 22 years since {{br|Darwin’s Dangerous Idea}} trying to dissolve them with his bottle of universal acid. First it was free will (in 2003’s {{br|Freedom Evolves}}). Then God (in 2006’s {{br|Breaking the Spell}}) and now, in newly published {{br|From Bacteria to Bach and Back Again}}, Dennett returns to mind, a problem which he declared settled as long ago as 1991, in {{br|Consciousness Explained}}.  
Conundrums don’t come knottier than those of classical metaphysics, and {{author|Daniel Dennett}} has spent the 22 years since {{br|Darwin’s Dangerous Idea}} trying to dissolve them with his bottle of universal acid. First, it was free will (in 2003’s {{br|Freedom Evolves}}). Then God (in 2006’s {{br|Breaking the Spell}}) and now, in newly published {{br|From Bacteria to Bach and Back Again}}, Dennett returns to mind, a problem which he declared settled as long ago as 1991, in {{br|Consciousness Explained}}.  


A one-line summary of each of these books would be: “You’re thinking about it the wrong way. It’s [[evolution]]. Everything else is an illusion”.  
A one-line summary of each of these books would be: “You’re thinking about it the wrong way. It’s [[evolution]]. Everything else is an illusion”.  
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<center>***</center>
<center>***</center>


This abstraction between data and language puts a back on the table a distinction between the “self” and “the brain that generates it” which Dennett has been very keen to banish. Isn’t this [[dualism]]? It might seem like it but, to co-opt another of Dennett’s coinages, it’s not ''greedy'' dualism. It doesn’t impose a supernatural creator or any other kind of sky-hook. It just observes something special is going on: if you want to go from binary code to rice pudding and income tax, you’ve got a bit more explaining to do.   
This abstraction between data and language puts a back on the table a distinction between the “self” and “the brain that generates it” which Dennett has been very keen to banish. Isn’t this [[dualism]]? It might seem like it but, to co-opt another of Dennett’s coinages, it’s not ''greedy'' dualism. It doesn’t impose a supernatural creator or any other kind of sky-hook. It just observes something special is going on: if you want to go from binary code to [[rice pudding and income tax]], you’ve got a bit more explaining to do.   


Dennett barely mentions language or [[metaphor]]. He spends a great deal of time talking about words and memes (in their technical sense: gene-like replicating units of cultural transmission, and not cat videos on YouTube).
Dennett barely mentions language or [[metaphor]]. He spends a great deal of time talking about words and memes (in their technical sense: gene-like replicating units of cultural transmission, and not cat videos on YouTube).
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{{quote|There are so many different worlds  <br>
{{quote|There are so many different worlds  <br>
:So many different suns  <br>
So many different suns  <br>
:We have just one world  <br>
We have just one world  <br>
:But we live in different ones <br>
But we live in different ones <br>
::— Dire Straits, ''Brothers in Arms''.}}
:— Dire Straits, ''Brothers in Arms''.}}


I doubt Mark Knopfler was talking about literary theory. The modern world seems to be polarising. {{author|Daniel Dennett}}’s [[reductionist]] disposition is of a piece with that. But the conscious world each of us inhabits is an ambiguous, ambivalent, imaginarium of a place. Alternative accounts of it and the things in it are just additional tools in the box: we are free to use them, or not, as we wish. If we keep them as alternatives we will not have to philosophise with a hammer when the occasion calls for a soft cotton cloth.
I doubt Mark Knopfler was talking about literary theory. The modern world seems to be polarising. {{author|Daniel Dennett}}’s [[reductionist]] disposition is of a piece with that. But the conscious world each of us inhabits is an ambiguous, ambivalent, imaginarium of a place. Alternative accounts of it and the things in it are just additional tools in the box: we are free to use them, or not, as we wish. If we keep them as alternatives we will not have to philosophise with a hammer when the occasion calls for a soft cotton cloth.