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{{a|devil| | {{a|devil|[[File:Concert flyer.png|450px|thumb|center|Bring cushions.]]}}{{Quote| | ||
{{office scene|III|iv|gazes admiringly at his own Insta feed, which consists entirely of touched-up selfies|silently fumes while the [[JC]], who has managed to elbow his way into what was meant to be a private meeting of important people, will now not stop talking}} | {{office scene|III|iv|gazes admiringly at his own Insta feed, which consists entirely of touched-up selfies|silently fumes while the [[JC]], who has managed to elbow his way into what was meant to be a private meeting of important people, will now not stop talking}} | ||
:'''[[JC]]''': [''Winding down''] “... so, I ask you: why has the legal industry been so ''inept'' at preventing catastrophic risks? There are more lawyers than ever, but we don’t seem to be able to stop anything: Nick Leeson, [[LTCM]], [[Amaranth]], [[Enron]], Global Crossing, Kerviel, [[Madoff]], Bear Stearns, [[Lehman]], [[LIBOR]], Theranos, London Whale, Mossack Fonseca, 1MDB, Wirecard. All our immense legal firepower failed to prevent ''any'' of these.” | :'''[[JC]]''': [''Winding down''] “... so, I ask you: why has the legal industry been so ''inept'' at preventing catastrophic risks? There are more lawyers than ever, but we don’t seem to be able to stop anything: Nick Leeson, [[LTCM]], [[Amaranth]], [[Enron]], Global Crossing, Kerviel, [[Madoff]], Bear Stearns, [[Lehman]], [[LIBOR]], Theranos, London Whale, Mossack Fonseca, 1MDB, Wirecard. All our immense legal firepower failed to prevent ''any'' of these.” | ||
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It is a persistent frame: by the time we get around to analysing any catastrophe and how it played out, all circumstances are known, all options have crystallised and all discretions have hardened. The employee who, with imperfect information and in the fog of war, tacked to ''starboard'' when hindsight revealed a safe harbour to ''port'' finds {{sex|himself}} short an very ugly option which those with executive responsibility for his performance will be mightily tempted to exercise. This is the lesson of {{fieldguide}}: the executive blames the [[meatware]], because by doing so, it exonerates the executive. | It is a persistent frame: by the time we get around to analysing any catastrophe and how it played out, all circumstances are known, all options have crystallised and all discretions have hardened. The employee who, with imperfect information and in the fog of war, tacked to ''starboard'' when hindsight revealed a safe harbour to ''port'' finds {{sex|himself}} short an very ugly option which those with executive responsibility for his performance will be mightily tempted to exercise. This is the lesson of {{fieldguide}}: the executive blames the [[meatware]], because by doing so, it exonerates the executive. | ||
{{rightbox|<youtube>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8PlLCKW4zuY</youtube>}} | |||
===[[Madoff]] and catastrophe=== | ===[[Madoff]] and catastrophe=== | ||
What caused the catastrophe — an inquiry one can only launch upstream — forms, informs, and reforms the ''down''stream [[narrative]]. Take [[Madoff]]: now we have [[No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller|the book]], the film, the exposés, the | What caused the catastrophe — an inquiry one can only launch upstream — forms, informs, and reforms the ''down''stream [[narrative]]. Take [[Madoff]]: now we have [[No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller|the book]], the film, the exposés, the fabulously gruesome congressional committee hearings (see panel) — now we know all that, ''everything'' about Madoff’s investment strategy is ''obviously'' bogus. How could this possibly have been allowed to happen? There can be only one explanation: ''someone further down the chain was asleep at the switch''. | ||
But ''were'' they? This is where the historian’s perspective is more useful than the [[thought leader]]’s.<ref>Sidebar: {{author|Thomas Kuhn}}, the greatest of all philosophers of science, was neither a scientist nor a professional philosopher but a ''historian''.</ref> We know [[Madoff]]’s regulators were ''not'' asleep at the switch because we have {{author|Harry Markopolos}}’s testimony that they ''can’t have been'': he kept prodding them in the ribs with a stick and pointing out exactly the anomalies they should have been alarmed by.<ref>His paper to the SEC, in November 2005 —more than ''three years'' before Madoff eventually shopped himself (even then the SEC didn’t see it!), was entitled “The World’s Largest Hedge Fund is a Fraud.” If that won’t wake you up, nothing will.</ref> | But ''were'' they? This is where the historian’s perspective is more useful than the [[thought leader]]’s.<ref>Sidebar: {{author|Thomas Kuhn}}, the greatest of all philosophers of science, was neither a scientist nor a professional philosopher but a ''historian''.</ref> We know [[Madoff]]’s regulators were ''not'' asleep at the switch because we have {{author|Harry Markopolos}}’s testimony that they ''can’t have been'': he kept prodding them in the ribs with a stick and pointing out exactly the anomalies they should have been alarmed by.<ref>His paper to the SEC, in November 2005 —more than ''three years'' before Madoff eventually shopped himself (even then the SEC didn’t see it!), was entitled “The World’s Largest Hedge Fund is a Fraud.” If that won’t wake you up, nothing will.</ref> | ||