How OTC to CCP clearing works: Difference between revisions

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=={{ccp|Agent}} or {{ccp|Principal}}?==  
=={{ccp|Agent}} or {{ccp|Principal}}?==  


Under current models for clearing OTC derivatives, the capacity in which the {{ccp|{{ccp|clearing member}}}} acts, as either {{ccp|agent}} or {{ccp|principal}}, determines the structure of the {{ccp|cleared trade}}s.  
[[Image:Ccp screenshot.jpg]]


'''Agent''': Where the {{ccp|{{ccp|clearing member}}}} acts as agent, the {{ccp|end user}} will face the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} directly because, although the {{ccp|clearing member}} may appear to be a party to the trade, it is not the true counterparty (here, there is just one transaction, albeit involving three parties).  
Under current models for clearing OTC derivatives, the capacity in which the {{ccp|clearing member}}} acts, as either {{ccp|agent}} or {{ccp|principal}}, determines the structure of the {{ccp|cleared trade}}s.  


'''Principal''': Where the {{ccp|clearing member}} acts as principal, the {{ccp|end user}} will face the {{ccp|clearing member}}, and the {{ccp|clearing member}} will face the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} (here, there are two identical ‘back-to-back’ transactions among the three parties).  
:'''Agent''': Where the {{ccp|clearing member}} acts as agent, the {{ccp|end user}} will face the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} directly because, although the {{ccp|clearing member}} may appear to be a party to the trade, it is not the true counterparty (here, there is just one transaction, albeit involving three parties).
 
:'''Principal''': Where the {{ccp|clearing member}} acts as principal, the {{ccp|end user}} will face the {{ccp|clearing member}}, and the {{ccp|clearing member}} will face the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} (here, there are two identical ‘back-to-back’ transactions among the three parties).  


The above diagram looks at the clearing process, from execution to settlement. (There are a number of different ways in which execution and clearing can be effected.) The {{ccp|end user}} (acting as a trader on its own account, or acting through a {{ccp|broker}}) enters into a trade with a market participant. That trade is then submitted by each party for clearing through its respective {{ccp|clearing member}}. When the trade is accepted for clearing, a give-up or novation of the original contract takes place through which the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} is substituted as the counterparty on both sides of the trade.  
The above diagram looks at the clearing process, from execution to settlement. (There are a number of different ways in which execution and clearing can be effected.) The {{ccp|end user}} (acting as a trader on its own account, or acting through a {{ccp|broker}}) enters into a trade with a market participant. That trade is then submitted by each party for clearing through its respective {{ccp|clearing member}}. When the trade is accepted for clearing, a give-up or novation of the original contract takes place through which the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} is substituted as the counterparty on both sides of the trade.  
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{{ccp|end user}}s will need to examine whether a {{ccp|clearinghouse}} operates on an agency basis or a principal-to-principal basis as part of their risk analysis before choosing clearing platforms. The basic proposition is that under an agency clearing model the {{ccp|end user}} takes greater exposure to the {{ccp|clearinghouse}}, and in a principal-to-principal clearing model there is greater exposure to the {{ccp|clearing member}}. However, matters are likely to be complicated by both the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} rules and the underlying documentation between the {{ccp|clearing member}} and the {{ccp|end user}}.  
{{ccp|end user}}s will need to examine whether a {{ccp|clearinghouse}} operates on an agency basis or a principal-to-principal basis as part of their risk analysis before choosing clearing platforms. The basic proposition is that under an agency clearing model the {{ccp|end user}} takes greater exposure to the {{ccp|clearinghouse}}, and in a principal-to-principal clearing model there is greater exposure to the {{ccp|clearing member}}. However, matters are likely to be complicated by both the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} rules and the underlying documentation between the {{ccp|clearing member}} and the {{ccp|end user}}.  


Documentation  
 
== Documentation ==


The structure of documentation which an {{ccp|end user}} will enter into will depend on a variety of factors including to what extent the clearing platform adopts a futures clearing approach, and indeed whether an OTC contract is ‘exchanged’ for a futures trade before being submitted for clearing, or whether the contract remains an OTC contract during the clearing process.  
The structure of documentation which an {{ccp|end user}} will enter into will depend on a variety of factors including to what extent the clearing platform adopts a futures clearing approach, and indeed whether an OTC contract is ‘exchanged’ for a futures trade before being submitted for clearing, or whether the contract remains an OTC contract during the clearing process.  


Certain clearing platforms will require that each {{ccp|end user}} enters into a futures customer agreement with an addendum to deal with OTC derivatives. Others will require that {{ccp|end user}}s use an existing (or new) ISDA Master Agreement with an addendum to deal with cleared transactions. Both sets of documentation will need to accommodate the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} rules, and in some cases the {{ccp|end user}} may be required to enter into an agreement directly with the {{ccp|clearinghouse}}.  
Certain clearing platforms will require that each {{ccp|end user}} enters into a futures customer agreement with an addendum to deal with OTC derivatives. Others will require that {{ccp|end user}}s use an existing (or new) {{isdama}} with an addendum to deal with cleared transactions. Both sets of documentation will need to accommodate the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} rules, and in some cases the {{ccp|end user}} may be required to enter into an agreement directly with the {{ccp|clearinghouse}}.  


Parties will be able to continue to use their existing ISDA Master Agreements for non-cleared trades – we will hear relatively soon from the US and European regulators as to what types of trades will not be subject to mandatory clearing, and what conditions will apply to such trades (for example to include collateral and capital requirements).  
Parties will be able to continue to use their existing {{isdama}}s for {{ccp|non-cleared trades}} (for those types of trades not be subject to mandatory clearing}} and what conditions will apply to such trades (for example to include {{ccp|collateral}} and capital requirements).  


Margin/collateral maintenance


Margining/collateral maintenance procedures for OTC derivatives will be different in the clearing environment. A unilateral credit relationship will apply whereby {{ccp|clearinghouse}}s will require that collateral is posted with them to cover their exposure, but not necessarily with a parallel requirement to deliver collateral the other way. However, in practice, an {{ccp|end user}} may receive a payment from its {{ccp|clearing member}} to cover the {{ccp|end user}}’s exposure at a particular point in time.  
== Margin/collateral maintenance ==
 
Margining/collateral maintenance procedures for OTC derivatives will be different in the clearing environment. A unilateral credit relationship will apply whereby {{ccp|clearinghouse}}s will require that {{ccp|collateral}} is posted with them to cover their exposure, but not necessarily with a parallel requirement to deliver collateral the other way.  
 
However, in practice, an {{ccp|end user}} may receive a payment from its {{ccp|clearing member}} to cover the {{ccp|end user}}’s exposure at a particular point in time.  


The robustness of a {{ccp|clearinghouse}} from a creditworthiness perspective will depend on a number of factors including how much margin it takes and how it holds it, and how much capital the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} has to fall back on.  
The robustness of a {{ccp|clearinghouse}} from a creditworthiness perspective will depend on a number of factors including how much margin it takes and how it holds it, and how much capital the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} has to fall back on.  


A key issue being discussed at the moment concerns segregation of customer collateral. Customers of Lehman found that their collateral was not where they thought it was, and was unexpectedly swept up in the insolvency process. This has focused {{ccp|end user}}s’ minds on where, and how, collateral is held, and the extent to which it is ring-fenced and recoverable, should the worst happen.  
'''Segregation of {{ccp|collateral}}''': A key issue being discussed at the moment concerns {{ccp|segregation}} of customer {{ccp|collateral}}. Lehman customers found that their collateral was unexpectedly swept up in the insolvency process. This has focused {{ccp|end user}}s’ minds on where, and how, {{ccp|collateral}} is held, and the extent to which it is ring-fenced and recoverable, should the worst happen.
 
{{ccp|Segregation}} of collateral in a clearing context should improve the ‘{{ccp|portability}}’ of positions (i.e. the transfer of positions to a new {{ccp|clearing member}}) in the event of the failure of a {{ccp|clearing member}}, because the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} will be more capable of finding a willing transferee if the positions can be transferred with sufficient margin to support the positions.  


Segregation of collateral in a clearing context should improve the ‘portability’ of positions (i.e. the transfer of positions to a new {{ccp|clearing member}}) in the event of the failure of a {{ccp|clearing member}}, because the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} will be more capable of finding a willing transferee if the positions can be transferred with sufficient margin to support the positions.


Gross and net margining  
== Gross and net margining ==


{{ccp|end user}}s will need to examine whether they are required to margin their trades with their {{ccp|clearing member}} on a ‘gross’ or ‘net’ basis, and whether their {{ccp|clearing member}} is required to post margin to the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} on a gross or net basis. In general, gross margining should improve the portability of positions between {{ccp|clearing member}}s, although posting margin on a net basis is a more efficient use of capital because it allows offsetting risks to decrease the margin required.  
{{ccp|end user}}s will need to examine whether they are required to {{ccp|margin}} their trades with their {{ccp|clearing member}} on a ‘gross’ or ‘net’ basis, and whether their {{ccp|clearing member}} is required to post {{ccp|margin}} to the {{ccp|clearinghouse}} on a gross or net basis. In general, gross margining should improve the portability of positions between {{ccp|clearing member}}s, although posting margin on a net basis is a more efficient use of capital because it allows offsetting risks to decrease the margin required.  


A {{ccp|clearinghouse}} may hold collateral in different pools for different groups of customers. Collateral deposited by {{ccp|clearing member}}s for their own proprietary positions should in any event be held in a separate ‘house’ account. Customers may be offered the ability to margin on a gross or net basis, or a combination of the two, with collateral being held in separate pools, one for ‘gross margining customers’ and one for ‘net margining customers’.  
A {{ccp|clearinghouse}} may hold {{ccp|collateral}} in different pools for different groups of customers. Collateral deposited by {{ccp|clearing member}}s for their own proprietary positions should in any event be held in a separate ‘house’ account. Customers may be offered the ability to margin on a gross or net basis, or a combination of the two, with collateral being held in separate pools, one for ‘gross margining customers’ and one for ‘net margining customers’.  


Ring-fencing of accounts  
== Ring-fencing of accounts ==


To take this analysis a step further, certain buy side participants have been pushing for a further level of segregation which would involve each buy side participant’s collateral being ring-fenced from collateral provided by other participants, to avoid exposure to a default by those other participants. In this way, customers may require segregated accounts on a ‘per fund’ basis or perhaps a ‘per manager’ basis – in the latter case a fund would accept default risk against other funds, but only those within its own ‘stable’.  
To take this analysis a step further, certain buy side participants have been pushing for a further level of segregation which would involve each buy side participant’s collateral being ring-fenced from collateral provided by other participants, to avoid exposure to a default by those other participants. In this way, customers may require segregated accounts on a ‘per fund’ basis or perhaps a ‘per manager’ basis – in the latter case a fund would accept default risk against other funds, but only those within its own ‘stable’.  
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