ISDA Comparison: Difference between revisions

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===[[Close-out]] method===
===[[Close-out]] method===
The {{2002ma}}, with its {{isdaprov|Close-Out Amount}}, is way simpler than the {{1992ma}} which gets bogged down with all this {{isdaprov|Loss}}, {{isdaprov|Market Quotation}}, {{isdaprov|First Method}}, {{isdaprov|Second Method}} malarkey.
The {{2002ma}}, with its {{isdaprov|Close-Out Amount}}, is way simpler than the {{1992ma}} which gets bogged down with all this {{isdaprov|Loss}}, {{isdaprov|Market Quotation}}, {{isdaprov|First Method}}, {{isdaprov|Second Method}} malarkey. See Section [[6(e)(i) - 1992 ISDA provision]] for more detail though, trust me, if you do you will lament the hours of your life you will never get back.  
====Two way payments only====
====Two way payments only====
The {{1992isda}} offered parties the choice between the outrageous one-way payment (the “{{isdaprov|First Method}}”) where only an innocent party could realise its net [[mark-to-market]] gain; and two-way payment (the “{{isdaprov|Second Method}}”) of the {{isdaprov|Settlement Amount}} following early termination, where a {{isdaprov|Non-defaulting Party}} could nonetheless find itself having to pay the {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} on close-out under the {{1992isda}}, where it was overall out-of-the-money on its {{isdaprov|Transaction}}s. Seeing as no-one with a functioning frontal lobe would (or, in the ten years of the {{1992ma}}, did) agree to the {{isdaprov|First Method}}, the {{2002isda}} ditched it and provided instead for only two-way payment, under the “{{isdaprov|Close-out Amount}}” concept.  Few tears were shed, though the famous transaction manager at a certain US house who, to this day, still insists on the {{1987ma}}, must have bridled a bit.
The {{1992isda}} offered parties the choice between the outrageous one-way payment (the “{{isdaprov|First Method}}”) where only an innocent party could realise its net [[mark-to-market]] gain; and two-way payment (the “{{isdaprov|Second Method}}”) of the {{isdaprov|Settlement Amount}} following early termination, where a {{isdaprov|Non-defaulting Party}} could nonetheless find itself having to pay the {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} on close-out under the {{1992isda}}, where it was overall out-of-the-money on its {{isdaprov|Transaction}}s. Seeing as no-one with a functioning frontal lobe would (or, in the ten years of the {{1992ma}}, did) agree to the {{isdaprov|First Method}}, the {{2002isda}} ditched it and provided instead for only two-way payment, under the “{{isdaprov|Close-out Amount}}” concept.  Few tears were shed, though the famous transaction manager at a certain US house who, to this day, still insists on the {{1987ma}}, must have bridled a bit.
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*'''Hierarchy Rules''': Under the {{2002isda}}, the hierarchy rules are as follows:  
*'''Hierarchy Rules''': Under the {{2002isda}}, the hierarchy rules are as follows:  
#if an occurrence would constitute an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} '''''and''''' a {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}}, the occurrence will be treated as an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} ;  
#if an occurrence would constitute an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} '''''and''''' a {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}}, the occurrence will be treated as an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} ;  
#if an occurrence would constitute an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} '''''or''''' {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}} '''''and''''' an {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} under {{isdaprov|Section 5(a)(i)}}, {{isdaprov|Section 5(a)(ii)}}(1), or {{isdaprov|5(a)(iii)}}(1), it will be treated as an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} or {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}}  so long as the occurrence relates to a failure to make any payment or delivery, failure to comply with a material term of the Agreement, or a failure to comply with a material provision of the {{2002isda}} or any {{isdaprov|Credit Support Document}} ; and  
#if an occurrence would constitute an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} '''''or''''' {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}} '''''and''''' an {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} under Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(i)}}, Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(ii)}}(1), or {{isdaprov|5(a)(iii)}}(1), it will be treated as an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} or {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}}  so long as the occurrence relates to a failure to make any payment or delivery, failure to comply with a material term of the Agreement, or a failure to comply with a material provision of the {{2002isda}} or any {{isdaprov|Credit Support Document}} ; and  
#if an occurrence would constitute an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} '''''or''''' {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}} '''''and''''' an {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} (other than an {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} as described in clause (ii)) or Other {{isdaprov|Termination Event}}, then it will be treated as the applicable {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} or Other {{isdaprov|Termination Event}} and not as a {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}} or {{isdaprov|Illegality}}
#if an occurrence would constitute an {{isdaprov|Illegality}} '''''or''''' {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}} '''''and''''' an {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} (other than an {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} as described in clause (ii)) or Other {{isdaprov|Termination Event}}, then it will be treated as the applicable {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} or Other {{isdaprov|Termination Event}} and not as a {{isdaprov|Force Majeure}} or {{isdaprov|Illegality}}


===={{isdaprov|Events of Default}} ====
=={{isdaprov|Events of Default}} ==
The {{isdaprov|Events of Default}} in the {{1992isda}} were not massively changed in the {{2002isda}}. Some revisions were made to reflect changes in market practice (by which parties would religiously, tediously, amend their 1992 {{isdaprov|Schedule}}s) including:
The {{isdaprov|Events of Default}} in the {{1992isda}} were not massively changed in the {{2002isda}}. Some revisions were made to reflect changes in market practice (by which parties would religiously, tediously, amend their 1992 {{isdaprov|Schedule}}s) including:
*'''Cure Periods''': Some of the cure periods were reduced out of the concern that these cure periods create undue risk when market volatility increases in times of turmoil in the financial markets. This was addressed in the {{2002isda}} by reducing the cure periods:
====Cure Periods====
Some of the cure periods were reduced out of the concern that these cure periods create undue risk when market volatility increases in times of turmoil in the financial markets. This was addressed in the {{2002isda}} by reducing the cure periods:
:*Under {{isdaprov|Failure to Pay or Deliver}} from three {{isdaprov|Local Business Day}}s to one;  
:*Under {{isdaprov|Failure to Pay or Deliver}} from three {{isdaprov|Local Business Day}}s to one;  
:*For a payment {{isdaprov|Default Under Specified Transaction}} (Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(v)}}(2)) from three {{isdaprov|Local Business Day}}s to one; and  
:*For a payment {{isdaprov|Default Under Specified Transaction}} (Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(v)}}(2)) from three {{isdaprov|Local Business Day}}s to one; and  
:*For an involuntary {{isdaprov|Bankruptcy}} filing pursuant to Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(vii)}}(1)(B) from 30 to 15days.  
:*For an involuntary {{isdaprov|Bankruptcy}} filing pursuant to Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(vii)}}(1)(B) from 30 to 15days.  
*'''{{isdaprov|Breach of Agreement}}''': An additional subsection has been added to the {{isdaprov|Breach of Agreement}} {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} (Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(ii)}} that establishes an {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} when “the party disaffirms, disclaims, repudiates or rejects, in whole or in part, or challenges the validity of, this Master Agreement, any {{isdaprov|Confirmation}} executed and delivered by that party or any {{isdaprov|Transaction}} evidenced by such a {{isdaprov|Confirmation}} (or such action is taken by any person or entity appointed or empowered to operate it or act on its behalf).” Although this additional subsection is part of Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(ii)}}, the 30 day cure period applies only to Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(ii)}}(1) and not to the new subparagraph (2). This new {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} is similar to the {{isdaprov|Credit Support Default}} {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} in Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(iii)}}(3) of the {{1992isda}}, which was also included in the {{2002isda}}.  
===={{isdaprov|Breach of Agreement}}====
*'''{{isdaprov|Default under Specified Transaction}}''': This {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} was expanded in five significant ways:
An additional subsection has been added to the {{isdaprov|Breach of Agreement}} {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} (Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(ii)}} that establishes an {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} when “the party disaffirms, disclaims, repudiates or rejects, in whole or in part, or challenges the validity of, this Master Agreement, any {{isdaprov|Confirmation}} executed and delivered by that party or any {{isdaprov|Transaction}} evidenced by such a {{isdaprov|Confirmation}} (or such action is taken by any person or entity appointed or empowered to operate it or act on its behalf).” Although this additional subsection is part of Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(ii)}}, the 30 day cure period applies only to Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(ii)}}(1) and not to the new subparagraph (2). This new {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} is similar to the {{isdaprov|Credit Support Default}} {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} in Section {{isdaprov|5(a)(iii)}}(3) of the {{1992isda}}, which was also included in the {{2002isda}}.  
#Delivery and other general defaults require the liquidation or early termination of the {{isdaprov|Specified Transaction}} (for general defaults) or the liquidation or early termination of all outstanding {{isdaprov|Transaction}}s under the documentation supporting the {{isdaprov|Specified Transaction}} (for a delivery default). This change was made with [[repo]]s and [[stock loan]]s in mind because a failure under a repo is not uncommon and may not be indicative of the {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}}’s creditworthiness, particularly when the default concerns delivery obligations.
===={{isdaprov|DUST}}====
#This {{isdaprov|Event of Default}} may now be triggered by a default under a credit support arrangement relating to a {{isdaprov|Specified Transaction}} . {{isdaprov|Specified Transaction}} credit support arrangements were not addressed in the {{1992isda}}.
{{isda 5(a)(v) comm|isdaprov}}
# As discussed above, the cure period for the failure to make a final payment or early termination payment in respect of a {{isdaprov|Specified Transaction}} has been reduced from three days to one.
===={{isdaprov|Cross Default}}====
#The [[repudiation]] subsection was modified in two significant ways:  (i) the phrase “or challenges the validity of” was added after “disaffirms, disclaims, repudiates or rejects” to reduce ambiguity as to whether a party’s action constitutes a repudiation; and (ii) a Non-{{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} is now required to possess evidence of such repudiation that is executed and delivered by the {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}}, its Credit Support Provider, or a Specified Entity; (iii) The definition of {{isdaprov|Specified Transaction}} has been broadened to include additional types of {{isdaprov|Transaction}}s market participants commonly add to Schedules to the Master Agreement, such as repos, and includes a catchall clause designed to include any future derivative products that are not specifically enumerated in this definition.
The formula for determining a {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} has been revised to permit the aggregation of amounts owed under multiple defaults. In determining whether the {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} threshold has been exceeded, the principal amount of the accelerated obligations in subparagraph (i) and the unpaid amount under subparagraph (ii) are added together to determine whether the {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} threshold has been exceeded. In the {{1992isda}}, subparagraphs (i) and (ii) could not be combined to evidence a {{isdaprov|Cross Default}}.  
*'''{{isdaprov|Cross Default}}''': The formula for determining a {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} has been revised to permit the aggregation of amounts owed under multiple defaults. In determining whether the {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} threshold has been exceeded, the principal amount of the accelerated obligations in subparagraph (i) and the unpaid amount under subparagraph (ii) are added together to determine whether the {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} threshold has been exceeded. In the {{1992isda}}, subparagraphs (i) and (ii) could not be combined to evidence a {{isdaprov|Cross Default}}.  
===={{isdaprov|Merger Without Assumption}}====
*'''{{isdaprov|Merger Without Assumption}}''': The types of events that constitute a “[[merger]]” have been broadened to include reorganization, reincorporation and reconstitution, and the methods by which a resulting, surviving or transferee entity can assume obligations have been deleted.  
The types of events that constitute a “[[merger]]” have been broadened to include reorganization, reincorporation and reconstitution, and the methods by which a resulting, surviving or transferee entity can assume obligations have been deleted.  
*'''{{isdaprov|Credit Support Default}}''': The failure of a security interest granted pursuant to a {{isdaprov|Credit Support Document}} now constitutes a {{isdaprov|Credit Support Default}}.  
===={{isdaprov|Credit Support Default}}====
*'''{{isdaprov|Set-Off}}''':  The absence of a {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} provision is seen by many as the biggest weakness of the {{1992isda}}. Although the User’s Guide to the {{1992isda}} included an optional {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} provision, the optional provision was not effective unless the parties added the provision to the Schedule to the {{1992isda}}. The {{2002isda}} remedies this concern by including a {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} provision that is similar to the provision included in the User’s Guide. This provision permits the Non- {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} to {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} any amounts owing between the parties against any early termination amount. While cross-product {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} is permitted, cross-affiliate {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} is not incorporated into this provision. The User’s Guide also suggested adding a representation to satisfy the requirement that mutuality must exist between the parties for a {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} to be effected. In response to this concern, the {{2002isda}} includes an additional representation in Section {{isdaprov|3(g)}} that both parties are principals in respect of all {{isdaprov|Transaction}}s.
The failure of a security interest granted pursuant to a {{isdaprov|Credit Support Document}} now constitutes a {{isdaprov|Credit Support Default}}.  
===={{isdaprov|Set-Off}}====
The absence of a {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} provision is seen by many as the biggest weakness of the {{1992isda}}. Although the User’s Guide to the {{1992isda}} included an optional {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} provision, the optional provision was not effective unless the parties added the provision to the Schedule to the {{1992isda}}. The {{2002isda}} remedies this concern by including a {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} provision that is similar to the provision included in the User’s Guide. This provision permits the Non- {{isdaprov|Defaulting Party}} to {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} any amounts owing between the parties against any early termination amount. While cross-product {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} is permitted, cross-affiliate {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} is not incorporated into this provision. The User’s Guide also suggested adding a representation to satisfy the requirement that mutuality must exist between the parties for a {{isdaprov|Set-Off}} to be effected. In response to this concern, the {{2002isda}} includes an additional representation in Section {{isdaprov|3(g)}} that both parties are principals in respect of all {{isdaprov|Transaction}}s.
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