Inhouse counsel: Difference between revisions

In this and many other ways their incentives are inverted. Where a [[private practice lawyer]] is a profit centre: one that profits from ''discord'' — the more of it, and the longer it takes to untangle, the better — an in-house lawyer resolutely is ''not''. Inhouse counsel don’t generate revenue: they can’t — they are not ''allowed'' to. They ''cost'' revenue. This is not just by coincidence: the [[legal department]] is by its very ''[[ontology]]'' a cost centre. This does not stop giddy [[general counsel]], [[from time to time]], alighting on the idea that perhaps they might like to be a profit centre. To be sure, this would be an excellent corrective to the unimaginative disposition usually held by the [[chief operating office]] when it holds the legal function in contemplation: that it is a blight, a cost, a drag and, at the end of the day, a roadblock: a costly department stocked with expensive professionals whose main talent seems to be devising creative ways of saying “''no''”. 

“But many of our lawyers are commercial and creative, and they ''do'' contribute to the successful execution of banking deal flow.” Indeed; this is quite so. “So, why should we not be credited with our contribution?”

There are many simple, axiomatic answers to this question: the importance of segregating those divisions whose primary mandate is defensive from those whose role is to seek out reward — that kind of thing. But one can quickly become bogged down with distracting details  and lose sight of the wood for all the argumentative trees. An easier way of remembering and shutting off this debate before it gets going is the single word: “[[Enron]]”. That is what happens when you turn a risk control function into a profit center.

There is a cautionary tale the JC has a