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Intention to create legal relations: Difference between revisions
Intention to create legal relations (view source)
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But I never thought it would come to this.... | {{a|contract|}}But I never thought it would come to this.... | ||
There is some debate on whether the [[intention to create legal relations]] is a separate ingredient in a legally binding contract, or really just an evaluative description of what all the other ingredients ([[offer]], [[acceptance]] and [[consideration]]) add up to. | There is some debate on whether the [[intention to create legal relations]] is a separate ingredient in a legally binding contract, or really just an evaluative description of what all the other ingredients ([[offer]], [[acceptance]] and [[consideration]]) add up to. | ||
Their worshipful honours have held<ref>{{cite|Edwards|Skyways|1964|1WLR|349}} that in an “express” contract or an “ordinary commercial transaction”, the burden of proof is on she who alleges the ''absence'' of an intention (but really? if, in actually signing a legal agreement, you did not intend to create legal relations, then what on earth did you think you ''were'' doing?) | '''Express {{tag|contract}}s''': Their worshipful honours have held<ref>{{cite|Edwards|Skyways|1964|1WLR|349}}</ref> that in an “express” contract or an “ordinary commercial transaction”, the burden of proof is on she who alleges the ''absence'' of an intention (but really? if, in actually signing a legal agreement, you did not ''intend'' to create legal relations, then what on earth did you think you ''were'' doing?) | ||
'''Implied contracts''': Where [[offer]] and [[acceptance]] of a contract can only be implied from conduct, then there are authorities<ref>{{cite1|The Aramis|1989|1Lloyd’sRep|213}}</ref> that the person alleging the contract has the burden of proof. But this seems to be no more than a burden of proving [[offer and acceptance]] in the first place. | |||
And a young [[Lord Denning|Mr Justice Denning]], off the record in the [[HighTrees]] case, thought that the intention to be bound by a [[promise]], whether or not accompanied by [[consideration]], might have some value, at least on a defensive tack, though it is hard to find support for that seemingly sacrilegious view. | |||
So while there is some judicial authority that the [[intention to create legal relations]] is a separate thing, but dammit, that legal authority, however [[Doctrine of precedent|binding]] it might be, is wrong. In [[this commentator]]’s irrelevant, jaundiced view. | |||
As the maxim has it, ''[[anus matronae parvae malas leges faciunt]]''. | As the maxim has it, ''[[anus matronae parvae malas leges faciunt]]''. | ||
This is a [[Jolly contrarian|contrarian]] view, by the way. | This is a [[Jolly contrarian|contrarian]] view, by the way. | ||
{{contractformation}} | {{contractformation}} | ||
{{ref}} | {{ref}} | ||