82,891
edits
Ipso facto clause: Difference between revisions
no edit summary
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
||
| (4 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{g}} | {{g}} | ||
===USA: [[Ipso facto clause]]s and the [[Bankruptcy Code]]=== | ===USA: [[Ipso facto clause]]s and the [[Bankruptcy Code]]=== | ||
In | In America, an [[ipso facto clause]] is one that allows one party [[terminate]] a contract, [[accelerate]] payments under it, or somehow get an unconscionable jump on the other party, if that unfortunate other party goes [[bankrupt]]. These are generally invalid under the [[Bankruptcy Code]] because an insolvency trustee is not bound by any provision that is conditioned on the debtor's insolvency. | ||
11 USC §365(e)(i) states: | 11 USC §365(e)(i) states: | ||
| Line 13: | Line 13: | ||
====Example: the flip clause in a [[synthetic CDO]]==== | ====Example: the flip clause in a [[synthetic CDO]]==== | ||
In {{casenote|Lehman Brothers Financing|BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited}} the US Bankruptcy Court held a “flip” clause in one of [[Lehman]]’s [[synthetic CDO]]s was an unenforceable [[ipso facto clause]]. Here the [[flip clause]] that inverted the priority of creditors — ordinarily, a swap counterparty ranks ahead of noteholders in a credit linked note, which figures, since the economic point of the deal is for the noteholder to sell [[credit protection]] to the swap counterparty — so that [[CDO]] noteholders would rank | In {{casenote|Lehman Brothers Financing|BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited}} the US Bankruptcy Court held a “flip” clause in one of [[Lehman]]’s [[synthetic CDO]]s was an unenforceable [[ipso facto clause]]. Here the [[flip clause]] that inverted the priority of creditors — ordinarily, a swap counterparty ranks ahead of noteholders in a [[credit-linked note]], which figures, since the economic point of the deal is for the noteholder to sell [[credit protection]] to the swap counterparty — so that [[CDO]] noteholders would rank ''ahead'' of the Lehman swap counterparty if Lehman defaulted under its swap with the CDO issuer. | ||
===UK: the [[anti-deprivation]] principle=== | ===UK: the [[anti-deprivation]] principle=== | ||
In the United Kingdom there is no statutory equivalent of | In the United Kingdom, beyond the [[voidable preference]] provision (section 239) in the [[Insolvency Act 1986]] there is no ''statutory'' equivalent of America’s [[ipso facto rule]], but resourceful [[common law]] judges invented<ref>I mean, “uncovered an until-then-disregarded-but-nonetheless-foundational [[Doctrine of precedent|principle of the common law]] that extends, unspoken, back to the dawn of civilisation”.</ref> the “[[anti‑deprivation rule]]”: that, in the honeyed words of Sir William Page Wood V.C., in {{citer|Whitmore|Mason|1861|2J&H|204}}: | ||
:“no person possessed of property can reserve that property to himself until he shall become [[bankrupt]], and then provide that, [[in the event of]] his becoming bankrupt, it shall pass to another and not his creditors”. | |||
This required some wilfulness on the bankrupt’s part and not just inadvertence or lucky hap, but if you ''intend'' to defeat the standing bankruptcy laws you will not get away with it. [[Voidable preference]] laws, defeating hastily-contrived security interests over the assets of a sinking merchant, do much the same thing. | |||
To this commentator, this feels quite a long way away from exercising a [[bankruptcy]] [[Event of Default]] under a master trading agreement, and so it has generally been regarded, until the [[coronavirus|global pandemic]] prompted some hasty and ill-thought out legislative proposals in the spring of 2020. | |||
It seems, at any rate, that the {{isdama}}’s Section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}}, which allows a party a positive windfall in the event of the oppo’s [[insolvency]] (in that it can suspend its own performance, but still insist on performance from the defaulting counterparty) might resemble some kind of intended deprivation; merely crystallising ones existing position and stopping it getting further down the Swanee, as one might do by closing out your {{isdama}} altogether, seems less so. | |||
{{sa}} | |||
*Section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii}}) of the {{isdama}}. | |||
{{ref}} | |||