Iterated prisoner’s dilemma: Difference between revisions

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{{a|risk|}}A game of [[prisoner’s dilemma]] with a twist: You get to play the game ''repeatedly'' with the same player (crucially, in for an indeterminate number of rounds, so neither of you know at any time that there won’t be “another time”), and you can remember how the other player treated you last time. In [[game theory]] terms, this dramatically changes the payoffs. whereas in a single round, the rational best move is to defect, in an [[iterated]] game, the best move is to cooperate ''until the other guy defects''. If she defects, defect in the next round, tit for tat.
{{a|devil|Prisonersdilemmatable}}A game of [[prisoner’s dilemma]] with a twist: You get to play the game ''repeatedly'' with the same player (crucially, in for an indeterminate number of rounds, so neither of you know at any time that there won’t be “another time”), and you can remember how the other player treated you last time. In [[game theory]] terms, this dramatically changes the payoffs. whereas in a single round, the rational best move is to defect, in an [[iterated]] game, the best move is to cooperate ''until the other guy defects''. If she defects, defect in the next round, tit for tat.


If two prisoners start out cooperating and play this tit-for-tat game they will always cooperate. Nice, huh?
If two prisoners start out cooperating and play this tit-for-tat game they will always cooperate. Nice, huh?