LIBOR rigging: Difference between revisions

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{{a|casenote|{{image|Dramatic look|jpg|''[[Dramatic look gopher]] goes to the [[British Bankers’ Association]]'' {{vsr|2024}}}}}}{{quote|
{{a|casenote|{{image|Dramatic look|jpg|''[[Dramatic look gopher]] goes to the [[British Bankers’ Association]]'' {{vsr|2024}}}}}}{{quote|
{{drop|“T|he courts have}} for many years been developing and using a broad concept which at times has threatened to bring chaos rather than light to the solution of the legal problems it has affected. This concept enunciates the division between questions of law and questions of fact.
{{drop|“I|f the law}} supposes that,” said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his hat emphatically in both hands, “the law is a ass—a idiot. If that’s the eye of the law, the law is a bachelor; and the worst I wish the law is that his eye may be opened by experience—by experience.”
:—''{{plainlink|https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/810/|What is a “Question of Law”?}}'', Arthur W. Phelps, 1949, bringing yet more chaos to the table.
}}{{quote|
{{drop|“I|f the law}} supposes that,” said Mr. Bumble,“the law is a ass—a idiot. If that’s the eye of the law, the law is a bachelor; and the worst I wish the law is that his eye may be opened by experience—by experience.”
:— Charles Dickens, ''Oliver Twist''}}
:— Charles Dickens, ''Oliver Twist''}}
== LIBOR: deep background ==


==== Banks have structural interest rate risk ====
==== Banks have structural interest rate risk ====
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In the early nineteen eighties, some [[First Men|bright sparks]] at [[Salomon Brothers]] figured out how to make interest rates into a tradable instrument. To standardise that instrument, the banks realised they would need a common way of describing how their interest rates change through time. A “benchmark”.
In the early nineteen eighties, some [[First Men|bright sparks]] at [[Salomon Brothers]] figured out how to make interest rates into a tradable instrument. To standardise that instrument, the banks realised they would need a common way of describing how their interest rates change through time. A “benchmark”.


==== Chess club and the cool kids ====
==== Chess club ====
{{Drop|E|nter the}} the [[British Bankers’ Association]]. This was just the sleepy, city-grandees-in-a-smoke-filled-gentlemen’s-club-in-Threadneedle-Street of your imagination. It began to compile what it called the “London Interbank Offered Rate” — “[[LIBOR]]”. This was to be an objective distillation of all the major banks’ borrowing rates.  
{{Drop|E|nter the}} the [[British Bankers’ Association]]. This was just the sleepy, city-grandees-in-a-smoke-filled-gentlemen’s-club-in-Threadneedle-Street of your imagination. It began to compile what it called the “London Interbank Offered Rate” — “[[LIBOR]]”. This was to be an objective distillation of all the major banks’ borrowing rates.  


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Now. It is one of JC’s [[Financial disasters roll of honour|axioms of financial scandal]] that [[Air crashes v financial crashes|''calumny happens where you least expect it'']]. This is because success in financial services is in large part about “[[edge]]”, and you generally only find an [[edge]] where no-one else is looking for it.
Now. It is one of JC’s [[Financial disasters roll of honour|axioms of financial scandal]] that [[Air crashes v financial crashes|''calumny happens where you least expect it'']]. This is because success in financial services is in large part about “[[edge]]”, and you generally only find an [[edge]] where no-one else is looking for it.


Tom Hayes was a cool kid (''metaphorically'': literally he has been described as “socially awkward”) but he hung out in the chess club. He, and a bunch of other groovers, found some [[edge]] there, where no one was looking for it. No one bothered them and they didn’t do any harm — at least, not that anyone has been since able to point to. But they sent each other lots of [[embarrassing emails]].  
==== The cool kids ====
{{Drop|T|om Hayes was}} a cool kid (''metaphorically'': literally he has been described as “socially awkward”) but he hung out in the chess club. He, and a bunch of other groovers, found some [[edge]] there, where no one was looking for it. No one bothered them and they didn’t do a lot of harm — not, at least, that anyone has been since able to point to. But they sent each other lots of [[embarrassing emails]].  


In any case, they made an effort to submit LIBOR rates that suited their derivatives trading positions and not, necessarily, their banks’ structural interest rate positions.
In any case, they made an effort to submit LIBOR rates that suited their derivatives trading positions and not, necessarily, their banks’ structural interest rate positions.
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Another one of JC’s axioms: [[If you like sausages, don’t work in a smallgoods factory|''if you like sausages, don’t work in a smallgoods factory'']].
Another one of JC’s axioms: [[If you like sausages, don’t work in a smallgoods factory|''if you like sausages, don’t work in a smallgoods factory'']].


==== Interest rate derivatives ====
As per the “basic banking model”, to manage its structural interest rate risk, a bank ''generally'' would want LIBOR to be low. But deposits are not the only show in town — there are other exposures to the interest rate market: notably, the new tradable instruments: [[interest rate swap]]s.
{{drop|A|s per the}} “basic banking model”, to manage its structural interest rate risk, a bank ''generally'' would want LIBOR to be low. But deposits are not the only show in town — there are other exposures to the interest rate market: notably, the new tradable instruments: [[interest rate swap]]s.
 
==== Interest rate swaps ====
{{Drop|I|n an interest}} rate swap, the bank “swaps” interest rates with individual counterparties: it might, for an agreed period, pay one counterparty a fixed rate and receive from it a floating rate; with another it might pay floating and receive fixed.  


In an interest rate swap, the bank “swaps” interest rates with individual counterparties: it might, for an agreed period, pay one counterparty a fixed rate and receive from it a floating rate; with another it might pay floating and receive fixed. Before the advent of swaps, the only way of getting exposure to interest rates was by borrowing and lending principal. This required a lot of money down.<ref>It is a [[a swap as a loan|misconception]] that interest rate swaps do not involve principal borrowing and lending, but that is a story for another day</ref> Interest rate swaps got popular, fast. There are now trillions of dollars in notional interest rate swaps outstanding on any day.
Before the advent of swaps, the only way of getting exposure to interest rates was by borrowing and lending principal. This required a lot of money down.<ref>It is a [[a swap as a loan|misconception]] that interest rate swaps do not involve principal borrowing and lending, but that is a story for another day</ref> Interest rate swaps got popular, fast. There are now trillions of dollars in notional interest rate swaps outstanding on any day.


Unlike basic banking, there is no structural bias to swap trading. If a bank swaps a five-year fixed rate for a five-year floating rate, and LIBOR then goes up, by definition the bank profits: the “[[present value]]” of its incoming floating rate will increase while the [[present value]]  of its outgoing fixed rate stays the same. The dealer is therefore “[[in-the-money]]”. If it swapped floating for fixed in the same case, it would book a corresponding loss.
Unlike basic banking, there is no structural bias to swap trading. If a bank swaps a five-year fixed rate for a five-year floating rate, and LIBOR then goes up, by definition the bank profits: the “[[present value]]” of its incoming floating rate will increase while the [[present value]]  of its outgoing fixed rate stays the same. The dealer is therefore “[[in-the-money]]”. If it swapped floating for fixed in the same case, it would book a corresponding loss.