LIBOR rigging: Difference between revisions

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While banks try to balance their books so their portfolio of customer swaps offset each other as far as possible, how they “position” the book might help manage the bank’s ''structural'' interest rate risk.  
While banks try to balance their books so their portfolio of customer swaps offset each other as far as possible, how they “position” the book might help manage the bank’s ''structural'' interest rate risk.  


We can see in any case that a swap trader who is “long” floating rates will wish floating rates to go higher. This prospect, we venture, was not wildly present in the minds of the Sir Bufton Tuftons who formulated the LIBOR rules defining how submitting banks should choose the rates they submit each day.
Under the “basic banking model”, a bank will always be “[[Axe|axed]]” for floating rates to be as low as possible. You would expect a basic bank’s submissions to reflect that. But a swap trader who is “long” floating rates will wish floating rates to go ''higher''.  


Under the “basic banking model”, a bank will always be “[[Axe|axed]]” for floating rates to be as low as possible. You would expect its submissions to reflect that. The question arose later, even though it did not arise then: when submitting a rate, what account should a bank take of its own derivatives trading book?   
This prospect, we venture, was not wildly present in the minds of the Sir Bufton Tuftons who formulated the LIBOR rules defining how submitting banks should choose the rates they submit each day.
 
The question arose later, even though it did not arise then: when submitting a rate, what account, if any, may a bank take of its own derivatives trading book?   
==== The LIBOR Definition====
==== The LIBOR Definition====
{{drop|T|he [[UK Finance|BBA]]’s guidance}} came in the form of “Instructions to BBA LIBOR Contributor Banks”. The critical part of these — what the court called the “LIBOR Definition” — ran as follows:
{{drop|T|he [[UK Finance|BBA]]’s guidance}} came in the form of “Instructions to BBA LIBOR Contributor Banks”. The critical part of these — what the court called the “LIBOR Definition” — ran as follows:
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{{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute ''the rate at which it could borrow funds'', were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100.”}}
{{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute ''the rate at which it could borrow funds'', were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100.”}}


On any day there would be a range of rates at which a bank ''could'' borrow. These might be firm offers from other lenders, good faith estimates or model outputs. There is an excellent [[subjunctive]] in there, by the way: “''were'' it to do so” implies that it need not ''actually'' do so.  
On any day there will be a range of rates at which a bank ''could'' borrow. These might be firm offers from other lenders, good faith estimates or model outputs. There is an excellent [[subjunctive]] in there, by the way: “''were'' it to do so” implies that that a submitting bank need not ''actually'' do so.  


Say the range of available rates on a given day was, as the court hypothesised, between 2.50% and 2.53%. Which of these was “the rate at which it could borrow funds”? Plainly, a submitter could not submit all of them.  
Say the range of available rates a bank sees on a given day is between 2.50% and 2.53%. Which of these is “''the'' rate at which it could borrow funds”? You can only choose one. The logical options (setting aside for now their legality) are:


The logical options (setting aside for now their legality) were:  
''Pick an “available” rate'': Choose one of the rates from the range, as above.


''Pick an “available” rate'': Choose one rate from those that were genuinely available per the bank’s good faith enquiry as above.  
''Manufacture a blended rate from the range'': Contrive some artificial rate from within that range, reflecting a median, a weighted average, or some such thing.


''Manufacture a blended rate from the range'': Contrive some artificial rate from within that range, reflecting a weighted average, or some such thing.
''Make one up'': Submit a rate that did not fall within the estimated range, whether lower or higher.


''Make one up'': Submit a rate that did not fall within the estimated range, whether lower or higher.
“Making one up” plainly falls outside the scope of the LIBOR Definition. “Making a blended rate” does not quite conform to the text, but perhaps captures its spirit.


“Making one up” plainly falls outside the scope of the LIBOR Definition. “Making a blended rate” does not quite conform to the text, but perhaps captures its spirit. But in any case, Hayes did neither of these things. “Picking one of the available rates” is what Hayes actually did. To an uncomplicated reading of the LIBOR Definition, Hayes fell squarely inside it. This was a rate at which the bank ''could'' borrow funds.  
To an uncomplicated reading, “picking one of the available rates” seems to fall squarely inside the LIBOR Definition. This was a rate at which the bank ''could'' borrow funds.


The complication is that Hayes actively selected the available rate that best suited his derivative trading position. That is, he was guided by his desk’s commercial interest, and not, the bank’s “structural” commercial interest.  
This is what Hayes did. The complication is that he actively selected the available rate that best suited his or, in some cases, competitors’ derivative trading positions. That is, he was guided by his own commercial interests, and not the “structural” interests of a hypothetical basic bank.  


This is the crux of the case. Having this ulterior motive dishonest in light of the ''proper basis for the submission of those rates'' so the Crown alleged was an imprisonable conspiracy to defraud.
This is the crux of the case: was this ulterior motive ''dishonest'' in light of the ''proper basis for the submission of those rates''”? The Crown alleged it was.


====“A conspiracy to defraud”====
====“A conspiracy to defraud”====
{{drop|H|ayes was indicted}} on the ancient [[common law]] offence of “conspiracy to defraud”. Criminal law minutiae, perhaps, but he was not charged with a statutory criminal offence under the [[Fraud Act 2006]]. That Act followed a Law Commission survey of the criminal law of fraud, which had also recommended ''abolishing'' common law conspiracy to defraud, because it was “unfairly uncertain, and wide enough to ''have the potential to catch behaviour that should not be criminal''”.<ref>{{plainlink|https://www.gov.uk/guidance/use-of-the-common-law-offence-of-conspiracy-to-defraud--6|Attorney General guidance to the legal profession on use of conspiracy to defraud}}, November 2012.</ref> The government did not follow the Law Commission’s recommendation.
{{drop|H|ayes was indicted}} on the ancient [[common law]] offence of “conspiracy to defraud”. Criminal law minutiae, perhaps, but he was not charged under the [[Fraud Act 2006]]. That Act followed a Law Commission survey of the criminal law of fraud, which had also recommended ''abolishing'' common law conspiracy to defraud, because it was “unfairly uncertain, and wide enough to ''have the potential to catch behaviour that should not be criminal''”.<ref>{{plainlink|https://www.gov.uk/guidance/use-of-the-common-law-offence-of-conspiracy-to-defraud--6|Attorney General guidance to the legal profession on use of conspiracy to defraud}}, November 2012.</ref> In enacting the Fraud Act 2006, the government did not follow the Law Commission’s recommendation but “decided to retain [''common law conspiracy to defraud''] for the meantime, but accepted the case for considering repeal in the longer term.” <ref>Ibid.</ref>


{{Quote|
In any case, common law conspiracy to defraud was not abolished, still hasn’t been, and that is what Hayes was charged with.
“The government decided to retain it for the meantime, but accepted the case for considering repeal in the longer term.” <ref>Ibid.</ref>}}


In any case, common law conspiracy to defraud was not abolished, still hasn’t been, that is what Hayes was charged with.
Being a common law offence, its ingredients are not sharply delineated — this in itself is a good policy reason to abolish all common law crimes, but anyway<ref>Shout out to my buddies in Kiwiland, by the way, where all criminal offences were codified and all residual common law crimes abolished in 1961. Good job, Kiwis!</ref> — but it seems to be along the following lines: ''there was an agreement between persons who intended to defraud someone by doing something dishonest with a likelihood of resulting loss, even if no loss eventually arose''.<ref>This is in JC’s non-expert words. Not a criminal lawyer. May be missing something.</ref>.
 
Being a common law offence, elements of the offence are not sharply delineated — a good policy reason to abolish all common law crimes, but anyway<ref>Shout out to my buddies in Kiwiland, by the way, where all criminal offences were codified and all residual common law crimes abolished in 1961. Good job, Kiwis!</ref> — but it seems to be along the lines that ''there was an agreement between persons who intended to defraud someone by doing something dishonest with a likelihood of resulting loss, even if no loss eventually arose''.<ref>This is in JC’s non-expert words. Not a criminal lawyer. May be missing something.</ref>.


The crux: was Hayes ''dishonest'' when he submitted his LIBOR rates?  
The crux: was Hayes ''dishonest'' when he submitted his LIBOR rates?  
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That, in turn, came down to whether Hayes “deliberately disregarded the “''proper basis''” for the submission of those rates”.
That, in turn, came down to whether Hayes “deliberately disregarded the “''proper basis''” for the submission of those rates”.


The first instance court did not really dwell on the meaning of the LIBOR Definition, but rather whether Hayes’ intentions when choosing the rate he submitted were to reflect “the bank’s genuine perception of its borrowing rate”.  
The first instance court did not really dwell what the LIBOR Definition meant — there’s not much of it — but rather whether Hayes’ intentions when choosing the rate he submitted were to reflect “the bank’s genuine perception of its borrowing rate”.  


The court framed its instructions to the jury as follows:
The court framed its instructions to the jury as follows:
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Hayes was sent to prison for 14 years, though this was later reduced to 11. He was not the only one. A total of thirty-seven traders were prosecuted for interest rate benchmark manipulation in London and New York of whom nineteen were convicted and nine imprisoned.


This is interesting purely because of its scale — we’ll come to that — but also because of the fortunes of two Deutsche Bank submitters, also convicted for manipulating LIBOR in the United States in similar circumstances, who then appealed. There, too, the question boiled down to what the LIBOR Definition actually meant.  
The jury answered, “yes” to all three questions and Hayes was sent to prison for 14 years.
 
He was not the only one: total of thirty-seven traders were prosecuted in London and New York for interest rate benchmark manipulation. Of these, nineteen were convicted and nine imprisoned.


====Meanwhile, in Gotham City====
====Meanwhile, in Gotham City====
{{drop|N|ow, an ocean}} away, an American appeals court had considered that very question in the matter of {{casenote|United States|Connolly and Black}},<ref>{{citer|United States|Connolly and Black|2d Cir. 2022|No. 19-3806|}}</ref> two Deutsche Bank submitters convicted for manipulating LIBOR.   
{{Drop|T|he travails of}} other LIBOR submitters is interesting purely because of its scale — we’ll come to that — but also because two men convicted for manipulating LIBOR in the United States in similar circumstances successfully appealed. Their appeal focussed on the question of ''what the LIBOR Definition actually meant''.   


Followers of current events may even know that the US courts overturned their convictions, considering the question before them to be one of ''fact'': the text of the “LIBOR Definition” as filtered through the prisms of grammar, usage, subject matter expert opinion and industry practice.
In {{casenote|United States|Connolly and Black}}<ref>{{citer|United States|Connolly and Black|2d Cir. 2022|No. 19-3806|}}</ref> the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, considered the meaning of the LIBOR Definition to be a question of ''fact'': filtered through the prisms of grammar, usage, subject matter expert opinion and industry practice.


The question of law — whether the submitters were dishonest — depended a great deal on matters of ''fact'' — such as what did those submitting rates believe was permitted within the LIBOR Definition, and if that seemed far-fetched, what a reasonable person reading the definition would think it required.  
The question of law — whether the submitters were dishonest<ref>The charge was wire fraud under {{Plainlink|https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1343|18 U.S. Code § 1343}}:  in the JC’s nutshell, electronically communicating for the purpose of executing any scheme to defraud or obtain by false pretence. (''Double'' disclaimer: JC is neither a US lawyer nor a criminal lawyer, but it looks analogous to common law conspiracy to defraud.)</ref> — depended a great deal on matters of ''fact'' — such as what did those submitting rates believe the LIBOR Definition allowed, and if that seemed far-fetched, what a reasonable person would think it required. The US court took a literal reading of the LIBOR Definition:


{{quote|
{{quote|
The precise hypothetical question to which the LIBOR submitters were responding was at what interest rate “could” DB borrow a typical amount of cash if it were to seek interbank offers and were to accept. ''If the rate submitted is one that the bank could request, be offered, and accept, the submission, irrespective of its motivation, would not be false''.}}
The precise hypothetical question to which the LIBOR submitters were responding was at what interest rate “could” DB borrow a typical amount of cash if it were to seek interbank offers and were to accept. ''If the rate submitted is one that the bank could request, be offered, and accept, the submission, irrespective of its motivation, would not be false''.}}


This led the US courts to conclude that picking from a range of available rates, whatever your motivations for your choice could not be fraudulent. It was within the rules.  
This led the US court to conclude that picking from a range of available rates, however the end choice was motivated, could not be fraudulent. It was within the rules. Connolly and Black were acquitted.  


Buoyed by the outcome in New York, Hayes persuaded the Criminal Cases Review Commission to refer his case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration, to consider the New York Court’s interpretation of the LIBOR Definition.  
Buoyed by the outcome in New York, Hayes persuaded the Criminal Cases Review Commission to refer his case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration, to consider the New York Court’s interpretation of the LIBOR Definition.  


==== The Hayes appeal ====
==== The Hayes appeal ====
{{drop|T|he Court of}} Appeal considered first a question of legal methodology: whose job was it to determine what the LIBOR Definition meant, and by reference to what?   
{{drop|T|he Court of}} Appeal considered first a question of legal methodology: whose job was it to determine what the LIBOR Definition meant, and by reference to what? It did not agree with the US court’s approach:  
{{Quote|The court was not confining itself, even “principally”, to the language of the [LIBOR Definition] but was taking into account the evidence ... as to how those particular submitters arrived at their submissions in practice. ... This means ... that the question of how the LIBOR Definition was to be construed was being treated as an issue of fact for the jury.}}
{{Quote|The [US court] was not confining itself, even “principally”, to the language of the [LIBOR Definition] but was taking into account the evidence ... as to how those particular submitters arrived at their submissions in practice. ... This means ... that the question of how the LIBOR Definition was to be construed was being treated as an issue of fact for the jury.}}
The Court of Appeal disagreed. Under English law, contractual interpretation is a matter of law, to be resolved by the judge. Evidence of market practice, or the belief of submitters, did not enter into it.  
Under English law, contractual interpretation is a matter of law, to be resolved by the judge. Evidence of market practice, or the belief of submitters, did not enter into it.


The Court of Appeal parsed the LIBOR Definition and interpreted it to mean the ''lowest'' of the submitted rates in the range:  
The Court of Appeal interpreted the LIBOR Definition to mean that a bank must always choose the ''lowest'' of the submitted rates in the range:  


{{Quote|In the LIBOR Definition what is required is an assessment of the rate at which the panel bank “could borrow”.  ''That must mean the cheapest rate at which it could borrow''.  A borrower “can” always borrow at a higher rate than the lowest on offer.  But the higher rate would not reflect what the LIBOR benchmark is seeking to achieve, namely identification of the bank’s cost of borrowing in the wholesale cash market at the relevant moment of time.  If in a stable and liquid market a submitting bank seeks and receives offers for a reasonable market size at the very time it is to make its submission, and receives offers ranging from 2.50% to 2.53%, it would accept the offer at 2.50%. It would be absurd to suggest that the LIBOR question could then properly be answered by a submission of 2.53%. The bank “could” borrow at that rate in the sense that it was a rate which was available, but that is obviously not what “could” means.}}
{{Quote|In the LIBOR Definition what is required is an assessment of the rate at which the panel bank “could borrow”.  ''That must mean the cheapest rate at which it could borrow''.  A borrower “can” always borrow at a higher rate than the lowest on offer.  But the higher rate would not reflect what the LIBOR benchmark is seeking to achieve, namely identification of the bank’s cost of borrowing in the wholesale cash market at the relevant moment of time.  If in a stable and liquid market a submitting bank seeks and receives offers for a reasonable market size at the very time it is to make its submission, and receives offers ranging from 2.50% to 2.53%, it would accept the offer at 2.50%. It would be absurd to suggest that the LIBOR question could then properly be answered by a submission of 2.53%. The bank “could” borrow at that rate in the sense that it was a rate which was available, but that is obviously not what “could” means.}}It is hard to imagine, in the abstract, a bank voluntarily borrowing at above the lowest rate then available. But finance is a complicated business, and borrowing decisions are not made in the abstract. There are plenty of examples where a bank might take a higher rate.<ref>Where, for example, the bank is a creditor of a bank offering the higher rate, but to the one offering the lower rate: here, the more expensive loan materially reduces the bank’s net credit exposure, and therefore the capital it must hold against the lending bank.</ref>


====Crimes and contracts====
====Crimes and contracts====
{{Drop|B|ear in mind}} that the “legal question” to be answered here is one of criminal law, not contract. The contract is merely the factual background upon which a crime was allegedly committed. The LIBOR definition, as near as can be approximated, formed part of a contract.
{{Drop|B|ear in mind}} that the “legal question” to be answered here is one of criminal law, not contract. The contract is merely the factual background upon which a crime was allegedly committed. The LIBOR definition, as near as can be approximated, formed part of a contract between the submitters and the BBA.


Under the intellectual theory of criminal law, ignorance or misunderstanding of the law is no excuse. This is as axiomatic for an effective criminal justice system as “all interests in cash pass by delivery” is to finance. The system would not work were defendants allowed to plead ignorance, even presumptively. ''Ignorantia legis non excusat'', if you are blameless in your inadvertence, is a moral iniquity but still a logical imperative of government.  
Under the intellectual theory of criminal law, ignorance of the law is no excuse. This is as axiomatic for an effective criminal justice system as “all interests in cash pass by delivery” is to finance: the criminal justice system would not work were defendants allowed to plead ignorance, even presumptively. ''Ignorantia legis non excusat'', if you are blameless in your inadvertence, is a moral iniquity but still a logical imperative of good government.  


This same imperative does not hold for a contract. Quite the opposite: the whole theory of contract is that the parties ''are'' materially cognisant of the whole thing. That is what [[offer]] and [[acceptance]] requires.  
This same imperative does not hold for a contract. Quite the opposite: under the intellectual theory of contract the parties ''are'' materially cognisant of the whole thing. That is what [[offer]] and [[acceptance]] requires: if they are not, there is no contract.


So the rules of contractual interpretation have forged a different path:
So the rules of contractual interpretation have forged a different path:
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A couple of observations:  
A couple of observations:  


One: plainly, what a contract means is, in some way, fact-dependent. It is not, purely, a matter of law. A contract testifies to the parties’ agreement. It cannot be sovereign to it.
One: plainly, what a contract means is fact-dependent. It is not, purely, a matter of law. A contract testifies to the parties’ agreement. It cannot be sovereign to it.
 
Another: how ''everyone'' behaved when interacting with the LIBOR Definition helps work out what a reasonable person would have understood it to mean. There can be no better indication of reasonableness than direct evidence of the behaviour of fellow [[Man on the Clapham Omnibus|passengers on the Clapham Omnibus]].
 
There is here the odd spectre of the law of [[contract]] forming the backdrop to a criminal allegation. This is rare. Usually, the criminal authorities stay well out of commercial disputes, even where allegations of fraud are flying around seeing them as a matter of civil loss between merchants perfectly able to look after themselves, and not requiring the machinery of the state. 
 
[[LIBOR]], on which the bank deposits and mortgage repayments of unwitting retail punters depend, made things a bit different.  This is no private matter to be sorted out between gentlemen with revolvers. 


Another: how ''everyone'' behaved when interacting with the LIBOR Definition helps work out what a reasonable person would have understood it to mean. There is no better indication of reasonableness than direct evidence of the behaviour of fellow [[Man on the Clapham Omnibus|passengers on the Clapham Omnibus]].
Nevertheless, still one must apply contractual principles, not criminal ones, to matters of contractual practice.  


There is here the odd spectre of the law of [[contract]] forming the backdrop and comprising some of the elements of a criminal allegation. This is rare. Usually, the criminal authorities stay well out of commercial disputes, even where allegations of fraud are flying around — there is a civil tort of fraud — seeing it as a matter of civil loss between merchants perfectly able to look after themselves, and not one requiring the machinery of the state.
And the argument here is not about economic reality but legal meaning, and legal meaning follows natural, ordinary meaning, and in the world of contractual interpretation, that is viewed from the perspective of the person performing the contract, [[Contra proferentem|''contra proferentem'']] — [[Contra proferentem|against the draftsperson’s interest]] — giving the benefit of the doubt to the reader.  


[[LIBOR]], on whom the mortgage repayments of unwitting retail punters depend, made things a bit different. This is no private matter to be sorted out between gentlemen with revolvers. Nevertheless, still one must apply contractual principles, not criminal ones, to matters of contractual practice.
Defendants get the benefit of the same doubt in case of ambiguously framed crimes.<ref>{{Cite|Sweet|Parsley|1970|AC|132}}</ref> For if the LIBOR Definition meant to mandate this “obvious” outcome, it did not do a very good job of it. As a matter of plain English, “could borrow” does not rule out a higher rate, but rather implies it: the Court of Appeal concedes as much, at para 89:


And the argument here is not about economic reality but legal meaning, and legal meaning follows natural, ordinary meaning, and in the world of contractual interpretation, that is viewed from the perspective of the person performing the contract and [[Contra proferentem|against the draftsperson’s interest]], giving the benefit of the doubt to the reader.  
{{Quote|“The bank “could” borrow at that [''higher''] rate in the sense that it was a rate which was available, but that is obviously not what “could” means.”}}
The “obviousness” to which the Court appeals here is not a legal one — show me the authority for that — but an ''economic'' intuition based upon an abstract conceptualisation of “borrowing”. Borrowing does not happen in the abstract.


The same doubt, as it happens, is given to defendants in case of ambiguously framed crimes. For if the LIBOR Definition meant to sanction mandate this “obvious” outcome, it did not do a very good job of it. As a matter of plain English, “could borrow” does not rule out a higher rate, but rather implies it: the Court of Appeal concedes as much, at para 89:
Per the plain words of the LIBOR Definition there is an upper bound delimited by the range of “inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100”. A submitter could not submit a rate higher than any actually offered, any more than it could submit a rate lower than one actually offered. 


{{Quote|The bank “could” borrow at that rate in the sense that it was a rate which was available, but that is obviously not what “could” means.}}
So, to construe “the rate at which it could borrow funds” to mean “the ''lowest'' rate ... ”, one must imply a term into the contract that is not there. Courts do not do this lightly. In Mackinnon LJ’s memorable words:<ref>''[[Shirlaw v Southern Foundries&action=edit&redlink=1|Shirlaw v Southern Foundries]]'' [1939] 2 KB 206</ref>
The “obviousness” to which the Court appeals here, is not a legal one — show me the authority for that — but one of a certain ''economic'' intuition. If that was the intended legal meaning it would have been really easy to fix it to it was clear.


But — per the wording in the LIBOR definition — there is an upper bound to that, delimited by the range of “inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100”. A submitter could not submit a rate higher than any actually offered, any more than it could submit a rate lower than the actually offered range. 
{{Quote|“That which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be expressed is something so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if, while the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express provision for it in their agreement, they would testily suppress him with a common ‘Oh, of course!’”}}


But to construe “the rate at which it could borrow funds” to mean “the ''lowest'' rate ... ”, involves implying a term into the contract that is not there. It would have been easy enough for the old grandees to have put the matter beyond doubt before knocking the top off that ''Château de Chasselas'', with a single modifying adjective:  
There are good reasons to imagine at least thirty-seven LIBOR submitters might not have done this. Especially since it would have been easy enough for the old grandees to have put the matter beyond doubt, with a single modifying adjective:  


{{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute the ''lowest'' rate at which it could borrow funds ...}}
{{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute the ''lowest'' rate at which it could borrow funds ...}}


But they did not. If they wanted to isolate the risk of a bank talking its own book they could have invited LIBOR banks to submit the minimum rates they were prepared to ''lend'' to each other. They did not do that either.
They did not.  
 
There were many other techniques they might have used to prevent banks talking their own book: for example, inviting them to submit the minimum rates they were prepared to ''lend'' to each other, rather than borrow.  
 
They did not do that either.


As the system was configured, riven with inherent conflict of interest, there  were any number of ways banks could — and for all we can tell now, probably did — skew the data: from whom do you seek bids? How late or early do you seek them? How do you phrase your request?
As Hayes’ original pleading made clear, a bank submitting the rate at which it could ''borrow'' has an inherent conflict of interest. There were any number of ways it could craft the data it received in ways no-one could check: by carefully selecting the banks from whom it did, and did not, seek offers. From its timing. From the phrasing of the request.


In the absence of clearly drafted prohibitions, given a vaguely articulated common law crime seen as unsatisfactory even by the executive, it seems pretty rich to insist upon a literal reading of a set of rules which didn’t say a lot and to which, on the evidence, no-one paid a great deal of attention. There was a ton of room for flex. We should not be surprised to see people use it to their commercial ends. That is how markets work.
If LIBOR had a problem it was not, principally, with the submitters: it was with the process. If you give merchants the flex to align their behaviour with their commercial interests, it is an odd merchant indeed who will not do it.  


====Everyone was at it====
====Everyone was at it====
{{drop|A|nd after all}}, ''everyone'' was at it. A fun game, if you have twenty minutes, is to google the names of the {{plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libor|LIBOR panel banks}} to see which were ''not'' somehow implicated in so-called “LIBOR rigging”. If you haven’t got twenty minutes, the WSJ’s brilliant interactive {{plainlink|https://graphics.wsj.com/libor-network/|spider network}} will give you the answer in an instant. There were thirty-nine prosecutions for LIBOR manipulation.
{{drop|A|nd after all}}, ''everyone'' was at it. A fun game, if you have twenty minutes, is to google the names of the {{plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libor|LIBOR panel banks}} to see which were ''not'' somehow implicated in “LIBOR rigging”. If you haven’t got twenty minutes, the WSJ’s brilliant interactive {{plainlink|https://graphics.wsj.com/libor-network/|spider network}} will give you the answer in an instant. There were ''thirty-seven'' prosecutions for LIBOR manipulation.


''Everyone'' was at it.  
''Everyone'' was at it.  
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Is the idea of a merchant prioritising its own commercial interests somehow reprehensible? This will be news to economists, and indeed the commercial courts who have frequently expected merchants to do nothing else.
Is the idea of a merchant prioritising its own commercial interests somehow reprehensible? This will be news to economists, and indeed the commercial courts who have frequently expected merchants to do nothing else.


Should LIBOR submitters should avoid conflicts of interest? How ''can'' they? The LIBOR rate is structurally fundamental to the economics of banking. In making LIBOR submissions, all banks had an inherent conflict of interest. Any submission must be at some level, in, counter to or magically neutral to the bank’s intrinsic interest rate exposure. A submission weighted to the lowest available rate structurally favours a bank that is not hedging its interest rate risk: why is that okay?
Should LIBOR submitters should avoid conflicts of interest? How ''can'' they? The LIBOR rate is structurally fundamental to the economics of banking. All banks are exposed to interest rates. All have skin in the game. All are necessarily conflicted if asked to opine on what they think the interest rate should be. Any submission must, at some level, support or undermine the bank’s intrinsic interest rate exposure. A submission weighted to the lowest available rate structurally favours a bank that is not hedging its interest rate risk: why is that okay?


Is the LIBOR rate designed to protect investors, and if so which ones, and why are they special? As noted, classic bank customers would benefit from a higher rate, not a low one. This is of course, all very complicated because banks are very complicated. It is not obvious what is or is not in a bank’s interest.
Is the LIBOR rate designed to protect investors, and if so who? Depositors? Borrowers? Why? As noted, classic bank customers, who borrow fixed and deposit floating, would benefit from a ''higher'' rate, not a lower one. This is of course, all very complicated, ''because banks are very complicated''. It is not obvious what is or is not in a bank’s interest.
====Stare decisis====
{{drop|T|his is a}} real lawyer nerd-out, but in forming its decision the Court of Appeal was confronted with some of its own prior rulings and judgments. The common law [[doctrine of precedent]] means an appeal court is generally bound by its own previous decisions in analogous cases. Usually, previous decisions are from unrelated cases. This always provides room for to distinguish inconvenient earlier decisions “on their facts”.  


But not here. Here, the prior authorities were decided in previous appeals of ''the actual case before the Court of Appeal''. This is unusual, due to the convoluted route by which the case came to the Court of Appeal, having been referred to it by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Hayes and Palombo’s original convictions had already been appealed once to the Court of Appeal. 


 
On one hand, it should not make a difference that it is the same case. It removes any possibility for “distinguishing on the facts”. On the other, asking the same court to reconsider decisions it feels constitutionally bound to follow makes a mockery of the appeal process. What is the point of reviewing a case you are bound to follow? This should, at least, be an unequivocal grounds for allowing a further appeal to the Supreme Court, which is not bound by lower court decisions or, after a famous practice direction, its own ones.
====Stare decisis====
{{drop|T|his is a}} real lawyer nerd-out, but in forming its decision the Court of Appeal was confronted with some of its own prior rulings and judgments. The common law [[doctrine of precedent]] means an appeal court is generally bound by its own previous decisions in analogous cases.  Usually, these cases are unrelated. But here the prior decisions were “interlocutory” hearings in ''the actual case being appealed'' — certain legal points were “escalated” to the Court of Appeal during the High Court trial.
 
On one hand, it should not make a difference that it is the same case. On the other, that makes a bit of a mockery of the appeal process if the appellate court is bound by the judgment being appealed against, which is what the Court found itself to be here. This should, at least, be a decent justification for a further appeal to the Supreme Court.


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