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While banks try to balance their books so their portfolio of customer swaps offset each other as far as possible, how they “position” the book might help manage the bank’s ''structural'' interest rate risk. | While banks try to balance their books so their portfolio of customer swaps offset each other as far as possible, how they “position” the book might help manage the bank’s ''structural'' interest rate risk. | ||
Under the “basic banking model”, a bank will always be “[[Axe|axed]]” for floating rates to be as low as possible. You would expect a basic bank’s submissions to reflect that. But a swap trader who is “long” floating rates will wish floating rates to go ''higher''. | |||
This prospect, we venture, was not wildly present in the minds of the Sir Bufton Tuftons who formulated the LIBOR rules defining how submitting banks should choose the rates they submit each day. | |||
The question arose later, even though it did not arise then: when submitting a rate, what account, if any, may a bank take of its own derivatives trading book? | |||
==== The LIBOR Definition==== | ==== The LIBOR Definition==== | ||
{{drop|T|he [[UK Finance|BBA]]’s guidance}} came in the form of “Instructions to BBA LIBOR Contributor Banks”. The critical part of these — what the court called the “LIBOR Definition” — ran as follows: | {{drop|T|he [[UK Finance|BBA]]’s guidance}} came in the form of “Instructions to BBA LIBOR Contributor Banks”. The critical part of these — what the court called the “LIBOR Definition” — ran as follows: | ||
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{{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute ''the rate at which it could borrow funds'', were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100.”}} | {{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute ''the rate at which it could borrow funds'', were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100.”}} | ||
On any day there | On any day there will be a range of rates at which a bank ''could'' borrow. These might be firm offers from other lenders, good faith estimates or model outputs. There is an excellent [[subjunctive]] in there, by the way: “''were'' it to do so” implies that that a submitting bank need not ''actually'' do so. | ||
Say the range of available rates on a given day | Say the range of available rates a bank sees on a given day is between 2.50% and 2.53%. Which of these is “''the'' rate at which it could borrow funds”? You can only choose one. The logical options (setting aside for now their legality) are: | ||
''Pick an “available” rate'': Choose one of the rates from the range, as above. | |||
'' | ''Manufacture a blended rate from the range'': Contrive some artificial rate from within that range, reflecting a median, a weighted average, or some such thing. | ||
'' | ''Make one up'': Submit a rate that did not fall within the estimated range, whether lower or higher. | ||
“Making one up” plainly falls outside the scope of the LIBOR Definition. “Making a blended rate” does not quite conform to the text, but perhaps captures its spirit. | |||
To an uncomplicated reading, “picking one of the available rates” seems to fall squarely inside the LIBOR Definition. This was a rate at which the bank ''could'' borrow funds. | |||
The complication is that | This is what Hayes did. The complication is that he actively selected the available rate that best suited his or, in some cases, competitors’ derivative trading positions. That is, he was guided by his own commercial interests, and not the “structural” interests of a hypothetical basic bank. | ||
This is the crux of the case | This is the crux of the case: was this ulterior motive ''dishonest'' in light of the “''proper basis for the submission of those rates''”? The Crown alleged it was. | ||
====“A conspiracy to defraud”==== | ====“A conspiracy to defraud”==== | ||
{{drop|H|ayes was indicted}} on the ancient [[common law]] offence of “conspiracy to defraud”. Criminal law minutiae, perhaps, but he was not charged | {{drop|H|ayes was indicted}} on the ancient [[common law]] offence of “conspiracy to defraud”. Criminal law minutiae, perhaps, but he was not charged under the [[Fraud Act 2006]]. That Act followed a Law Commission survey of the criminal law of fraud, which had also recommended ''abolishing'' common law conspiracy to defraud, because it was “unfairly uncertain, and wide enough to ''have the potential to catch behaviour that should not be criminal''”.<ref>{{plainlink|https://www.gov.uk/guidance/use-of-the-common-law-offence-of-conspiracy-to-defraud--6|Attorney General guidance to the legal profession on use of conspiracy to defraud}}, November 2012.</ref> In enacting the Fraud Act 2006, the government did not follow the Law Commission’s recommendation but “decided to retain [''common law conspiracy to defraud''] for the meantime, but accepted the case for considering repeal in the longer term.” <ref>Ibid.</ref> | ||
In any case, common law conspiracy to defraud was not abolished, still hasn’t been, and that is what Hayes was charged with. | |||
Being a common law offence, its ingredients are not sharply delineated — this in itself is a good policy reason to abolish all common law crimes, but anyway<ref>Shout out to my buddies in Kiwiland, by the way, where all criminal offences were codified and all residual common law crimes abolished in 1961. Good job, Kiwis!</ref> — but it seems to be along the following lines: ''there was an agreement between persons who intended to defraud someone by doing something dishonest with a likelihood of resulting loss, even if no loss eventually arose''.<ref>This is in JC’s non-expert words. Not a criminal lawyer. May be missing something.</ref>. | |||
Being a common law offence, | |||
The crux: was Hayes ''dishonest'' when he submitted his LIBOR rates? | The crux: was Hayes ''dishonest'' when he submitted his LIBOR rates? | ||
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That, in turn, came down to whether Hayes “deliberately disregarded the “''proper basis''” for the submission of those rates”. | That, in turn, came down to whether Hayes “deliberately disregarded the “''proper basis''” for the submission of those rates”. | ||
The first instance court did not really dwell | The first instance court did not really dwell what the LIBOR Definition meant — there’s not much of it — but rather whether Hayes’ intentions when choosing the rate he submitted were to reflect “the bank’s genuine perception of its borrowing rate”. | ||
The court framed its instructions to the jury as follows: | The court framed its instructions to the jury as follows: | ||
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The jury answered, “yes” to all three questions and Hayes was sent to prison for 14 years. | |||
He was not the only one: total of thirty-seven traders were prosecuted in London and New York for interest rate benchmark manipulation. Of these, nineteen were convicted and nine imprisoned. | |||
====Meanwhile, in Gotham City==== | ====Meanwhile, in Gotham City==== | ||
{{ | {{Drop|T|he travails of}} other LIBOR submitters is interesting purely because of its scale — we’ll come to that — but also because two men convicted for manipulating LIBOR in the United States in similar circumstances successfully appealed. Their appeal focussed on the question of ''what the LIBOR Definition actually meant''. | ||
In {{casenote|United States|Connolly and Black}}<ref>{{citer|United States|Connolly and Black|2d Cir. 2022|No. 19-3806|}}</ref> the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, considered the meaning of the LIBOR Definition to be a question of ''fact'': filtered through the prisms of grammar, usage, subject matter expert opinion and industry practice. | |||
The question of law — whether the submitters were dishonest — depended a great deal on matters of ''fact'' — such as what did those submitting rates believe | The question of law — whether the submitters were dishonest<ref>The charge was wire fraud under {{Plainlink|https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1343|18 U.S. Code § 1343}}: in the JC’s nutshell, electronically communicating for the purpose of executing any scheme to defraud or obtain by false pretence. (''Double'' disclaimer: JC is neither a US lawyer nor a criminal lawyer, but it looks analogous to common law conspiracy to defraud.)</ref> — depended a great deal on matters of ''fact'' — such as what did those submitting rates believe the LIBOR Definition allowed, and if that seemed far-fetched, what a reasonable person would think it required. The US court took a literal reading of the LIBOR Definition: | ||
{{quote| | {{quote| | ||
The precise hypothetical question to which the LIBOR submitters were responding was at what interest rate “could” DB borrow a typical amount of cash if it were to seek interbank offers and were to accept. ''If the rate submitted is one that the bank could request, be offered, and accept, the submission, irrespective of its motivation, would not be false''.}} | The precise hypothetical question to which the LIBOR submitters were responding was at what interest rate “could” DB borrow a typical amount of cash if it were to seek interbank offers and were to accept. ''If the rate submitted is one that the bank could request, be offered, and accept, the submission, irrespective of its motivation, would not be false''.}} | ||
This led the US | This led the US court to conclude that picking from a range of available rates, however the end choice was motivated, could not be fraudulent. It was within the rules. Connolly and Black were acquitted. | ||
Buoyed by the outcome in New York, Hayes persuaded the Criminal Cases Review Commission to refer his case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration, to consider the New York Court’s interpretation of the LIBOR Definition. | Buoyed by the outcome in New York, Hayes persuaded the Criminal Cases Review Commission to refer his case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration, to consider the New York Court’s interpretation of the LIBOR Definition. | ||
==== The Hayes appeal ==== | ==== The Hayes appeal ==== | ||
{{drop|T|he Court of}} Appeal considered first a question of legal methodology: whose job was it to determine what the LIBOR Definition meant, and by reference to what? | {{drop|T|he Court of}} Appeal considered first a question of legal methodology: whose job was it to determine what the LIBOR Definition meant, and by reference to what? It did not agree with the US court’s approach: | ||
{{Quote|The court was not confining itself, even “principally”, to the language of the [LIBOR Definition] but was taking into account the evidence ... as to how those particular submitters arrived at their submissions in practice. ... This means ... that the question of how the LIBOR Definition was to be construed was being treated as an issue of fact for the jury.}} | {{Quote|The [US court] was not confining itself, even “principally”, to the language of the [LIBOR Definition] but was taking into account the evidence ... as to how those particular submitters arrived at their submissions in practice. ... This means ... that the question of how the LIBOR Definition was to be construed was being treated as an issue of fact for the jury.}} | ||
Under English law, contractual interpretation is a matter of law, to be resolved by the judge. Evidence of market practice, or the belief of submitters, did not enter into it. | |||
The Court of Appeal | The Court of Appeal interpreted the LIBOR Definition to mean that a bank must always choose the ''lowest'' of the submitted rates in the range: | ||
{{Quote|In the LIBOR Definition what is required is an assessment of the rate at which the panel bank “could borrow”. ''That must mean the cheapest rate at which it could borrow''. A borrower “can” always borrow at a higher rate than the lowest on offer. But the higher rate would not reflect what the LIBOR benchmark is seeking to achieve, namely identification of the bank’s cost of borrowing in the wholesale cash market at the relevant moment of time. If in a stable and liquid market a submitting bank seeks and receives offers for a reasonable market size at the very time it is to make its submission, and receives offers ranging from 2.50% to 2.53%, it would accept the offer at 2.50%. It would be absurd to suggest that the LIBOR question could then properly be answered by a submission of 2.53%. The bank “could” borrow at that rate in the sense that it was a rate which was available, but that is obviously not what “could” means.}} | {{Quote|In the LIBOR Definition what is required is an assessment of the rate at which the panel bank “could borrow”. ''That must mean the cheapest rate at which it could borrow''. A borrower “can” always borrow at a higher rate than the lowest on offer. But the higher rate would not reflect what the LIBOR benchmark is seeking to achieve, namely identification of the bank’s cost of borrowing in the wholesale cash market at the relevant moment of time. If in a stable and liquid market a submitting bank seeks and receives offers for a reasonable market size at the very time it is to make its submission, and receives offers ranging from 2.50% to 2.53%, it would accept the offer at 2.50%. It would be absurd to suggest that the LIBOR question could then properly be answered by a submission of 2.53%. The bank “could” borrow at that rate in the sense that it was a rate which was available, but that is obviously not what “could” means.}}It is hard to imagine, in the abstract, a bank voluntarily borrowing at above the lowest rate then available. But finance is a complicated business, and borrowing decisions are not made in the abstract. There are plenty of examples where a bank might take a higher rate.<ref>Where, for example, the bank is a creditor of a bank offering the higher rate, but to the one offering the lower rate: here, the more expensive loan materially reduces the bank’s net credit exposure, and therefore the capital it must hold against the lending bank.</ref> | ||
====Crimes and contracts==== | ====Crimes and contracts==== | ||
{{Drop|B|ear in mind}} that the “legal question” to be answered here is one of criminal law, not contract. The contract is merely the factual background upon which a crime was allegedly committed. The LIBOR definition, as near as can be approximated, formed part of a contract. | {{Drop|B|ear in mind}} that the “legal question” to be answered here is one of criminal law, not contract. The contract is merely the factual background upon which a crime was allegedly committed. The LIBOR definition, as near as can be approximated, formed part of a contract between the submitters and the BBA. | ||
Under the intellectual theory of criminal law, ignorance | Under the intellectual theory of criminal law, ignorance of the law is no excuse. This is as axiomatic for an effective criminal justice system as “all interests in cash pass by delivery” is to finance: the criminal justice system would not work were defendants allowed to plead ignorance, even presumptively. ''Ignorantia legis non excusat'', if you are blameless in your inadvertence, is a moral iniquity but still a logical imperative of good government. | ||
This same imperative does not hold for a contract. Quite the opposite: the | This same imperative does not hold for a contract. Quite the opposite: under the intellectual theory of contract the parties ''are'' materially cognisant of the whole thing. That is what [[offer]] and [[acceptance]] requires: if they are not, there is no contract. | ||
So the rules of contractual interpretation have forged a different path: | So the rules of contractual interpretation have forged a different path: | ||
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A couple of observations: | A couple of observations: | ||
One: plainly, what a contract means is | One: plainly, what a contract means is fact-dependent. It is not, purely, a matter of law. A contract testifies to the parties’ agreement. It cannot be sovereign to it. | ||
Another: how ''everyone'' behaved when interacting with the LIBOR Definition helps work out what a reasonable person would have understood it to mean. There can be no better indication of reasonableness than direct evidence of the behaviour of fellow [[Man on the Clapham Omnibus|passengers on the Clapham Omnibus]]. | |||
There is here the odd spectre of the law of [[contract]] forming the backdrop to a criminal allegation. This is rare. Usually, the criminal authorities stay well out of commercial disputes, even where allegations of fraud are flying around seeing them as a matter of civil loss between merchants perfectly able to look after themselves, and not requiring the machinery of the state. | |||
[[LIBOR]], on which the bank deposits and mortgage repayments of unwitting retail punters depend, made things a bit different. This is no private matter to be sorted out between gentlemen with revolvers. | |||
Nevertheless, still one must apply contractual principles, not criminal ones, to matters of contractual practice. | |||
And the argument here is not about economic reality but legal meaning, and legal meaning follows natural, ordinary meaning, and in the world of contractual interpretation, that is viewed from the perspective of the person performing the contract, [[Contra proferentem|''contra proferentem'']] — [[Contra proferentem|against the draftsperson’s interest]] — giving the benefit of the doubt to the reader. | |||
Defendants get the benefit of the same doubt in case of ambiguously framed crimes.<ref>{{Cite|Sweet|Parsley|1970|AC|132}}</ref> For if the LIBOR Definition meant to mandate this “obvious” outcome, it did not do a very good job of it. As a matter of plain English, “could borrow” does not rule out a higher rate, but rather implies it: the Court of Appeal concedes as much, at para 89: | |||
{{Quote|“The bank “could” borrow at that [''higher''] rate in the sense that it was a rate which was available, but that is obviously not what “could” means.”}} | |||
The “obviousness” to which the Court appeals here is not a legal one — show me the authority for that — but an ''economic'' intuition based upon an abstract conceptualisation of “borrowing”. Borrowing does not happen in the abstract. | |||
Per the plain words of the LIBOR Definition there is an upper bound delimited by the range of “inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100”. A submitter could not submit a rate higher than any actually offered, any more than it could submit a rate lower than one actually offered. | |||
So, to construe “the rate at which it could borrow funds” to mean “the ''lowest'' rate ... ”, one must imply a term into the contract that is not there. Courts do not do this lightly. In Mackinnon LJ’s memorable words:<ref>''[[Shirlaw v Southern Foundries&action=edit&redlink=1|Shirlaw v Southern Foundries]]'' [1939] 2 KB 206</ref> | |||
{{Quote|“That which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be expressed is something so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if, while the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express provision for it in their agreement, they would testily suppress him with a common ‘Oh, of course!’”}} | |||
There are good reasons to imagine at least thirty-seven LIBOR submitters might not have done this. Especially since it would have been easy enough for the old grandees to have put the matter beyond doubt, with a single modifying adjective: | |||
{{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute the ''lowest'' rate at which it could borrow funds ...}} | {{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute the ''lowest'' rate at which it could borrow funds ...}} | ||
They did not. | |||
There were many other techniques they might have used to prevent banks talking their own book: for example, inviting them to submit the minimum rates they were prepared to ''lend'' to each other, rather than borrow. | |||
They did not do that either. | |||
As the | As Hayes’ original pleading made clear, a bank submitting the rate at which it could ''borrow'' has an inherent conflict of interest. There were any number of ways it could craft the data it received in ways no-one could check: by carefully selecting the banks from whom it did, and did not, seek offers. From its timing. From the phrasing of the request. | ||
If LIBOR had a problem it was not, principally, with the submitters: it was with the process. If you give merchants the flex to align their behaviour with their commercial interests, it is an odd merchant indeed who will not do it. | |||
====Everyone was at it==== | ====Everyone was at it==== | ||
{{drop|A|nd after all}}, ''everyone'' was at it. A fun game, if you have twenty minutes, is to google the names of the {{plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libor|LIBOR panel banks}} to see which were ''not'' somehow implicated in | {{drop|A|nd after all}}, ''everyone'' was at it. A fun game, if you have twenty minutes, is to google the names of the {{plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libor|LIBOR panel banks}} to see which were ''not'' somehow implicated in “LIBOR rigging”. If you haven’t got twenty minutes, the WSJ’s brilliant interactive {{plainlink|https://graphics.wsj.com/libor-network/|spider network}} will give you the answer in an instant. There were ''thirty-seven'' prosecutions for LIBOR manipulation. | ||
''Everyone'' was at it. | ''Everyone'' was at it. | ||
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Is the idea of a merchant prioritising its own commercial interests somehow reprehensible? This will be news to economists, and indeed the commercial courts who have frequently expected merchants to do nothing else. | Is the idea of a merchant prioritising its own commercial interests somehow reprehensible? This will be news to economists, and indeed the commercial courts who have frequently expected merchants to do nothing else. | ||
Should LIBOR submitters should avoid conflicts of interest? How ''can'' they? The LIBOR rate is structurally fundamental to the economics of banking. | Should LIBOR submitters should avoid conflicts of interest? How ''can'' they? The LIBOR rate is structurally fundamental to the economics of banking. All banks are exposed to interest rates. All have skin in the game. All are necessarily conflicted if asked to opine on what they think the interest rate should be. Any submission must, at some level, support or undermine the bank’s intrinsic interest rate exposure. A submission weighted to the lowest available rate structurally favours a bank that is not hedging its interest rate risk: why is that okay? | ||
Is the LIBOR rate designed to protect investors, and if so | Is the LIBOR rate designed to protect investors, and if so who? Depositors? Borrowers? Why? As noted, classic bank customers, who borrow fixed and deposit floating, would benefit from a ''higher'' rate, not a lower one. This is of course, all very complicated, ''because banks are very complicated''. It is not obvious what is or is not in a bank’s interest. | ||
====Stare decisis==== | |||
{{drop|T|his is a}} real lawyer nerd-out, but in forming its decision the Court of Appeal was confronted with some of its own prior rulings and judgments. The common law [[doctrine of precedent]] means an appeal court is generally bound by its own previous decisions in analogous cases. Usually, previous decisions are from unrelated cases. This always provides room for to distinguish inconvenient earlier decisions “on their facts”. | |||
But not here. Here, the prior authorities were decided in previous appeals of ''the actual case before the Court of Appeal''. This is unusual, due to the convoluted route by which the case came to the Court of Appeal, having been referred to it by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Hayes and Palombo’s original convictions had already been appealed once to the Court of Appeal. | |||
On one hand, it should not make a difference that it is the same case. It removes any possibility for “distinguishing on the facts”. On the other, asking the same court to reconsider decisions it feels constitutionally bound to follow makes a mockery of the appeal process. What is the point of reviewing a case you are bound to follow? This should, at least, be an unequivocal grounds for allowing a further appeal to the Supreme Court, which is not bound by lower court decisions or, after a famous practice direction, its own ones. | |||
On one hand, it should not make a difference that it is the same case. On the other, | |||
{{sa}} | {{sa}} |