LIBOR rigging: Difference between revisions

no edit summary
No edit summary
No edit summary
Line 22: Line 22:


==== Interest rate derivatives ====
==== Interest rate derivatives ====
As per the basic model, to manage their structural interest rate risk, banks ''generally'' would want LIBOR low — but deposits are not the only show in town. Banks have other exposures to the interest rate market. One notable category: [[Interest rate swap mis-selling scandal|interest rate swap]]<nowiki/>s.
{{drop|A|s per the}} “basic banking model”, to manage their structural interest rate risk, banks ''generally'' would want LIBOR low — but deposits are not the only show in town. Banks have other exposures to the interest rate market. One notable category: [[Interest rate swap mis-selling scandal|interest rate swap]]s.


Here, the bank “swaps” interest rates with individual (large) customers: it might, for an agreed period, pay one customer a fixed rate and receive from it a floating rate; with another it might pay floating and receive fixed.  
Here, the bank “swaps” interest rates with individual (large) customers: it might, for an agreed period, pay one customer a fixed rate and receive from it a floating rate; with another it might pay floating and receive fixed.  
Line 42: Line 42:
{{drop|T|he [[UK Finance|BBA]]’s guidance}} came in the form of “Instructions to BBA LIBOR Contributor Banks”. The critical part of these — what the court called the “LIBOR Definition” — ran as follows:
{{drop|T|he [[UK Finance|BBA]]’s guidance}} came in the form of “Instructions to BBA LIBOR Contributor Banks”. The critical part of these — what the court called the “LIBOR Definition” — ran as follows:


{{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute '''''the rate at which it could borrow funds''''', were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100.”}}
{{Quote|“An individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank will contribute ''the rate at which it could borrow funds'', were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100.”}}


On any day there would be a range of rates at which a bank ''could'' borrow. These might be firm offers from other lenders, good faith estimates or model outputs. There is an excellent [[subjunctive]] in there, by the way: “''were'' it to do so” implies that it need not actually do so.  
On any day there would be a range of rates at which a bank ''could'' borrow. These might be firm offers from other lenders, good faith estimates or model outputs. There is an excellent [[subjunctive]] in there, by the way: “''were'' it to do so” implies that it need not ''actually'' do so.  


Say the range of available rates on a given day was, as the court hypothesised, between 2.50% and 2.53%. Which of these was “the rate at which it could borrow funds”? Plainly, a submitter could not submit all of them.  
Say the range of available rates on a given day was, as the court hypothesised, between 2.50% and 2.53%. Which of these was “the rate at which it could borrow funds”? Plainly, a submitter could not submit all of them.  
Line 107: Line 107:


==== The Hayes appeal ====
==== The Hayes appeal ====
The Court of Appeal considered first a question of legal methodology: whose job was it to determine what the LIBOR Definition meant, and by reference to what?   
{{drop|T|he Court of}} Appeal considered first a question of legal methodology: whose job was it to determine what the LIBOR Definition meant, and by reference to what?   
{{Quote|The court was not confining itself, even “principally”, to the language of the BBA Definition but was taking into account the evidence ... as to how those particular submitters arrived at their submissions in practice. ... This means ... that the question of how the LIBOR Definition was to be construed was being treated as an issue of fact for the jury.}}
{{Quote|The court was not confining itself, even “principally”, to the language of the [LIBOR Definition] but was taking into account the evidence ... as to how those particular submitters arrived at their submissions in practice. ... This means ... that the question of how the LIBOR Definition was to be construed was being treated as an issue of fact for the jury.}}
The Court of Appeal disagreed. Under English law contractual interpretation is a matter of law, to be resolved by the judge. Evidence of market practice, or the belief of submitters, did not enter into it.  
The Court of Appeal disagreed. Under English law, contractual interpretation is a matter of law, to be resolved by the judge. Evidence of market practice, or the belief of submitters, did not enter into it.  


The Court of Appeal parsed the LIBOR Definition and interpreted it to mean the ''lowest'' of the submitted rates in the range:  
The Court of Appeal parsed the LIBOR Definition and interpreted it to mean the ''lowest'' of the submitted rates in the range:  
Line 125: Line 125:


{{quote|
{{quote|
Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. [...] '''The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact,” but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include'''. Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man.
Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. [...] ''The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact,” but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include''. Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man.
:—Lord Hoffman in {{cite|Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd|West Bromwich Building Society|1998|1 WLR|896}}}}
:—Lord Hoffman in {{cite|Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd|West Bromwich Building Society|1998|1 WLR|896}}}}


Line 134: Line 134:
Another: how ''everyone'' behaved when interacting with the LIBOR Definition helps work out what a reasonable person would have understood it to mean. There is no better indication of reasonableness than direct evidence of the behaviour of fellow [[Man on the Clapham Omnibus|passengers on the Clapham Omnibus]].
Another: how ''everyone'' behaved when interacting with the LIBOR Definition helps work out what a reasonable person would have understood it to mean. There is no better indication of reasonableness than direct evidence of the behaviour of fellow [[Man on the Clapham Omnibus|passengers on the Clapham Omnibus]].


There is here the odd spectre of the law of [[contract]] forming the backdrop, and comprising some of the elements of a criminal allegation. This is rare. Usually, the criminal authorities stay well out of commercial disputes, even where allegations of fraud are flying around — there is a civil tort of fraud — seeing it as a matter of civil loss between merchants perfectly able to look after themselves, and not one requiring the machinery of the state.   
There is here the odd spectre of the law of [[contract]] forming the backdrop and comprising some of the elements of a criminal allegation. This is rare. Usually, the criminal authorities stay well out of commercial disputes, even where allegations of fraud are flying around — there is a civil tort of fraud — seeing it as a matter of civil loss between merchants perfectly able to look after themselves, and not one requiring the machinery of the state.   


[[LIBOR]], on whom the mortgage repayments of unwitting retail punters depend, made things a bit different.  This is no private matter to be sorted out between gentlemen with revolvers. Nevertheless, still one must apply contractual principles, not criminal ones, to matters of contractual practice.  
[[LIBOR]], on whom the mortgage repayments of unwitting retail punters depend, made things a bit different.  This is no private matter to be sorted out between gentlemen with revolvers. Nevertheless, still one must apply contractual principles, not criminal ones, to matters of contractual practice.  


And the argument here is not about economic reality, but legal meaning, and legal meaning follows natural, ordinary meaning, and in the world of contractual interpretation, that is viewed from the perspective of the person performing the contract and [[Contra proferentem|against the draftsperson’s interest]], giving the benefit of the doubt to the reader.  
And the argument here is not about economic reality but legal meaning, and legal meaning follows natural, ordinary meaning, and in the world of contractual interpretation, that is viewed from the perspective of the person performing the contract and [[Contra proferentem|against the draftsperson’s interest]], giving the benefit of the doubt to the reader.  


The same doubt, as it happens, is given to defendants in case of ambiguously framed crimes. For if the LIBOR Definition meant to sanction mandate this “obvious” outcome, it did not do a very good job of it. As a matter of plain English, “could borrow” does not rule out a higher rate, but implies it: the Court of Appeal concedes as much, at para 89:  
The same doubt, as it happens, is given to defendants in case of ambiguously framed crimes. For if the LIBOR Definition meant to sanction mandate this “obvious” outcome, it did not do a very good job of it. As a matter of plain English, “could borrow” does not rule out a higher rate, but rather implies it: the Court of Appeal concedes as much, at para 89:  


{{Quote|A borrower “can” always borrow at a higher rate than the lowest one on offer.}}
{{Quote|The bank “could” borrow at that rate in the sense that it was a rate which was available, but that is obviously not what “could” means.}}
The “obviousness” to which the Court appeals here, is not a legal one — show me the authority for that — but one of a certain ''economic'' intuition. If that was the intended legal meaning it would have been really easy to fix it to it was clear.


But — per the wording in the LIBOR definition — there is an upper bound to that, delimited by the range of “inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100”. A submitter could not submit a rate higher than any actually offered, any more than it could submit a rate lower than the actually offered range. That would be dishonest.
But — per the wording in the LIBOR definition — there is an upper bound to that, delimited by the range of “inter-bank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 1100”. A submitter could not submit a rate higher than any actually offered, any more than it could submit a rate lower than the actually offered range.


But to construe “the rate at which it could borrow funds” to mean “the ''lowest'' rate ... ”, involves implying a term into the contract that is not there. It would have been easy enough for the old grandees to have put the matter beyond doubt before knocking the top off that ''Château de Chasselas'', with a single modifying adjective:  
But to construe “the rate at which it could borrow funds” to mean “the ''lowest'' rate ... ”, involves implying a term into the contract that is not there. It would have been easy enough for the old grandees to have put the matter beyond doubt before knocking the top off that ''Château de Chasselas'', with a single modifying adjective:  
Line 167: Line 168:
Now, seeing as the different desks and functions of a universal bank borrow in different markets, from different counterparties and in different circumstances, clearly, there will be no single unitary rate that the market will offer. The submitter will be confronted with a range of rates. Plainly it would be odd to submit a rate that was completely ''outside'' that range, but each of those rates counts as “''a'' rate at which it could borrow funds”.
Now, seeing as the different desks and functions of a universal bank borrow in different markets, from different counterparties and in different circumstances, clearly, there will be no single unitary rate that the market will offer. The submitter will be confronted with a range of rates. Plainly it would be odd to submit a rate that was completely ''outside'' that range, but each of those rates counts as “''a'' rate at which it could borrow funds”.


 
====Stare decisis====
This is a real lawyer nerd-out but the court considered the effect of [[Doctrine of precedent|precedent]] on its decision and was confronted with an odd scenario. A given court is generally bound by its own prior decisions in analogous cases.  Usually, these cases are unrelated. Here the prior decisions were interlocutory hearings in ''this actual case'', where certain legal points were escalated to the Court of Appeal during the high court trial.


{{sa}}
{{sa}}